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
# SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

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ESSENTIALS OF  
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY



# ESSENTIALS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY


BY  
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"INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY"  
"ESSENTIALS OF AMERICANIZATION"

*NEW AND ENLARGED  
EDITION*

1920  
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PRESS  
LOS ANGELES





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First Edition, September 1918

Second Edition, April 1920

602087

16.2.55

Jesse Ray Miller  
University of Southern California Press  
Los Angeles

DEDICATED TO  
EDITH PRITCHARD BOGARDUS





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## PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION

(*Abridged*)

This book is written specifically for the purpose of developing the problem-solving method of education in the field of social psychology. To this end the main attention has been given to the formulation of the "problems" which appear in connection with the themes of each chapter. Each of the problems has been tried out in the classroom and found to produce constructive thought on the part of students. These exercises are intended to set the student at work and to stimulate him to do his own thinking.

The instructor should encourage the pupils to begin the study of each chapter with the problems. If the student has an inadequate background for giving his attention first to the exercises, he may read the context, not as an end in itself, but as a method of preparation for attacking the exercises. The context of each chapter should not be "remembered," but utilized as a means of finding answers, seeing new relationships, and making new discoveries. If the student comes into the class *remembering*, this book is intended to send him out *thinking*.

The second aim of the author has been to write a treatise which would meet the needs of the undergraduate student in colleges, junior colleges, and normal schools. The subject of social psychology is of



such vital, far-reaching, and practical importance that every college student should be introduced to a scientific consideration of the field. Every such student is compelled to study the psychology of the individual; but few are required or even encouraged to study the psychology of the interactions of individuals in their multifarious group relationships. Surely the latter phenomena are as vitally important as the former.

A third need which this book aims to meet is to give a new organization of the subject matter of social psychology. The writer believes that social psychology begins with the psychological bases of human interactions and ends with the group methods of developing socialized personalities; he aims to traverse the field between these two points.

The writer is indebted to so many authors that it is impossible to make adequate acknowledgments. The interest of the writer in the subject was awakened by Professor G. H. Mead; the books and syllabi which have been the most helpful are those of Professors McDougall, Tarde, Ross, Howard, Baldwin, and Ellwood. For the stimulus to develop the problem-solving method of teaching and for encouragement in the preparation of the manuscript, I am indebted to Dr. E. C. Moore. For many of the problems that are given at the close of each chapter, I am under obligation to various persons, but chiefly Professor Ross and my advanced students. Sometimes a re-phrasing of a quotation or quoted exercise has been necessary, in which case it has not been feasible to use quotation marks and thus to indicate my indebtedness. The encouragement and suggestions of Professor George Elliott

Howard, who has read the manuscript, are gratefully acknowledged.

E. S. B.

*University of Southern California*

*February 21, 1918.*

## PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION

In this edition the problems have been re-stated and increased in number. They carry the gist of the argument.

The subject matter has been re-written and elaborated. The original eight chapters have grown into fifteen chapters. Several special topics have been given extended analysis.

EMORY S. BOGARDUS.

*University of Southern California,*

*January 1, 1920.*





# ESSENTIALS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

## CHAPTER I.

### THE FIELD, DEVELOPMENT, AND LITERATURE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

1. *The Field.* Social psychology is the study of the interactions of personalities in groups. It is based upon the facts and principles of general psychology. It begins with an interpretation of the human mind in action. It involves a knowledge of the nature and the functions of mental processes. This preliminary field of study includes an understanding of the nature and types of the instinctive, the habitual, and the conscious reactions of the mind. Upon analysis the conscious reactions of a person show three phases: affective, cognitive, and volitional.

Upon the conclusions of functional psychology, the social psychologist builds. The first independent step is to analyze and to understand the traits of human personalities. In the vocabulary of social psychology, personality is the first outstanding term. Personalities are composed of distinguishing peculiarities which combine to form individuality; personalities also possess frequently recurring similarities which constitute sociality. Social psychology generally uses the term, individual, in referring to the unit member of a group

of persons; and the term, individuality, in describing that phase of personality which distinguishes one member of a group from another. First of all, the social psychologist studies personalities with their two-fold nature—individuality and sociality.

The social elements of personalities are similar and manifold. The social personality is a rich field for the social psychologist. The social instincts stand out prominently. An extensive knowledge of them is basic to a fundamental appreciation of the interactions of personalities. They underlie the growth of personal character and social institutions. Common examples are the gregarious, the sex and parental, and the curiosity instincts. Then there are other closely related phases of the social personality which invite examination. These elements include sympathy, the emotions, and the sentiments. The social character represents the inner citadel of personality. The social-mirror, or socially reflected, self is one of the strongest determinants in human life and progress. Language results from the attempts of persons to communicate with one another in the give-and-take of group life. Laughter is a personal trait which as a rule is stimulated by incongruous social situations, or by ideas that represent incongruous social situations. Then there is that vast, variegated suggestion-imitation phase of personality which challenges the best thinking of the social psychologist.

The consideration of the suggestion-imitation elements of personality leads the student out into the field of group phenomena. Personalities interacting in groups constitute the very heart and kernel of social psychology. At once suggestion-imitation phenomena

take on the character of fashion imitation and custom imitation. These types of social action in turn may be analyzed and re-classified under the titles of irrational imitation, rational imitation, and socio-rational imitation.

The complementary aspects of imitation are found in invention. Invention is closely related in its nature to discovery; and both are inherently similar to leadership. In social psychology one of the high peaks of observation and study is social leadership.

Leadership implies the conditions of group life. These conditions may be either temporary or permanent. Social psychology gives special attention to temporary groupings, chief of which are the crowd, the mob, and the assembly. The public may be either temporary or permanent; it may be considered a transitional phenomenon between temporary and permanent groups.

An inquiry into the nature of permanent groupings logically involves an investigation of the rise of group and social consciousness. The social psychology of patriotism, or group loyalty, is vitally important. Group loyalties result in group conflicts, which produce social changes.

The social psychology of group life includes an examination of group control, or social control. The unanswered question arises: How much and what kind of control shall the group exercise in order that the individual members may perfect their personalities to the highest degree and at the same time co-ordinate themselves and function as one brain in ways that constitute group progress?

It is the individual who imitates, who works over the ideas and technique of his time into new and advanced forms; it is the group which appropriates and adopts the inventions of the few. The group possesses power to encourage human personalities to the extent that nearly everyone may become an inventor and contributor to progress, or it may carelessly or deliberately stifle initiative, thereby destroying personalities and inviting group stagnation and retrogression. Social control should function so that personalities may perfect themselves in both the individuality and sociality phases of their natures, and so that groups and human society may progress.

To some writers, social psychology consists chiefly of a study of the social nature and the social activities of the individual. To other authors, social psychology includes in the main an analysis of the operations of suggestion and imitation in society. The first method is essentially subjective, genetic, and psychological; the second interpretation is largely objective and sociological.

Fortunately, these two views of our subject are converging. The new science of social psychology is developing its own methodology and speaking from its own vantage ground. Its sector of the field of the social sciences is that important territory which lies in the main between psychology and sociology, which for whole stretches is entirely uncultivated, and which in other places is tilled by both the psychologists and sociologists. Instead of permitting its advance to be directed from either psychological or sociological headquarters, social psychology is developing its own

technique and programs, but is remaining subject, of course, to the rules of scientific and social science procedure.<sup>1</sup>

Social psychology lends itself to the problem-solving method of study. The student must assume not a memorizing attitude, but a problem-solving method of approach. He will read not to memorize, but in order to find answers and solutions. As no one can develop skill as a marksman except by aiming at targets in his practice work, so no student can acquire thorough methods, for example, in social psychology, except by keeping targets constantly before his mind. Who is more foolish than a would-be marksman who spends hour after hour in shooting in all directions, but at no particular target? Target-hitting is the worth-while achievement in marksmanship and problem-solving is the valuable goal in studying social psychology. It is expected that the student of social psychology, who uses this book will give his major attention to the problems at the close of each chapter. He is urged to search his own mind, his own experiences, and the experiences of others, for solutions of the given exercises. Then the subject matter of the respective chapters may be consulted in order to secure additional light, and finally the readings at the close of each chapter will afford further guidance.

The line of procedure in social psychology is inductive, evolutionary, and cumulative. It moves from the particular to the general, from the individual to

<sup>1</sup>According to another view, social psychology has no distinct field of its own and must be considered as either psychology or sociology; but the probabilities are that time will prove this conception to be a mistaken one.



the group, from the group to mankind, and it culminates in the subject of social progress. Social psychology approaches the problem of life from its own viewpoint which is psychological in origin and sociological in outlook. It begins with the socio-functional conclusions of psychology and ends in the presentation of societary principles, which underlie all sound reasoning in sociology. Social psychology is the scientific study of the social nature and reactions of the human mind, of the interactions of minds, of group conflicts and change, and of social control and progress. The quintessence of social psychology is found in personalities interacting within groups.

2. *The Development and Literature of Social Psychology.* Social psychology is one of the youngest of the specific social sciences. It is in the making. In the United States the subject did not command widespread attention until 1908. At the beginning of the present century there was no book in America that bore the title, social psychology; and only one that printed the term in its sub-title. Although the subject received recognition in Europe earlier than in the United States, its organized development has acquired headway chiefly in the last decade in our country. It has now won an established place in the curricula of our colleges and universities and of our leading normal schools.

In another sense, social psychology is one of the oldest studies. Since the beginning of human society upon the earth, man has been interested in, and has given thought to, the interactions of personalities in



group life. The primitive tribe had its phenomena of individual ascendancy and social ascendancy which attracted the attention of the most advanced members. The tribal chieftain made rough calculations concerning the probable actions of his subjects when experiencing the exuberance of victory or the gloom of defeat. The Australian Blackfellow who put a taboo upon young cocoanuts in order to protect them and to have a supply of them on a given feast day possessed a rudimentary knowledge of the principles of individual ascendancy. The African belle who wore thirty pounds of copper ornaments upon her ankles in order to outdo a rival who could wear only twenty-five pounds was interested in the social psychology of fashion.

It is not until the days of the Greeks that we find evidences of extensive thought in the field of social psychology. Plato gave expression to many sound observations of a social psychological nature. If one person accumulates wealth, others will imitate. As a result, all the citizens will become lovers of money.<sup>2</sup> Plato supported custom imitation and opposed fashion imitation. Customs represent the ripe fruitage of the centuries.<sup>3</sup> The chief advantage of laws is not that they make men honest but that they cause them to act uniformly and hence in a socially dependable way.<sup>4</sup> Plato pointed out the parallelism between a just society and a just individual, and that the conduct of individuals in the mass is predictable.

<sup>2</sup>*Republic*, (tr. by Jowett), 550 D, E; cf. *Laws*, (tr. by Jowett), 742, 791.

<sup>3</sup>*Laws*, 772.

<sup>4</sup>*Statesman*, (tr. by Jowett), see bks. IX-XII.

According to Aristotle man is a political animal, that is to say, man lives by necessity in association.<sup>5</sup> Social organization, to Aristotle, is not as important as social attitudes. All people must become socially-minded before there can be a perfect government. The "social mean" plays a leading part in Aristotle's ideal society. The existence of only two classes in society—the very rich and the very poor—spells social disaster. Society is safe when the middle class is in control.<sup>6</sup> Aristotle analyzed the psychological weakness of communism when he wrote, "For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it."<sup>7</sup> In the mind of the renowned philosopher, social process and development are ever uppermost.

In the beginning of the modern period of thought, Sir Thomas More showed marvelous insight into the nature and causes of human actions. Fashion imitation was forestalled in Utopia.<sup>8</sup> Laws in Utopia are few<sup>9</sup> because the people are so well instructed and so socially-minded that numerous laws are needless. In not allowing the Utopians to vote immediately upon new issues, More shrewdly safeguarded them against the dangers of crowd emotion. More stood for freedom of opinion and recognized the group value of sympathy.

David Hume has been called the father of social psychology. Upon the basis of the instincts and of

<sup>5</sup>*Politics*, (tr. by Jowett), I, 2.

<sup>6</sup>*Politics*, IV, 11.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, II, 3.

<sup>8</sup>*Utopia*, (Bohn's Libraries), pp. 148, 149.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 93.

sympathy, he analyzed society. The sentiment of sympathy develops into intelligent co-operation. Intellectual control of society is a relatively late phase of social evolution. Against the influence of environmental forces upon man, Hume placed the power of imitation and declared that group conformity is due more to imitation than to environment. It is these ideas of Hume that answered completely the contract theory of society which prevailed at that time.

In 1859, Moritz Lazarus and Heymann Steinthal founded the *Zeitschrift für Völker-Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, which they edited jointly until 1890. In this journal psychological analyses of the traits, peculiarities, and group activities of primitive peoples were made. Subsequently, a historical and analytical résumé of social origins appeared in William Wundt's *Elements of Folk Psychology*. The original work of W. I. Thomas in this field is published in *Sex and Society*, *Source Book for Social Origins*, and *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (particularly volume one). In this same field, Sumner's *Folkways* and Hobhouse's *Morals in Evolution* are classics.

Fundamental pioneering in social psychology was done by Lester F. Ward. In 1883, *Dynamic Sociology* was published. In it and in *Psychic Factors in Civilization* and *Applied Sociology*, Ward made clear the importance of psychic factors in social evolution. In the development of society, the psychic forces are gradually acquiring strength. Ultimately, they will assume control over the physical and the biological forces. While his psychology does not stand present-

day tests, Ward nevertheless was one of the founders of social psychology.

Gabriel Tarde may be called the chief founder of our subject. In 1890 he published *Les lois de l'imitation*, which established his reputation as an authority on the psychology of society. Through his work as a jurist he became interested in the causes of human conduct and in the nature of social processes. He declared that to understand society one must know how human minds act and interact. Through interaction they become alike. Imitation is the key to the process. Opposition between imitations occurs, and inventions result. Although the English publicist, Walter Bagehot, had written a chapter on "Imitation" in his remarkable book, *Physics and Politics*, as early as 1872, Tarde was the first person to set forth comprehensively the laws of imitation. *The Laws of Imitation* is the best single volume on that subject. Other valuable books by this author for the student of social psychology are *La logique sociale*, *L'opposition universelle*, and *L'opinion et la foule*. In the *Social Laws*, Tarde gives a succinct summary of his main theories concerning the psychical processes that are taking place in society. Tarde's conception of imitation is well summarized and criticized by Michael M. Davis, Jr., in his *Psychological Interpretations of Society*. In this book Dr. Davis reviews historically and critically the literature of a socio-psychological nature. The influence of Tarde has been far-reaching. A unique tribute of indebtedness to Tarde has been given by E. A. Ross.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup>Preface, *Social Psychology*.



In 1892 the *Psychologie der Suggestion* by H. Schmidkunz was published. This book is a pioneer work in the field in which *The Psychology of Suggestion* (1911) by Boris Sidis has become a well-known American treatise. In 1895 there appeared the *Psychologie des foules* by Gustave Le Bon. This volume at once created phenomenal interest in the psychology of crowds. In *The Psychology of Revolution* (with special analysis of the French Revolution), and in *The Psychology of the Great War*, as well as in Le Bon's other works, the reader needs to be prepared for an overemphasis of crowd psychology and for a marked lack of confidence in the proletariat. In *The Psychology of Peoples* Le Bon gives a brief description of the leading European races.

In 1896 the *Principles of Sociology* by F. H. Giddings developed the thesis that in social evolution there is an increasing consciousness of kind, or of kindred interests, which becomes the chief working principle in social processes. In the following year (1897), *Social and Ethical Interpretations* by J. Mark Baldwin was printed. The sub-title is "A Study in Social Psychology." This was the first time that the term, social psychology, was used in America in a title of a book. It presents from the genetic viewpoint a fundamental analysis of the nature and characteristics of the social self. Thus, two books of far-reaching importance appeared almost simultaneously, one by a sociologist and the other by a psychologist. They both hastened the development of an organic social psychology.

In 1902 C. H. Cooley's first book, *Human Nature and the Social Order* was published. At once it was

accepted as an authority on the integral relationship of the individual self and the social self. The well-balanced, accurate scholarship of Dr. Cooley receives further expression in his *Social Organization* and *Social Process*. Professor Cooley's three books should be studied in the order in which they are mentioned here. They are the chronological development of a logical and penetrating system of thought in social psychology. The first volume elaborates the concept of the self in its relations to group life; the second explains the nature of primary groups, of the democratic mind, and of social classes; the third defines the many elements in the process by which society is characterized. The central theme of the three books is that the individual and society are aspects of the same entity and that the individual and society are twin-born and twin-developed.

The Tardian social psychology was taken up by E. A. Ross, who has gone far beyond Tarde, not only in his treatment of conventionality and custom imitation, but in producing a *chef-d'oeuvre* on the subject of social control. Professor Ross' *Social Psychology* (1908) has been widely read. It appeared in the same year that William McDougall's *An Introduction to Social Psychology* was first printed. These two books by Ross and McDougall established social psychology as a definite branch of knowledge.

Professor Ross used the sociological and objective method in handling his subject; Mr. McDougall utilized the psychological and subjective viewpoint. The latter made a detailed diagnosis of the springs of social action which he found in the social instincts of the



individual. He gives primarily the psychological premises of social psychology and affords the student a fundamental discussion of the social instincts and of their functioning in group life. Dr. Ross, on the other hand, does not inquire into the social nature of personality nor into the genesis of the social attitudes of persons. He discusses intensively and uniquely the nature of suggestion-imitation phenomena. Custom imitation, conventionality, and fashion imitation are favorite themes. While Ross' *Social Psychology* is Tardian in its origin, it manifests the rare originality and phrase-making power of its author. Where Mr. McDougall concludes his analysis, Professor Ross begins; their two books have little in common except the title. Consequently, a controversy has arisen over the question: Shall social psychology be studied subjectively or objectively? The psychologists insist upon the subjective method; the sociologists urge the objective approach. I believe that the subjective analyses naturally precede the objective, that the two blend together well, and that in the blended regions the new science of social psychology will find its citadels of strength. Professor Ross' *Social Control* is the best book upon that subject; it constitutes an excellent supplement or complement to his *Social Psychology*.

In his syllabus, *Social Psychology* (1910), George Elliott Howard maintains the sociological viewpoint. Dr. Howard has prepared the best analytical reference syllabus (including the most comprehensive bibliography) that is available. Professor Howard planned volume XII of the "Publications of the American Sociological Society." It is entitled, *Social Control*,

and contains thirteen papers which deal with the history and the problems of social control and which constitute an indispensable document for the social psychologist. The initial paper which was written by Professor Howard and which bears the title, "Ideals as a Factor in the Future Control of International Society," is a *magnum opus*.

Charles A. Ellwood in *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1917) writes as a sociologist who constantly keeps in mind the psychological viewpoint. The book contains a careful and synthetic discussion of the nature and function of the chief psychic elements that operate in social life. A valuable analysis of social change under normal and abnormal conditions is made. *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects* (1912) by the same author is an earlier and standard work.

Italian contributions are represented by Paolo Orano's *Psicologia sociale*, which includes only a partial treatment of the subject. Scipio Sighele in *La foule criminelle* and the *Psychologie des sectes* has given a detailed analysis of groups.

*The Great Society* by Graham Wallas is a penetrating, philosophic discussion of social process and organization. The social psychology of business and industrial life has been indicated by Thorstein Veblen in *The Theory of Business Enterprise*, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, and *The Instinct of Workmanship*. An incisive inquiry into the nature of psychosociological forces and especially of social control is made by E. C. Hayes in his *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*.

The primary group of books for the student of our subject is the standard works on the principles of psychology. The psychologies which bear the names of James, Royce, Stout, Titchener, Thorndike, Angell, Pillsbury, and other authorities are invaluable. They give the most important bases of our science. For further references and for citations of leading articles, the reader is directed to the lists at the end of each chapter and to the selected bibliography at the close of this book. Although social psychology is new as a field of organized and scientific study, it already possesses a large and increasing body of literature.

To the writer, social psychology begins with the psychological analyses of human personality. It centers attention upon the social traits of personality as they express themselves under group stimuli, and upon the resultant group activities. It concludes its work by evaluating the method of group, or social, control in terms of socialized personalities. In brief, the interactions of personalities in groups is the interesting and attractive field which the student of social psychology is invited to explore.

## PROBLEMS

1. Before you began this study, what meaning did the term "social psychology" have to you?
2. What is the relation of psychology to social psychology?
3. What relation does social psychology bear to sociology?
4. What connection do you observe between so-

cial psychology and the psychological phases of sociology?

5. Which is the more important for the study of social psychology, a knowledge of psychology or of sociology?

6. Explain the statement that formerly psychology was individualistic in its interpretations.

7. Why has the American been primarily an individualist?

8. Is the American youth today more of an individualist than his father?

9. Which is the more useful, the study of individual psychology or the study of social psychology?

10. Distinguish between racial psychology and social psychology.

11. What meaning do you see in the terms "individual ascendancy" and "social ascendancy"?

12. Would an abnormal development of either individual ascendancy or social ascendancy be good for a community?

13. When do you feel of greater importance—on a mountain alone, or as a member of a multitude of people?

14. Is social psychology an old or new subject?

15. What is the primary cause of the rise of social psychology?

16. Why has David Hume been called the father of social psychology?

17. Why does Gabriel Tarde occupy a high place among the founders of social psychology?

18. Why is 1908 a red letter year in the rise of social psychology?

19. What is your highest aim in studying social psychology?

20. As a student of social psychology what constitutes your laboratory?

21. Do you expect that the study of social psychology will make you more dependent upon others, or more independent of others?

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## CHAPTER II.

# PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

The study of social psychology is based on a knowledge of psychological principles. It is apropos that attention be given here to those facts of psychology which are essential to an understanding of the field.

Psychology may be divided into two branches, structural and functional. The former treats chiefly of the states of consciousness, while the latter describes the mind in action. It is in functional psychology that the social psychologist is directly interested. Functional psychology furnishes the principles for interpreting the social nature of personality and for understanding the interactions of personalities in group life. According to functional psychology there are three general classes of mental reactions, namely, (1) instinctive, (2) habitual, and (3) conscious.

1. *Instinctive Reactions.* Instinctive tendencies are based on ready-made, inborn co-ordination. They arise from tropistic and reflex activities. They are the organism's stock in trade at birth. They are psychical acquisitions which are biologically transmitted. They are ancestral ways of meeting common problems and conditions of life in primitive times. They have cut so deep into the neural system that they have become

a real part of the organism and hence are biologically passed on from one generation to the next.

An instinct is a neurologically established way of meeting a given situation. It is a tendency to do this or that thing. It is set off automatically, and always in the same way, whenever the organism receives a certain stimulus. It has evolved in the process of adaptation of species to environment. It is a triple alliance of "sense-stimulus, central adjustment, and muscular response." An instinct is a crude, blind, and ready-made unit of behavior for solving frequently recurring problems. It serves the individual well until he finds himself face to face with an absolutely new problem.

An instinct is a way of acting (1) which promotes the welfare of the individual himself, (2) which perpetuates the species, or (3) which may even advance the welfare of the species. These ends, however, are not ordinarily sought consciously. The chick which hears the warning cluck and runs to the mother hen does not stop to inform itself that it must run to cover for self-preservation. The warning cry was the sense-impression to which the chick automatically responded. Chicks that do not respond to warning calls soon lose their lives; those that heed promptly are saved, and become the progenitors of a line of chicks which are characterized by this type of instinctive behavior.

In the same way the instincts which function to perpetuate the species operate blindly, and not because the desire is present to increase the number of the members of the species. The prevalence of large

families a century ago in the United States, or today among the poorer classes, does not mean at all that the parents in question were or are motivated by definite plans to build up the race numerically.

Instincts which serve to advance human welfare function as a rule in unconscious ways. A large proportion of self-sacrificing, altruistic deeds are performed without thought of benefitting the race, e. g., the multitudinous acts of self-sacrifice of the mother in behalf of her infant. It is highly fortunate, in fact, that social conduct can be reduced in a large percentage of instances to instinctive reactions.

The innate, or inherited, tendencies are the essential springs or motive forces of feeling, thought, and action—whether individual or collective.<sup>1</sup> They are the foundations from which personality develops; they are the elementary factors upon which character is constructed. All that we learn and all our mastery of life is built upon the basis of our equipment of instincts. Our later adaptations are modifications of these original, inherited reactions.

An instinct cannot be developed in one's life time; neither can it be rooted out in a life time. It can, of course, be greatly modified, or entirely covered up as far as observers are concerned. The instincts remain exceedingly close to the core of personality—to the inmost citadel of one's self, which is rarely disclosed to others.

The instincts are also at the root of societary life. The interactions between personalities possess in-

<sup>1</sup>The best chapter on this point is William McDougall's, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Ch. II.

instinctive traits. The leading social structures and institutions have had their origins in instincts. Behind fraternal organizations and even nation-states is the silent, powerful operation of the gregarious instinct. The family as a social institution arises from the sex and parental impulses. The institutions of private property and inheritance developed from the acquisitive instinct.

2. *Habitual Reactions.* The failure of an instinct to function successfully in a new situation leads to the appearance of consciousness and to the reconstruction of the instinctive ways of acting. The modification of the instinctive reaction may be slight, or it may be so extensive that it changes the course of the instinct. The modification when repeated many times becomes habitual. Both new and old habits themselves may prove faulty under new conditions, and through the action of consciousness may be made over. Hence, habits are modifications of instincts or of previously formed habits.

It should be stated here that the concept of "crisis," as used by W. I. Thomas, is a useful tool.<sup>2</sup> Whenever an established way of doing, either instinctive or habitual, proves inadequate, a crisis has occurred. Attention is at once centered upon the established reaction which has failed, and it is altered to meet the new needs. Repetition of the alteration results in the establishment of a new habit. A "crisis" may be either individual or social or both.

The small boys who lived in one corner of a rural

<sup>2</sup>This valuable concept is explained in detail in the *Source Book for Social Origins* by W. I. Thomas, pp. 18 ff.

school district in Illinois were accustomed to walk to and from school in a single, winding file across the farmers' fields. By taking a cross-country route the distance to school was considerably shortened. Further, the boys had the pleasure of making a path across the fields. One spring morning when the boys were moving joyfully along this path which led through a waving oat field, they were unexpectedly intercepted by an irate farmer—the owner of the field. A crisis occurred. Habits were challenged and a new way of going to school was sought, and found.

The actions of the lower forms of animal life are chiefly tropistic, reflex, or instinctive. Within narrow limits, higher animals adapt their instinctive reactions to peculiar or new circumstances, and acquire rudimentary habits. Man modifies his instincts so completely that they operate almost entirely in hidden ways. If his gregarious instinct causes him to concentrate his attention on a few friends, he is dubbed cliquish. If his sex instinct causes him "to make love" in public, he is at once ridiculed. If his acquisitive instinct moves him to express frankly his desire to accumulate wealth, he is referred to insinuatingly as a lover of mammon. In consequence, man conceals the instinctive desires behind camouflaged habits. He suppresses the open expression of instinctive tendencies with a set of habitual ways of doing which meet the demands of propriety and society.

It is the privilege of human beings deliberately to modify their instincts and habits, and to build up new habits which will make them masters of themselves and to a degree of their environment. Within limits,



a young person who has a normal social environment can acquire habits in almost any direction that he wills. It is a fortunate child who has parents and teachers who impress him with the fact that he can plan his habits, and deliberately set out to build up a constructive habitual way of acting.

Virtues and vices are striking illustrations of habit. He who teaches a child to build constructive habits into his neurological system is one of the greatest benefactors of mankind. He who influences a child to develop negative habits, or permits him to do so, is in that regard anti-social.

Habit is a leading factor in accelerating or hindering social advance. Ordinarily too little attention is given to the constructive nature of habit.<sup>3</sup> (1) Habit is a valuable time-saver, both individually and socially. Suppose that the grocer had to learn to read every time that he filled an order for a customer, that an engineer had to learn to operate an engine whenever he started out upon his regular run, or that a banker had to learn the numeral system whenever he transacted business for a patron—these suppositions indicate the almost inconceivable dependence of modern social processes upon habit.

(2) Habit increases both individual and social accuracy. Note the difference between driving a nail the first time and the twentieth. Compare the accuracy of a piano novice and a Paderewski. Observe the difference in movements and despatch of a group of recruits and a trained regiment. It is strangely

<sup>3</sup>Two splendid chapters on this subject are in William James' *Psychology* (briefer course) and in W. D. Scott's *Increasing Human Efficiency in Business*.



true that nothing is well done until it is done by habit. Reliability and thoroughness depend on habit.

(3) Habit enables one to do a large amount of work with a relatively small degree of fatigue. The first hundred miles that one drives an automobile in learning is more wearing upon him than the second thousand miles that he drives. The learning processes in any field are usually very fatiguing until they become habitual. Reduction of new processes to habit releases the energy of the individual for new activities and enables him to accomplish a large amount of work with a minimum expenditure of strength.

(4) Habit releases the mind from the necessity of paying attention to the details of the successive steps of an act. He who has a large number of well-established constructive habits is free to center his whole attention to the best advantage on the problem of the hour. If it is true that the man who is in the grip of habit is a slave, it may be also true that he is the best prepared to advance. He is a slave when the habit is destructive; he is a fortunately free man if the habit is constructive. Destructive habits are often acquired as a result of unconscious adaptation. Unless individuals are taught or are wise enough to build up constructive habits, unconscious and passive adaptation will likely bring about destructive or useless habits. Life is a contest between personality and habit. If we do not acquire constructive habits, destructive habits will acquire us. Herein lies the difference between individual freedom and slavery.

(5) Habit means to have. Habit gives possession; it gives permanency to one's experiences. A

city milkman who left his horse and wagon at the curb for a moment was surprised upon his return to see the horse, with the milk cans rolling from the wagon, pursuing at a gallop the fire department's wagon that had passed. Several years previously the horse had become a well-trained member of the fire department, and on this occasion his former habits had been immediately stimulated by the clanging gong of the fire department's wagon. Although I learned to ride a bicycle several years ago, it has now been five years since I have ridden. But I would not hesitate today to get on a bicycle and start off, and within a few minutes I should expect to feel perfectly at home again upon a "wheel." The process of riding was long ago reduced to a habit which remains with me. To reduce one's constructive ways of doing, of thinking, and of judging to habit is a valuable enterprise. Such a process is the essence of learning.

(6) Habits signify stability. A person with strength of character possesses a number of well-organized habits. The reliability of a person is due to the fact that he has habits and hence acts with a certain uniformity in given situations. His honesty or dishonesty is largely a matter of habit; he who is trusted is ordinarily the person who is honest by habit. Reliable habits are socially negative or positive. According to his habits, a person is entirely dependable—dependable to vote for the saloon, dependable to accept the easy task, dependable to exploit, dependable to beg, dependable to steal. Another person can be depended on to vote for child welfare measures, to refuse bribes, to render public service at the expense

of his own business. The highest type of habits is socialized habits, whereby the individual habitually responds to public welfare or to individual welfare which is in line with public welfare.

But habitual reactions are subordinate in importance to conscious activities. It is through consciousness that personality grows and becomes more useful.

(3) *Conscious Reactions.* Besides instinctive and habitual tendencies, there are marginal reactions of a conscious nature. Conscious reactions are made chiefly at those points where the neuro-physiological mechanism is incapable of meeting the demands of the environment, that is, where instincts and habits fail. Consciousness appears where changes, or new adjustments are necessary; it is the chief factor in the process which is known as adjustment to environment, and particularly in active adaptation. Conscious reactions have three characteristics: (1) affective, or the feeling phase; (2) cognitive, or the thinking phase; and (3) volitional, or the willing phase.<sup>4</sup>

The feelings are a development of the instinctive side of life. At the council table of consciousness, the instincts have representation in the form of the feelings. Although as old in its origin as the instinctive tendencies, the feeling side of life developed later, phylogenetically, than the instincts. The feelings are the pleasant or unpleasant tones of consciousness.<sup>5</sup> An idea which furthers my momentary interests is at once accompanied by an agreeable tone of

<sup>4</sup>Cf. I. E. Miller, *The Psychology of Thinking*, pp. 64 ff.

<sup>5</sup>Cf. C. A. Ellwood, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Ch. XIV.

consciousness; while an idea which thwarts those interests is instantaneously undermined by a disagreeable feeling.<sup>6</sup> An act which as a rule has been favorable in the past to the organism or to the race or to both produces an agreeable tone of consciousness. If some one were to suggest to me at the present moment a visit to the dentist's chair, I should suffer an unpleasant tone of consciousness, because my early experiences in the dentist's chair were exceedingly painful. On the other hand if some one were to suggest to me a beefsteak fry in the Rockies, I should experience a highly agreeable tone of consciousness. In fact the simple thought of frying beefsteak gives me a pleasant feeling.

The agreeable or disagreeable tone appears quickly and in far less time than is required to analyze and to evaluate the given suggestion. In other words, the feeling character of consciousness gives a quicker-than-thought evaluation to a proposed activity upon the basis of past experience, not only of the organism itself, but also of the race. It was this conception which Plato undoubtedly had in mind when he said that there are two counsellors in one's bosom, one is pleasure and the other is pain.<sup>7</sup>

A pleasurable feeling that accompanies a given idea indicates that in the history of the organism, or of the race, the group of acts to which the given idea is related has been helpful and constructive. The pleasurable tone implies but does not necessarily prove the present value of a given act. The fact that a certain type of acts in the past has been helpful or harmful

<sup>6</sup>Cf. J. R. Angell, *Psychology*, Ch. XIV.

<sup>7</sup>*Laws*, tr. by Jowett, p. 644.



indicates that in all probability this type will continue to be helpful or harmful. If conditions change, however, this implication will probably not be realized.

People are peculiarly alike in their feelings—an observation which is due to the fact that people have had about the same racial experience. In this long racial history, certain ways of doing have proved favorable to race development; and others, unfavorable. A given activity will fall into one of two main groupings of race experience and the reaction in all individuals who come in contact with this idea is the same—a pleasant or unpleasant tone of consciousness in accordance with the favorable or unfavorable race experience with this type of activity.

It is difficult to argue against the feelings. There are many reasons. An important explanation is that the feelings are outside the plane of cognition. Cognition can recognize, describe, and classify the events which lead to the expression of a given feeling, but can not do much else. An idea which is thrown against the feelings by way of an argument travels on an entirely different plane. The best way to “argue” against the feelings is to stimulate counter feelings.

Another cause of the difficulty of arguing against the feelings is the fact that the feelings developed much earlier, phylogenetically, than cognition. The feelings are older and more deep-seated than ideas. They are closer to the inner core of consciousness. Consequently they are not reached by the younger and less deep-rooted thought side of life.

A person who moves according to his feelings acts



usually in harmony with the dictates of race experience. In so far as racial history is similar to present conditions, he thus acts wisely. The conditions of life, however, whether physical or social, are constantly undergoing change. Hence, racial or even individual experience is not always a safe guide. Another factor is necessary, namely, cognition.

Cognition is the central nucleus of consciousness. Cognition developed to aid the organism to adjust itself to new factors in the environment. If there were no new problems to solve, then the feelings—representing past experience—would be adequate. In a social environment, characterized by change and marked by constantly arising new situations, the feelings are insufficient. An additional element is required; cognition meets this need. With the feeling side of consciousness to evaluate acts on the basis of past experience, and with the cognitive phase to evaluate acts on the basis of present conditions and future probabilities, a person is well equipped to solve the problems of life.

As the social environment is more changeable and gives rise to more new problems than the physical environment, cognition in a surprising degree is a social product. Its development has come in response to the changing elements in the social environment. It is probable that an average child who grew from birth to adult life with no social contacts, that is, outside group life, would not advance beyond a state of mental groveling. On the other hand, in the case of an ordinary individual, the effects of an unusually stimulating social and mental environment are clearly

seen. The term, "high potential of the city," coined by E. A. Ross, refers to the relatively large number of mental stimulations which come to an urban resident in a day and which normally result in increased mental activity.

The imagination is a vital phase of cognition. To imagine is to think of reality in terms of images. The purpose of imagination is to make the real seem more real. It operates even in abstract thinking. The public speaker continually utilizes images in order to present his ideas to his audience. The crowd or even the ordinary audience thinks almost entirely in terms of images. The advanced experimenter in the laboratory imagines one possible solution after another to a problem and proceeds to try out the imagined solutions consecutively until he comes upon the correct combination. His success depends in part upon his ability to imagine a variety of experiments.

Imagination enables one to put himself in the place of others. According to Balzac, imagination permits one to slip into the skins of other persons. A selfish man is unable or unwilling to imagine himself in the positions of others. Imagination is a basic element in sympathy, and socialized imagination is essential to social progress.

Remembering is another element of the cognitive phase of consciousness. To remember is to think an idea that one has thought before with the added consciousness that one has thought it before. To remember is to re-create an idea that one has already thought about. The re-creating process means that in remembering, the individual may easily and unconsciously

change the character of the given idea. Hence the frequent inaccuracy in remembering.

Many persons blindly complain of their poor memories. Others patronize the so-called memory training schools and expend more energy in trying to memorize and utilize a set of abstract formulæ than is necessary in remembering by the use of natural methods. All who complain of poor memories overlook the fact that they are probably using only a small percentage of the retentive ability which they have inherited. They need to know that they can learn anything that they want to if they get interested in it sufficiently. They need to utilize the law of the association of ideas, that is, to analyze the given new idea and connect it, or some part of it, with an idea, or a train of ideas, that is already established. They need to learn the importance of expressing to others frequently that which they would remember.

The highest form of cognition is reason. Pure reason takes cognizance of factors present in neither time nor space; it considers a larger environment than that which is present to the senses. Reason is a supreme adjuster. It enables a person to adjust himself to the factors of a world environment. It assists an individual in becoming so adapted to his social and universal environments that he develops a perfected and socialized personality.

The third characteristic of consciousness is volition. Consciousness can make evaluations, not only upon the basis of past experience, and with reference to present needs and future probabilities, but it can also choose between several proposed activities and act

upon the given choice. In one sense volition is the choosing phase of consciousness; in another sense, it is the acting side of consciousness, that is, it is the individual acting.

While many choices are probably made upon bases which are largely determined by hereditary and environmental factors, there is left a certain margin wherein the individual may make choices. This margin of freedom in choosing is undoubtedly a result of selection. Individuals with a reserve of freedom survive better and are able to adjust themselves more satisfactorily to their social environment with its changing elements than persons without this advantage. The margin of choice would be useless in a static environment, or in a purely physical, materialistic, and mechanistic universe. Volition has its fundamental roots in the changing factors of social life. If not in its origin then in its development, volition is social.

The margin of freedom in making choices varies. When health conditions are unfavorable, when poverty pinches, when wealth inflates, the margin shrinks. For every person the margin varies from hour to hour. For nearly all persons and at nearly all times, this limited freedom in choosing is in many ways the most significant psychical characteristic that they possess.

The marginal degree of freedom means that personality is not completely plastic. Within limits, personality is independent of environment. Consciously and unconsciously a person continually makes choices among the countless stimuli with which he is bom-

barded. He acts within the range of his limited freedom and upon the basis of his organic needs and of his acquired habitual needs. These psychological boundaries denote the field within which personality develops.

Every person is active. Personality is activity. Personality expresses itself and to a degree makes over its environment. Since personality is activity, it possesses force, and it can make over the conditions under which it lives. Personality, moreover, is intelligent force and can exercise wisdom in modifying its environment. The more highly developed the personality, the greater the control that it may exercise over its conditions of life. The more socialized the personality, the greater the influence that it will wield in behalf of public welfare.

A person does not simply make choices, and rest there. He carries out the accepted idea. Every idea is dynamic and tends to carry itself out into action—this is the primary fact in acting and doing. If there are no inhibiting tendencies or obstructive environmental factors, acting and doing are easy. When the given choice arouses inhibitions or encounters environmental obstacles, action is difficult. Consequently, the individual must will to act; he must develop the habit of overcoming. The individual must be trained, and train himself to keep his eye upon and think of the gains which result from overcoming obstacles. The idea of public service may become so strong that individuals will regularly inhibit selfish impulses or overcome socially vicious temptations.

The result of acting and doing is learning. It is in



carrying choices into effect that one really learns the meaning of them. The experimental laboratory surpasses the class room because it offers many more opportunities for carrying out ideas. Discussions are superior to lectures because they provide an open field for expression. Action underlies learning. I could sit beside a chauffeur and watch him carefully in his handling of an automobile every day for a year, but at the end of that time I could not be a safe driver. It is in actual driving that I become trustworthy at the wheel. Action, therefore, leads to learning, achieving, progressing.

The psychological fundamentals of social psychology are instinctive, habitual, and conscious reactions. The latter possesses a complex, three-fold nature— affective, cognitive, and volitional. The discussion of these subjects leads to the theme of the three following chapters, the social personality, which is the first main topic in social psychology proper and one of the most attractive topics in the entire field.

## PROBLEMS

### (INSTINCTIVE REACTIONS)

1. What is an instinctive reaction?
2. What is the origin of instincts?
3. What is the most striking example of purely instinctive action that you can give?

4. Why are instincts common to people of every race?
5. Why can instincts never be eradicated from the mental constitution of the individual?
6. Distinguish between individual instincts and social instincts.
7. What social instincts can you name?
8. Illustrate the statement: Social institutions rest upon the basis of instincts.

(HABITUAL REACTIONS)

9. What is the origin of habits?
10. What is the derivation of the term, habit?
11. What is the underlying purpose of habits?
12. Criticize the statement: He instinctively closed the door.
13. Why are habits so commonly deprecated?
14. Give an original illustration of each of the following statements:
  - (a) Habit is a time-saver.
  - (b) Habit increases accuracy.
  - (c) Habit gives permanency to experience.
  - (d) Habit gives strength of character.
15. Explain: "Habit is the bank into which consciousness puts its deposits."
16. Explain: Speed which is habitual is never hurried.

17. Explain: The population of London would be starved in a week if the flywheel of habit were removed.

18. Why is it true that whatever is worth doing at all is worth doing well?

19. What is the habit of greatest usefulness that one can form?

20. How can you proceed psychologically to break a habit?

21. What classes of habits are the most difficult to overcome?

22. Which would represent a greater loss to the individual, the loss of his habits or the loss of his instincts?

23. Explain: "There is no more miserable person than one in whom nothing is habitual but indecision."

24. Which will be used in the following cases, instinct or habit?

(a) By an untrained puppy when his mistress appears with a plate of scraps.

(b) By a trained puppy under similar circumstances.

(c) By a salmon in a whirling current of a river.

(d) By a fireman who sees a house on fire.

(e) By a mother whose child is in imminent danger.

25. Compare the evils of occasional lying and habitual lying.

26. Name one good habit that you have formed during the past year.

## (CONSCIOUS REACTIONS)

*(General)*

27. When does consciousness arise in the experience of an individual?

28. In a qualitative sense which procedure is the more difficult to learn in each of the following cases:

(a) Writing or walking;

(b) Thinking or writing;

(c) Deciding "no" or deciding "yes"?

*(Affective)*

29. What does a pleasant feeling signify?

30. Why is it difficult to argue against the feelings?

31. Why are human beings so much alike in their feelings?

32. Why do you ever think?

33. Why are you thinking now?

34. When during your waking hours do you think least?

35. When do you think the most strenuously?

36. When do you do the highest grade of thinking?

37. Does a squirrel need to be more intelligent than a fish?

38. Does an architect need to be more intelligent than a mason?

39. Does a child of the tenements need to be more intelligent than a child of wealthy parents?

40. Is it true that no two persons can think exactly alike while any number can feel alike?

41. Why is it that the feeling side of consciousness expresses itself more quickly than the cognitive phase?

42. What is the imagining phase of cognition?

43. Is it true that the tap-root of selfishness is weakness of imagination?

44. Why are we more moved "by our neighbor's suffering from a corn on his great toe than by the starvation of millions in China"?

45. What is meant by a socialized imagination?

46. Is the intolerant, selfish nation the unimaginative nation?

47. What is remembering?

48. Is the average person today less able to remember than the average person three centuries ago?

49. In what way do adults have an advantage over children in being able to remember?

50. Is it true that the average student habitually begins the study of his lesson by memorizing "with the expectation of doing whatever thinking is necessary later"?

51. Is the examination system in universities psychologically sound?

52. Can one think quickly and well at the same time?

53. Explain: To think is dangerous.

54. What is reasoning?

55. What is the highest function of reasoning?

56. Why do so few people develop the reasoning phase of consciousness to its full extent, when it would be so greatly advantageous to do so?

57. When do you act most rationally?



58. Are the judgments which are made by men more impartial than those made by women?

59. Is it more common for a person to base his decision upon evidence, or to seek evidence to justify his decision?

*(Volitional)*

60. What is volition?

61. Give an original illustration of the statement: Thought is motor.

62. Can you distinguish between the statements: (a) Thought is motor; and (b) Ideas are dynamic.

63. Explain: We learn to worship through worshipping.

64. What is the meaning of learning by teaching?

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### CHAPTER III.

## THE SOCIAL PERSONALITY

We now find ourselves in the field of social psychology proper. We are at once confronted with living, interacting personalities. Personality is the first and in certain particulars the most important phenomenon which is considered by the social psychologist. A finely developed personality is the essence of leadership; and it is for the sake of producing well-balanced and civically-functioning personalities that society exists.

Personality is characterized by self-determination, or initiative, and by a sense of public responsibility. As stated in Chapter I, personality possesses two phases—individuality and sociality. Individuality and sociality are simply the two poles of the same entity—personality. Sociality, or the social personality, does not exist by itself; it is that side of one's nature which is most closely related to the welfare of others. It is that phase of human nature which creates and personifies the finest and deepest of social relationships. Sociality enables a person to enter into the problems of others and to embody in himself the best qualities of other persons. Sociality is the quintessence of the welfare of others.

Upon examination, the social personality is found to be comprised of (1) the social instincts, (2) the

social emotions and sentiments, (3) the social self, (4) the socially reflected self, (5) the communicative self, (6) the mirthful self, and (7) the socially dependable self. The first four of these topics will be presented in this chapter and the remaining three in the chapter which follows.

1. *The Social Instincts.* There are two groups of social instincts—primary and secondary.<sup>1</sup> The best known and differentiated of the primary social instincts are: (1) gregarious, (2) sex and parental, and (3) play. The impulses of these primary social instincts are closely related. The gregarious instinct is perhaps the oldest of the three. The sex and parental instincts are so closely connected that they should be discussed together. Play is more complex than an ordinary instinct. It is clearly instinctive, however, and is more readily classified under instincts than elsewhere.

The chief secondary social instincts are (1) the inquisitive, (2) the acquisitive, and (3) the combative. In each of these expressions of psychic energy, the instinct develops along anti-social as well as social directions. Despite the individualistic elements in these instinctive tendencies, they are all essential to the development of society.

Then there are the distinctly individual instincts which are closely related to the secondary social instincts and are often inseparable from them. This list includes the self-preservation instinct or what the philosopher calls the "will to live." With this, the self-

<sup>1</sup>The terms, primary and secondary, are used here in the sense of first and second, respectively, in importance.



assertive or "dominating" instinct is connected; it expresses itself in aspiring and striving for power, and is inseparable from the so-called instinct of workmanship, of activity, of constructiveness. On the other hand, there is the so-called submissive instinct. Without this tendency, individuals would perish, and hence, society. In this chapter the discussion will be confined to the primary and secondary social instincts. In a later chapter, recognition will be given to the individual instincts since they are fundamental to invention and leadership.

The gregarious instinct expresses itself in a satisfaction of being one of a herd or group, and in an uneasiness—leading to wild distraction—in being alone or separated from the group. David Hume, one of the first close observers in social psychology, asserted that every pleasure languishes and every pain becomes more cruel when experienced apart from the company of others.<sup>2</sup> "Let all the powers serve one man," declared Hume, and "he will still be miserable till he be given at least one man to enjoy them with him."<sup>3</sup>

The animal which becomes separated from the herd will risk its life in order to re-join the group. On a holiday rural people rush to the places where crowds are expected to congregate. Urban people herd together in the already overcrowded districts. Even mercantile stores which sell the same kind of wares tend to locate on the same street. As a result, for example, every large city has its "automobile row."

<sup>2</sup>*A Treatise of Human Nature*, (ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge), Oxford, 1896, p. 363.

<sup>3</sup>*Loc. cit.*

Prisoners who are subjected to solitary confinement suffer so greatly that penologists now consider this form of punishment unjustifiably cruel. The insanity rate runs from three to ten times higher in prisons where solitary punishment is used than in other prisons. Solitude for a long time tends to break up and unbalance the strongest personalities.

The gregarious instinct possesses a definite survival value inasmuch as it keeps individuals in the presence of one another and furnishes a basis for co-operative effort. In the long process of the struggle for existence, those individuals survive best who co-operate best. Those families function well in which the co-operative spirit is great. Those nations are the most developed whose spirit of co-operation is the most intelligent and thorough.

The gregarious instinct underlies all fraternal relations between individuals and the establishment and on-going of all fraternal organizations. In the public realm, the nation-state is the chief permanent social institution in which the gregarious instinct has functioned. It is probable that the gregarious instinct furnishes the basis for all our social ideals.

Because the sex and parental instincts are closely connected, they will be discussed together and in order. The sex instincts make the race possible. Without them mankind would pass away with the present generation. Their power is tremendous and the regulation of them constitutes the gravest of social problems. In fact the misuse of the sex instincts is known as *the* social evil. Illegitimacy and other forms of vice and sin follow the wake of unregulated social

instincts. From the beginning of time to the present hour, all tribes and nations have grappled and struggled with this Hercules among social problems. In the United States a far-reaching conflict is in progress between the persons and organizations which have subtly commercialized the sex instincts of the young, and the forces of individual and public chastity. There is a widespread and appalling use of hotels and apartment houses by "mistresses" who are supported by so-called respectable men. Sexual vice always constitutes a standing menace in the vicinity of army cantonments where sexual prostitutes ply their trade with boldness.

The parental instinct is an outgrowth of the sex instincts. It has produced the venerable social institution of the family. Without parental care, the offspring early begins the struggle for existence, against great odds, and with little opportunity for normal development. With one parent who gives a protecting and directing care, the offspring has a fair chance for self-development and for rendering useful service to society. When both parents intelligently co-operate in the process of family-building, the children are thus given the advantage of the experience of two elders, and are protected from the harsher phases of the struggle for existence, for a time sufficient to enable them to become mature individuals, and to learn the meaning of the fundamental principles of co-operative living.

The loss of the influence of two worthy parents and of the institution of the family is so fundamental that children who grow up outside the family have few

chances to become socialized members of society. In studying the home conditions of delinquents, the writer has found that the broken or unfit home of one type or another<sup>4</sup> is a leading factor in the majority of delinquency cases. The loss to a child of a socially-minded and sympathetic parent is irreparably great, and the loss of two such parents is beyond comprehension. No public or private institution is an adequate or equivalent substitute. It is an established principle of modern philanthropy that the best alternative for the child's own home—if it fails—is a home with foster parents who are wisely selected and who maintain a home that is reasonably well suited to the temperament and needs of the child.<sup>5</sup>

As a member of a family, the child learns fundamental rules of conduct. He acquires respect for law. He learns rudimentary principles of co-operation. In view of the fact that the family is a social microcosm, the child in a family that has a social vision receives an excellent start for constructive participation in public life.

From the standpoint of the parents themselves, the expression of the parental instincts results beneficially.

<sup>4</sup>There are several types of broken or unfit homes, namely: (1) The home entered by death, (2) the home in which the parents are divorced or separated, (3) the home in which prolonged poverty or pauperism exists, (4) the home that is undermined by the extended sickness of a wage-earner, (5) the home characterized by shiftlessness and incapacity, and (6) the immigrant home where the parents in trying to adjust themselves to the strange American environment have lost control of their children.

<sup>5</sup>For the data in this connection, see "A Study of Juvenile Delinquency and Dependency in Los Angeles County for the Year 1912," *Jour. of Crim. Law and Criminol.*, Sept., 1914.



Parenthood tends to lead to conduct which is essentially altruistic. The parental impulses are constantly coming in conflict with the egoistic impulses and would be worsted in the struggle if it were not for strong reinforcements which society itself has brought to their aid. In order to protect itself and to further the parental tendencies the given group—and society—has built up powerful sanctions, for example, the moral rules which were instituted in ancient Hebrew days. The injunction: Honor thy father and thy mother, has served as a bulwark to the parental instincts. Then there is the institution of marriage which was established as a guardian of the parental desires. Taboos upon celibacy, upon divorce, upon immoral sex life are effective social agents which lend support to the family. Ancestor worship has hallowed parenthood and thus helped to give China a long life. Consistent and persistent emphasis upon a sound family life has enabled the Hebrew race to perpetuate itself and assisted it to survive countless obstacles and innumerable destructive factors. In summary, it may be said that the sex and parental instincts run the entire gamut of life from the lowest levels to the planes of highest social usefulness.

The third primary social instinct is play. This human trait is innate, instinctive, and complicated. It is so complex that it permits of various explanations and of markedly different classifications. It possesses such a socially varied nature that it is doubtful whether it should be classified, as is done here, as an instinct. Play often manifests itself in individual effort. In such cases, however, the individual personifies or so-



cializes the object or objects with which he plays—and thus creates a group, with play manifesting itself as a social phenomenon. Even the kitten that plays with a spool seems to be treating the spool as if it were a toy mouse.

Play and work overlap. Both involve expenditure of effort. But play is expenditure of effort which is intrinsically interesting, or the goal of which is unusually attractive. Effort which in itself produces agreeable feelings is play.

The normal exercise of the play impulses renews life. Play rehabilitates and re-creates life. It offers relaxation and at the same time brings the individual to a balanced attitude toward the world of living, changing, and developing people. No personality in whom the play spirit dies can long remain well-balanced. The play attitude is essential in seeing the humorous side of life, in perceiving the silver linings to the cloudy days of life, and in appreciating the ordinary causes of laughter. The play instinct must remain active throughout life if one would keep his personality in tune with changing social phenomena.

As a member of a play-group, the child learns co-operative lessons of fundamental and life-long importance. At the age of three or thereabouts the child begins to build up a small, selected, and changing play-group of two to five members. From three to six years of age the child lives in two groups—parental and play. In both, the gregarious instinct operates strongly. Upon entry into school the child's play group increases rapidly in size. It is the play instinct, supported strongly by the gregarious instinct, that

gives the average child his great enjoyment in beginning his school career. For the same reason he begs to attend Sabbath school.

The play groups gradually take on the character of boys' gangs or girls' clubs. Then athletic teams and fraternal societies develop. It is in the team-work that the play group affords that the individual learns some of his most valuable social lessons. Where the family occasionally fails, the team work of a play group will succeed in inculcating a social principle. It is this team play that teaches the individual to obey, to become a leader, and to evaluate himself as a group-member and a force in society.

The emphasis today is being placed upon eight hours for work, eight hours for sleep, and eight hours for leisure of which one-half is to be given over to amusements and recreation. Although this formula is not generally adopted it indicates that a large portion of life is being devoted to amusements. The pace, stress, and complexity of modern urban life demand that regular hours daily be set aside for recreation. The questions arise: Does it matter how one plays? and, Is it anybody's business how one spends his leisure hours? From the standpoint of group welfare it matters decidedly how the individual plays—whether he wastes or builds up his energies. In the case of the young the nature of play means not only construction or destruction, but the formation of lifelong habits.

In this age commercial enterprise has provided amusements of all types and for all classes and ages of individuals. These provisions are made primarily to secure the largest profits, not to build up those per-

sons whose play impulses are rampant. The kinds of appeals that are being made to the play instincts constitute a problem of vast social moment.<sup>6</sup>

The secondary social instincts are characterized by both socializing and individualizing elements. Because of the social factors, this group of innate tendencies will be discussed here.

The inquisitive instinct underlies all inquiry, all searches after the new, and all forms of prolonged leadership. Inquisitiveness is excited by all phenomena which are moderately different from those that come within one's ordinary experiences. On one hand, events which are different from the usual do not attract special attention at all. On the other hand, phenomena which are especially different from anything that is known arouse fear.<sup>7</sup> But that which is moderately different at once arouses the inquisitive instinct.

Animals which have been led astray by sounds that are very strange have probably been decoyed and consequently have sooner or later lost their lives. Those individuals, either animal or human, which are never attracted by anything that is new remain mediocre or retrograde. Those who are interested in things that are moderately strange avoid violent destruction and also slow decadence. A highly differentiated form of the moderately strange is "signs of concealment or stealth," which immediately arrest attention and make a powerful appeal to inquisitiveness. Reasonably cur-

<sup>6</sup>For an elaboration of this point the student is referred to the writer's *Introduction to Sociology*, Ch. V.

<sup>7</sup>William McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, (eighth edit.), pp. 57 ff.

ious individuals survive best.

Society prefers individuals with moderately inquisitive minds. The person who is overly inquisitive becomes unpopular and loses his influence; he who never asks questions falls behind his contemporaries into obscurity. He who attends to his own affairs and maintains an alert, active mind regarding social tendencies lays the best foundation for a progressive personality.

Scientific research and genuine intellectual study arise definitely from the curiosity instinct. Many research scholars have testified to the motivating force of curiosity. The statements of Thomas A. Edison indicate that the achievements of the distinguished inventor sprang from an overwhelming desire to find satisfactory solutions to problems. Finding answers to problems represents the highest development of the inquisitive instinct. Finding solutions to social questions is the highest service which that instinct renders. Thus, intellectual progress (primarily) and social progress (secondarily) depend upon the operation of the curiosity impulses.

The acquisitive instinct develops early. One of the most interesting traits of a five-year-old child is his propensity for making collections of articles. Childhood and adolescence abound with expressions of the desire to make collections—of stamps, butterflies, dolls, marbles, bird eggs. This propensity often continues throughout life. To it there may be traced some of the world's finest libraries and art galleries.

The instinct to acquire is fundamental to all acquisitions of land and other forms of material wealth. So strong and persistent is it that men continue to accu-



mulate riches long after they have acquired enough property for the needs of themselves and of their immediate descendants.

Modern civilization owes its rise in part to private accumulations of wealth. It is reserve wealth which makes leisure from manual labor possible; it is this leisure which has given some individuals opportunities to make socially beneficial inventions. If all persons had to spend all their working time in satisfying the physical needs of life, there would be little leeway for social advance.

The desire to acquire property, especially land, is characteristic not only of the individual but of the group. Every strong nation has manifested the desire to acquire territory—note the territorial expansion of the United States since 1789. Some nations have spent themselves in their desire for more territory. Many of the cruel wars that have been waged by monarchial governments have arisen from the national weakness for more territory. When monarchial forms of government pass away, it is probable that territorial wars will become unpopular. An international institution such as a League of Nations will justify its existence if it can succeed in stifling national desires for territorial aggrandisement.

The regulation of the acquisition instinct when it has succeeded in building up a strongly entrenched system of private property is exceedingly difficult. The acquisitive instinct knows no bounds. A relatively few individuals or coteries may secure control of a major portion of the wealth within a nation and use it arbitrarily. Consequently, socialism, syndicalism,



Bolshevism gain vast recruits from the propertyless classes. The fact that English lands have become concentrated in large estates that are owned by a very small proportion of the population of England, and that the farmers have become a class of tenants<sup>8</sup> has expedited the rise of Bolshevistic feelings, which began in a startling way to be expressed after the signing of the armistice in November, 1918.

To solve the problem, two methods are proposed. Without entering into a meticulous discussion it may be said that on one side are the people who believe that the acquisitive desires should be blocked and crushed out and that the government should own all rent-producing land and all interest-producing capital. On the other side of the question there are the persons who hold that the acquisitive instinct is too deep-seated to be eliminated from human nature; that it would not be wise to stamp out the instinct, even if it were possible; and that this basic set of impulses should be allowed to operate, but trained to an expression in harmony with public welfare.

The acquisitive instinct, however, has acquired such force that at times it defies governmental regulation. The undemocratic attitude and the disrespect for law of vast corporate or inherited bodies of wealth find themselves today matched by the undemocratic and legally disrespectful program of Bolshevism. If civilization is going to survive the world-wide revolutionary and terrorist tendencies that are abroad, there must be a renaissance of respect for law and order on the part of everyone, beginning with the most powerful

<sup>8</sup>*Cf.*, William McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

and ending with those who possess least. In other words the purely selfish aspects of the acquisitive instinct—individually and nationally—must be eliminated. The acquisitive, or possessive, instinct has made civilization possible. It must be socialized, else it will turn upon its child and destroy it.

Another secondary social instinct is the combative. It is usually accompanied by the spectacular emotion of anger. In a primitive group the fighting leaders survived; the others perished. In early human society the fighting tribes survived longest and succeeded best; the others suffered extinction. Thus, throughout a long period of time—probably extending to the present—the combative instinct has been at a high survival premium. It is deeply ingrained in human nature.

The combative instinct, and its accompanying emotion of anger, is excited whenever any obstacle blocks the operation of the other instinctive tendencies, of the habitual activities, or of the newly aroused and currently conscious desires. The fighting instinct<sup>9</sup> and its emotion energizes the individual, concentrates his energies, and drives him ahead over obstacles. The fighting impulses secure readjustments, both individual and social. In its crudest forms combativeness shows itself in the snarl and rush of the dog, in the clenched and striking fists of the boy, in the lynching atrocities of the mob, in the brutalities which are committed in the name of organized warfare.

The fighting instinct has been undergoing modifications. Its earliest expression was in the form of de-

<sup>9</sup>The combative instinct, the fighting instinct, and the pugnacious instinct are terms which are used synonymously in this chapter.

struction. If a plant is obnoxious, destroy it. If an animal is dangerous, kill it. If a man gets in your way, knock him down, stab him, shoot him. If a tribe wants your hunting grounds, annihilate that tribe. Then revenge developed out of the fighting instinct. If you cannot destroy at once the thing, person, or tribe that is in your way, bide your time, foster the desire to destroy, and at the opportune moment rise up and slay. If you cannot destroy the person who has wronged you, then kill an innocent relative—thus originated the blood feud.

But if you cannot exterminate, then administer heavy physical and mental punishment. Torture has been considered a satisfactory form of punishment, and as a result, jails and prisons have turned back their inmates to society in a more anti-social state of mind than when the offenders were committed to punishment. The new standard is to allow the rigorous discipline of work to serve as punishment and to set in motion constructive processes of reform. A new criterion involving a high degree of self-control for dealing with anger was set thousands of years ago by the ethical seer who said: "A soft answer turneth away wrath."

Although a heritage from the days of fang and claw, the fighting tendencies, in modified forms, are an essential factor in individual and social progress. In the early days of human society they were commonly expressed in the physical combat between individuals. In the modern civilized nation-state individuals as a rule do not resort to physical clash in order to settle disputes, but turn to discussion and concilia-

tion or to the organized courts. Their individual fighting energies are thus not used to destroy their fellow beings but are diverted into intellectual contests.

The combative instinct is undergoing intrinsic changes. Its very nature is being transformed by the operation of intellectual factors, such as discussion and education. It may be entirely altered through the continued operation of social organizations, such as courts of justice. Its course may be completely changed through the expression of the highest spiritual virtues, such as love.

The struggle for existence in the biological world which takes place upon the plane of physical strength has its counterpart among human beings in militarism and in commercialism of the highly competitive, destructive types. It is increasingly evident that these struggles will be completely changed in nature through the quiet, creative, pervasive influence of love and other spiritual forces. As a class the "fittest" to survive are undergoing an evolution from the lowest types of brute strength to shrewd forms of mental efficiency and strength, and then to socialized personalities motivated by the principle of love.

A recent evidence of the belief that vital modifications of the fighting instinct are taking place is found in a book entitled, *Die Biologie des Krieges* by Professor G. F. Nicolai. The volume was published in 1917 and translated into English in 1918.<sup>10</sup> This daring German writer, who was imprisoned during the War for his views and who was rescued from prison by aeroplane, holds that the hitherto ineradicable fighting

<sup>10</sup>*The Biology of War*, Century Co.



instinct is a survival of tendencies which at one time were useful but which are now positively dangerous. The need for the transformation of this instinct is imperative. One species of animals after another has died out before it could change its instinctive ways. Hence, the question is pertinent: Will mankind die out because it can not change the fighting instinct? Will mankind through the pugnacious use of marvelous scientific inventions literally kill itself off? Or can it control the fighting energies of individuals and nations and convert them into constructive forces?

The combative instinct is the chief psychic element in business competition and political campaigning. It is the dynamo which engenders tremendous forces in intellectual realms. It contributes to the pleasure of the participant in and the spectator of competitive games. It leads to contests between ideals and programs and is a primary factor in progress. Additional phases of the combative impulses will be presented in a subsequent chapter on "Group Conflicts."

When war becomes historic, there will still be a far-reaching need for the fighting spirit. Then nations and individuals will still need to fight social evils and sins. They will be constrained to destroy, not the best people of competitive, sovereign groups, but the evil in all peoples, under the supervision of a planetary order. The struggles against social evils will always demand, as far as one can now see, the exercise of the combative instinct in a socialized form. The combative forces are not to be eliminated but to be rationally directed, modified, and made subservient to world welfare.



## PROBLEMS

1. Does the gregarious instinct exist in the hermit?
2. Give an original illustration of the operation of the gregarious instinct.
3. Why do the working classes on holidays rush to the places where the crowds are?
4. Why is the country considered dull by so many people?
5. Why do people become "chummy" when sitting around the hearth fire?
6. Why does a prisoner take a special interest in a flower?
7. Why do people talk aloud to themselves?
8. Explain: It is lonesome to be a college president.
9. Why should one alternate between friendship and solitude?
10. What are the leading forces which are opposing the parental impulses?
11. Why does a child play?
12. Why does an adult go to a prize-fight?
13. Why is it work for a mason to pile up brick and play for a small boy to pile up blocks?
14. Why is work hard and play easy to a child even when the latter requires the expenditure of more energy?
15. Why is it play to a boy to clear brush from a lot for a baseball diamond and work to clear the same lot at his parent's command?
16. What is the chief social value in play?

17. What is curiosity?
18. Are women more curious than men?
19. What is the relation between curiosity and science?
20. What is the chief value of the acquisitive instinct?
21. What was the earliest collection of articles that you made, as far as you can recall?
22. Beyond what limits is it wrong to indulge the acquisitive instinct?
23. What instinct impels a person to run to see a fight?
24. Is it necessary to get angry in order to fight well?
25. What is righteous indignation?
26. What has rendered bodily combat unnecessary in order to settle disputes?
27. Is anger a good guide to action?
28. Will the fighting instinct die out?

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## CHAPTER IV.

### THE SOCIAL PERSONALITY

(Continued)

2. *The Social Emotions and Sentiments.* An emotion is a complex of feelings. It arises when instinctive, habitual, or conscious desires are blocked. Whenever an obstacle appears in the path of a human interest a mental disturbance ensues, accompanied by emotional manifestations. In a way, the emotion is the affective phase of the disturbance. Whenever a conflict in the mind occurs, the emotions arise; but when no conflict exists *ennui* is likely to develop. Emotions and *ennui* are the opposite ends of the pole of interest. In other words, emotions heighten and give color to the obstacles of life.

There are three main groups of emotions, those of anger, of sorrow, or joy. In the case of anger, fundamental desires have been held up. The individual is energized to overcome the obstruction. The rise of sorrow indicates that one has in some particular actually loved and lost. He has had definitely to give up pleasant hopes or valued possessions. Joy marks the more or less sudden realization of some important desire.

As enlargements of the feeling side of life, the emotions often run to extremes and express themselves in wild, blind exhibitions of discharged energy, or in a

temporary but complete paralysis of the volitional nature. For example, the emotion of anger results in concentrated but frequently irrational forms of activity. On the other hand, the emotion of sorrow—which follows defeat and losses tends to produce temporary impotence.

Perhaps the most elemental of all emotions and the one which is more evenly spread than any other is sympathy. Certainly the chief social emotion is sympathy. It is probably fundamental to all three types that are mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs.

As the word implies, sympathy means “feeling with” others. An example of the expression of an elemental form of sympathetic emotion is the immediate and appropriate response of the brood of chickens to the warning cry of the mother hen. Because of sympathetic emotion, the vigorous crying of a baby is followed by simultaneous wailing on the part of infants near by, even though they do not have the slightest conception of the cause of the crying of the first child. For the same reason a scream of terror on the part of an adult evokes a similar pang on the part of bystanders, although the latter do not know the cause of the scream.

The characteristic of “feeling with” others varies in degree with individuals. In an extreme form it often decreases personal efficiency. It is a misfortune, for example, for a surgeon to be over-sympathetic. At the other extreme a small measure of sympathy permits one’s egoistic, selfish impulses to run riot. Sympathy enables the individual to understand the experiences, attitudes, and actions of other people.



When an important issue is to be settled, the party which is successful in enlisting the sympathies of the public possesses a strong advantage. The sympathies often manifest erratic choices. Because they—like the feelings—are not closely allied to the reasoning side of consciousness, they are likely to be expressed in strange, irrational, and at times in unreliable forms. Sympathy does not always connote dependable conduct. Perhaps the most conspicuous social characteristic of sympathy is its tendency to be associated with the conservative elements in a conflict or struggle. It is commonly allied with the old, the tried, and the true. It is a gigantic stabilizing force. Oftentimes it adds too much stability. Occasionally it is so closely attached to outworn habits and customs that it acts as a stumbling-block to progress. Nevertheless every new reform measure tries to win the permanent sympathies of the people. If it succeeds in this enterprise, all will be well for a time.

Sympathy possesses far-reaching connections. For example, it functions extensively in connection with the parental impulses. Even the most primitive forms of love foster it. Sympathy is a strong ally of the gregarious instinct in holding together the members of a group. For this reason it has been aptly described as a social cement.

A sentiment is a complex of emotional reactions which appears in organized ways. Sentiments are organized emotions with social values. For example, admiration involves the person who admires and the one who is admired; it implies the expression of a certain degree of wonder, of humility, and of generosity

toward the one for whom admiration is felt. A successful leader must gain the permanent admiration of his followers. Admiration plus fear constitutes awe; and awe with the addition of gratitude leads to reverence—the highest religious sentiment.<sup>1</sup>

Respect is closely allied to admiration; it is more cognitive and less affective, and in general, more permanent than admiration. Respect is perhaps the most intellectualized sentiment. Self-respect implies that the individual has given thought to his actions and has justified them. Respect for another implies that one has analyzed the activities of the other person and has found them satisfactory, or in harmony with his own ideals or standards. I do not believe with Dr. McDougall<sup>2</sup> that we always respect those who respect themselves, and that our respect for another person is always a sympathetic reflection of his self-respect. It is true that others must respect themselves before we will respect them, but if the moral standards of others are below our own we will not grant them complete respect.

Pity is a mild sentiment which arises out of sympathy for other persons but does not result in positive sacrifice for others. The person who pities usually feels himself definitely separated by some barrier from the one who is pitied. Pity is a developed form of sympathy which is held in check by a feeling of superiority, of inability to render aid, or of the impracticability of giving aid. The results of pity are rarely positive.

<sup>1</sup>Cf. William McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, (eighth edit.), p. 132 ff.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 161.

Shame is experienced when the individual finds himself compared unfavorably with the standards of his friends, or when he falls below the standards which others expect of him. To protect himself from experiencing shame, the individual will often submit himself unflinchingly to severe discipline. The group, or the leaders, will often capitalize an individual's aversion to shame in order to secure his otherwise unwilling support of a worthy or unworthy cause. Whenever the socially reflected self falls below par, shame arises, and exists until the social mirror self recovers its prestige.

Jealousy, revenge, and hate are related sentiments. Jealousy arises when the ego is strongly developed and generally indicates a self-centered view of life. At its heart there is an exaggerated self-feeling. As a rule, jealousy narrows and contracts the individual; it hinders the growth of personality. In the long run, the individual is justified only in being jealous of his character and reputation. In a secondary and vital sense, the individual should be jealous of the character and good name of other persons and of worthy institutions.

Revenge is an aggressive sentiment which springs up when the individual feels that he or someone in whom he is interested has been grievously injured. It flares high and may die down quickly. It is likely to be temporary in form and to disappear as soon as the rule of an eye for an eye has been administered. It may be generalized, however, by the group and assume deep-seated and long term proportions, as in the case of blood feuds. The development of courts of justice

has met the general need which is served by vengeance; consequently, the sentiment has been losing a great deal of its force. It still bursts into disgraceful proportions—in the case of lynchings—and occupies a concealed place in many lives.

Hate is a long-lived, ingrained sentiment that functions against the progress of constructive tendencies, or even of persons and races irrespective of social values. Hate is an ominous element in race prejudice. Its value appears when it is directed not against people as such, but against sin, vice, and crime.

Love is a conserving, stabilizing and yet tumultuous sentiment of unmeasured power. In its most primitive, elemental expressions it may be more or less purely sexual and may lead to sexual vice and impurity and to illegitimacy. A higher form is that known as romantic love, the subject of which is impelled to extensive undertakings and sacrifices in behalf of the one who is loved.<sup>3</sup> The primitive nature of romantic love is shown in its fickleness. It may lead, however, to conjugal love which possesses qualities of endurance. The strength of conjugal love develops out of the fact that husbands and wives experience great joys and sorrows together. It is particularly in the suffering together of husband and wife that emotional romantic love becomes transformed into the strong, deep, and abiding currents of conjugal love. Maternal love is the keenest, deepest, and most concentrated form of the love of one person for another. The love of a mother for her child is the most enduring type of love; it persists despite continued gross neglect and even of

<sup>3</sup>Cf. L. F. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 377 ff.



utterly despicable conduct on the part of the son or daughter. Paternal love is far less intense and less enduring than maternal love; it is more akin to love of brother for brother. Filial love is often strongly expressed in childhood and adolescence and then it may weaken. It may be revived in the later years of life and assume its earlier strength and be expressed in ways which gladden parental hearts. Consanguineal love ranges from the close attachment that is characteristic of maternal love to a simple form of nominal friendship. Out of all these forms of love the family as a social institution is builded.

A further observation should be made concerning consanguineal love, which frequently takes on idealistic forms. It often manifests itself in sane types of friendship. It may extend itself beyond blood relationships. Two unrelated persons may become "like brothers." Consanguineal love leads to the most dependable types of loyalty. In its highest sense it gives content to a doctrine of the brotherhood of man. In the same way parental love has been given a religious connotation of God's love for man, and filial love has been transcribed into man's love for God.

3. *The Growth of the Social Self.* The development of the self is surprisingly social. The consciousness of self arises when the individual is set off or sets himself off from other selves. It was this process which was first analyzed in an able way by J. Mark Baldwin.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>*Social and Ethical Interpretations*, Ch. I; also cf. C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Chs. I, V, VI.



To the infant everything is first of all objective. Even his fingers and toes seem to him to belong to an outside world. But when these fingers or toes are pinched or burned, they are given a self valuation by the owner. Through his experiences—chiefly of suffering—the child learns to distinguish between the ego and the *alter* and to set up a self-world in apposition to an others-world.

The ego and the *alter* are not separate entities but opposite ends of the same pole of growth, *i. e.*, of personality. With the growth of personality there always arises this bi-polarism. From one extremity of the bi-polar being there emanates a recognition of the ways in which oneself is different from other selves—individuality. From the other pole there springs a consciousness of the particulars in which one possesses kindred interests with others—sociality. The interaction between the ego and the *alter* results in the growth of both. The process is one, and in the deepest sense the ego and the *alter* evolve constructively or destructively together.

The social consciousness of the child arises simultaneously with the development of his self consciousness. If it were not for the presence, activities, and stimulations of others, his consciousness of self would remain undeveloped. The stimuli which call forth self consciousness are caused by the contacts of the individual with other persons. The degree to which self consciousness is developed depends upon the original store of self-assertive impulses and instincts and upon the nature of the social environment. If the original nature of the child bristles with aggressiveness, the

impingement of the social environment will produce qualities of leadership in the individual, or may unfortunately lead to an exaggerated self-assertion and to continual exhibitions of contra-suggestion, of overbearing attitudes, and of a pugnacious disposition.

At the time that the child is learning the meaning of life through his experiences, he is simultaneously reading those meanings into the activities of life. He projects himself and his experiences into the world of life about him—this is the projective phase of the self. The projection usually takes place along horizontal lines. The individual throws himself out along his occupational or friendship levels. In this way there is a marked tendency toward the growth of horizontal selves.<sup>5</sup>

To the growing personality every new phenomenon of life is first objective and almost meaningless, then through experience life becomes subjective and full of significance, and finally projective and social.<sup>6</sup> The process is one of social self-development. It is in this fashion that one learns—throughout life. As long as phenomena are purely subjective to an adult, he can hardly comprehend them. Through experiencing them, they become subjective, and highly so, if that experience involves suffering. Then, and then only, can one truly project his personality helpfully into the lives of others, then can one truly sympathize, then can one feel "the pulse of mankind."

<sup>5</sup>Cf. the discussion of the linear self, flat self, vein self, star self by E. A. Ross, *Amer. Jour. of Sociol.*, XXIV: 668 ff.

<sup>6</sup>Cf. the discussion of the social self by C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, Chs. I, II, and J. M. Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, Ch. I.

4. *The Socially Reflected Self.* Every person is surrounded by social mirrors. A friend or an enemy is a social mirror. The reflection of oneself which he sees in the minds of others is his socially reflected self. The nature of the reflection is rarely true; it varies with the points of view of the different human reflectors. The conduct of every person, young and old, is continually conditioned by the presence and opinions of other persons, and especially by the judgments or supposed judgments of friends. At every turn of life, the choices and actions of a person are partially determined by the images of himself which he sees reflected in the minds of his friends, that is, by his socially reflected self.

The strenuous struggles for medals, honors, positions are often due to the desire to satisfy the socially reflected self. A military officer reports that a grave weakness of the army and navy is the powerful desire for promotion. Promotion is the coveted honor, the topic of open and secret conversations, the measure of success. To win a promotion means to receive the admiring glances of friends and the jealous appraisals of enemies. The socially reflected self is likely to become unduly distorted and to give one a dangerously inflated estimate of himself.

At first many a recruit has cared nothing for his regiment. After a few weeks of training he has learned to value the opinions of himself which are held by his comrades. Within a few months he becomes not only willing but anxious to hazard his life for his regiment. At first the reflections of himself that he saw in the eyes of his fellow "rookies" he scorned;

but in a relatively short time he came to value these reflections above nearly all things else.

"Watch the change as the column, marching at route step, swings into some small French town where children and an old woman or two observe the passing army," says an officer of a colored regiment. "Every man swings into step, shoulders are thrown back, and extra distances between ranks close automatically. *Some one is watching them.*" Among these soldiers there was one "who stowed somewhere about him for these occasions a battered silk hat. We let him wear it—in small towns! The inhabitants stared at him and laughed. He was happy and made the whole company happy."

College athletes explain that the reflections of themselves in the eyes of the spectator-crowd upon the bleachers is one of the most impelling factors in their achievements. To be elected to an honor society stimulates many pupils, not because of the actual benefit to be derived from the competitive processes but on account of the complimentary remarks and the standing which the coveted honor gives, that is to say, because of the dazzling reflections of oneself which the social mirrors present.

A young man who does not approve of missions attends a church service in order to please a young lady who is interested in missionary enterprises. An offering for missions is to be taken. The first impulse of the young man is not to give. Then he thinks of the impression that his stingy self would make upon the young lady. Straightway he makes one of the largest subscriptions of the evening and



takes pleasure in the reflection of his liberality which he beholds in the pleased countenance of the young woman at his side.

"It was my social mirror self which manifested itself to me last Sabbath," states a lady, "when I made my yearly pledge to the church. If I had made it by myself and sent it to the church treasurer, I would have lowered, in view of my present circumstances, the amount which I gave last year. But I was called upon by two prominent members of the church, and wishing to see a generous self reflected back to me from their eyes, I increased my annual pledge."

A business man boasts of a shrewd transaction to a friend who he knows will approve of such a proceeding. When he is talking with another friend, who holds higher social principles, he refrains from mentioning the questionable action. In the first instance the reflection of himself as a shrewd business man was favorable; in the latter case it would have been unfavorable: in both cases he was guided by his social mirror self.

A politician will spend large sums of money on philanthropic enterprises. By so doing he sets up favorable impressions of himself in the minds of his townspeople. Later he will utilize these impressions in his campaign for votes.

At a meeting which was held for money-raising purposes, the chairman called for subscriptions of five hundred dollars. At that moment a man of means raised his hand to drive away an annoying fly. The chairman saw the hand, elatedly called out the name of the man, and the audience cheered loudly.



The wealthy individual had planned to contribute one hundred dollars, but rather than mar the splendid reflection of himself that had come from his neighbors and friends he cheerfully paid the larger subscription.

An American abroad tries to do in Rome as the Romans do. By such actions he receives better reflections of himself than would otherwise be the case. A wide-awake immigrant in the United States quickly adopts American ways—impelled by his social mirror self.

"As a child of five, I became acquainted in the kindergarten with a colored boy," states a public school teacher. "Our friendship grew rapidly. I admired the black face and the small, tight curls. One day my father laughed heartily at me when he saw me with my colored playmate. I felt hurt, and thereafter avoided the colored boy, not through race prejudice on my part, but through the unpleasant reflection in my father's eyes of my association with the Negro child."

The self respect of an individual often depends on maintaining the respect of other people. If he loses the esteem of his friends, he is likely to lose his own self respect. "I would enjoy riding a bicycle," says a middle-aged woman, "but the impression that I should make upon my friends would be unfavorable and hence I abstain."

A housewife who could not afford to use ice secured an ice-card and put it in the window, but always after the ice wagon had passed her house. She wanted her neighbors to think that she bought ice, because thereby she might not lose caste in their eyes. For a similar

reason a child in school often will study in order to recite well. He is not guided by his desire to learn so much as by the desire to maintain a worthy opinion of himself in the judgments of his classmates. Likewise, the growing adolescent who suddenly becomes interested in the cleanliness of his neck and ears is endeavoring to maintain or improve his standing in the eyes of a young girl. His mood changes from dejection to hilarity as the reflection of himself in her eyes changes from unworthy to worthy.

"At the age of ten," a young man relates, "I found myself considered the black sheep of the family. Because of this reputation, other boys envied me. Even my elders sometimes made complimentary remarks about my startling conduct. On more than one occasion I overheard my parents describe my pranks to their friends, and then I would hear them all laugh loudly, and I would swell with pride. Many references were made to my actions in a more or less approving way. From these experiences I gained favorable impressions of my black-sheep self. My roguishness was stimulated by hearing such expressions as, "Oh! isn't he a clever rascal." Consequently, I began deliberately to act the part of a black sheep; and some of the things which I did would not read well here. I was saved from going to the dogs because our family (a minister's family) moved to another town where my friends—especially one girl friend—did not consider that a black sheep should be envied. The reflection of my dare-devil self no longer had a halo around it, and I changed."

"When I was asked to give an illustration of my

social mirror self," reports a student, "I chose the best example of which I could think. When I was trying to decide whether or not to use this particular illustration, it occurred to me that the only reason I was unwilling to use it was because of the unfavorable reflection of myself which it would produce in the mind of my instructor. Hence in the very process of choosing an illustration, the social mirror self had interfered."

The development of character depends upon the nature of the social mirrors which surround the individual. A growing, active-minded, or sensitive child is particularly affected by the reflection of his acts which he sees in the human mirrors about him. If a bad act or a good act is reflected favorably to him, he is likely to repeat it until it becomes a habit. Similarly, although at times in a lesser degree, the individual is affected throughout life.

The individual continually experiences a conflict of socially reflected selves. He cares more for the reflections of himself which he receives from his friends than from strangers or enemies, and from his dearest friends than from casual friends. For this reason he shows as a rule his best nature to his friends and his worst nature to his enemies and is careless about the impressions which he makes upon strangers. For this reason, also, he commonly is more subject to suggestions which come from friends than to those which emanate from enemies.

The individual is affected most by the reflections of himself which come from those who are like-minded. It was this which Hume doubtless had in mind when

he said: "The praises of others never give us as much pleasure unless they concur with our own opinion. . . A mere soldier little values the character of eloquence. . . Or a merchant, of learning." The explanation of this statement is found in the fact that the soldier has superiors who belittle eloquence, and the merchant admires "captains of industry," whose love for the academic is not great. The first finds himself reprimanded for much speaking, and the latter discovers that he is held in derision for much theorizing.

Groups, also, have their socially reflected selves. The actions of groups, also, are guided by the social reflections. In the Declaration of Independence Jefferson wrote that "a decent respect to the opinion of mankind" required that our forefathers should make a statement of the causes which impelled them to revolt. At the beginning of the World War each large nation hastened to give its reasons for declaring war and tried to justify itself in the eyes of the world.

The operation of the socially reflected self explains partially the influence of the gang upon the boy, of the fraternity upon the student, of the afternoon bridge party upon the debutanté, of the labor union upon their industrial neophyte, of the board of directors upon the foreman or the clerk, of any occupational group upon its members. To an amazing degree the socially reflected self determines the direction of both individual and group change.



## PROBLEMS

### (THE SOCIAL EMOTIONS AND SENTIMENTS)

1. Is anger a good guide to action?
2. What are the physical expressions of (a) a happy face, (b) a sad face, and (c) an angry face?
3. Is it true that one of the first qualifications of a successful public school teacher is to be happy?
4. Why are one's sympathies more keen toward a fellow countryman in a foreign country than when one is at home?
5. Why is it not enough for a business man to be a sympathetic husband, parent, and neighbor?
6. Should every citizen indulge occasionally in capricious and sympathetic giving?
7. Why do children fear the dark?
8. Explain: Only those succeed who worry.
9. Do people summon a physician in order to get sympathy?
10. What is the chief social value of love?
11. Can one love his neighbor at will?
12. If one can not love his neighbor, what is the next best thing to do?
13. What is the chief social value of hate?
14. What is the leading social value in suffering?
15. Is it true that friends are persons who have about the same sets of prejudices?

### (THE SOCIAL SELF, THE SOCIALLY REFLECTED SELF)

16. Distinguish between the individual self and the social self.



17. What causes a little boy to become ashamed of wearing dresses?

18. Why did a little girl pray: "Please, God, make my hair straight because I don't like curls"?

19. Give an original illustration of the social mirror self.

20. Why is it easier to talk with one individual than to talk to fifteen?

21. In what different ways does the social mirror self of the pupil affect his recitation in class?

22. Are men or women more sensitive to their socially reflected selves?

23. Why does the average small boy dislike dish-washing?

24. What is the chief cause of bashfulness?

25. Is the gregarious instinct or the socially reflected self the greater factor in arousing the desire of a college girl "to make a sorority"?

26. Are the wealthy or the poor more sensitive to their socially reflected selves?

27. Would you have achieved much, if no one had ever expected anything of you?

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## CHAPTER V.

### THE SOCIAL PERSONALITY

(Continued)

5. *The Communicative Self.* In the give-and-take between persons there arise sets of symbols with their meanings—this is language. Even animals develop languages. The mother bird utters a shrill cry and the young who run to cover are saved. A set of simple sounds, or calls, or emotional ejaculations constitutes language in the animal world. The cry and the exclamation are the starting-points of that elaborate set of symbols which is represented in an unabridged dictionary.

The human infant early learns to cry—and hence to speak—in a half dozen different ways. To one who is unacquainted with children these different cries sound alike, but to the mother they are meaningful. There are the particular cries of hunger, of physical pain, of fear, of anger, of general discomfort and fretfulness, and of the acquired habit to be taken up and rocked. Each of these cries develops in later life into whole vocabularies. If acquired cries, such as the cry to be picked up and soothed, does not produce the vaguely desired result, it will die out. In other words, the cry and the recognition of its meaning are inseparable. Language in its simplest expression is a sym-

bol and its meaning. The significance of the symbol must be clear to the individual with whom communication is held.

The symbol is always a gesture of some form. It may be pantomimic, i. e., of the hands and shoulders, or facial, or vocal. Gestures of the hands and shoulders are common among the deaf, among foreigners who are trying in a strange environment to make their wants known, among any excited group of people, among adults who are at a loss to find the precise words that they want to use. Civilized people use pantomimic and facial gestures continually for the purpose of naturally supplementing vocal gestures and in order to meet the needs of the communicative self when vocal language fails.

It is stated that the Eskimos who were brought to the Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893 immediately began to communicate with a group of deaf and dumb Americans on the basis of "sign" language. The two groups possessed a common medium of communication.

The ordinary gestures of the hands and shoulders convey meanings which are easy to grasp. Pantomimic gestures are practical, for example, the open, extended hand, or the clenched fist. Pantomimic gestures are unconsciously imitated on a large scale. Even the majority of the people of an entire nation may develop common peculiarities of pantomimic gestures.

The facial gesture centers about the eyes and mouth. Like pantomimic gesture, it is easily and universally intelligible. If you are perfectly frank and unreserved

when you look at me, I can tell how you feel about me even though you do not speak my vocal language. The smile of welcome or the glance of hatred are understood the world around. The foreigner always and naturally gives careful attention to the facial gestures of the people whom he meets, whether he be a Greek immigrant in the United States or an American in Turkey. Although he may require several years to learn the vocal language of a country, he understands facial gestures at once.

Vocal language arises out of the sudden exhalation of the breath—in the exclamatory cry. An elemental step in the process of language formation is the naming of objects, i. e., the creating of nouns. When the baby cries “ba ba,” “pa pa,” and “ma ma,” he names himself, his father, and his mother respectively—unconsciously to himself and to others, including his parents. The rise of verbs, except as they are sometimes used as nouns, comes late. A verb involves the recognition of two objects and particularly the relationship between them. Abstract concepts are the last phases of language to acquire definite meaning. A five year old girl with a considerable vocabulary of nouns and verbs will persistently ask such questions as these: “What is ‘honesty’?” “What does ‘honest to goodness’ mean?” “What does ‘I doubt it’ mean?” Even an adult finds difficulty in reducing such a term as “democracy” to satisfactory imagery.

Teaching is a process of transforming unintelligible and higher ideas and methods into intelligible and lower signs and symbols. Frequently the successful teacher, whether of music or of cooking, is she who



goes through a whole act in the presence of the pupils. As the latter learn, the teacher reproduces only a few motions, and finally she gives only now and then a gesture, "a cry, a look, an attitude." The orchestra leader finds his trained players responding at once and accurately to his slightest facial and pantomimic gestures. The teacher of philosophy speaks to his class as through a glass darkly until perchance by a few deft chalk marks on the blackboard he releases a flood of light.

In every case the gesture represents the beginning of a whole act.<sup>1</sup> As soon as the second party recognizes the act for which the given gesture is the beginning, conversation has begun. The response will consist of another gesture, which in turn is the beginning of another act—and thus the conversation of attitudes and appropriate responses takes place. Hence, language is a social phenomenon and consists in an interchange of gestures and suitable responses between individuals; language is a conversation of attitudes and responses. Social life itself is built upon interchanges of symbols and their meanings between individuals.

As new individual and social situations arise, new symbols of expression are needed. Sometimes the invented term is a studied compound of latinized antiques and sometimes it is the shortest cut between two ideas, namely, a new slang phrase. In other words, language is always in the process of creation. Heretofore new communicative gestures usually have been

<sup>1</sup>Cf. G. H. Mead, "Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning," *Psychological Bul.*, VII: 397-405.

created fortuitously and thoughtlessly. There is need for an increased conscious control of the processes of inventing language.

The social psychology of conversation is a fascinating and important theme. (1) A good conversationalist has a rich personality. He has something to give, besides words; he is not merely a fluent talker. He has more than a large vocabulary and a wide command of English. He is not only courteous and possessed of cultivated manners, but projects his personality into the situations of other people and throws helpful, sympathetic light upon the experiences of his associates. In his contact with his fellows, he is both individual and social.

(2) A good conversationalist knows a few things well and authoritatively, but he does not talk "shop." At this point many persons are helpless. They know and can talk about only one thing—their daily work. Outside this subject, they have nothing to converse about except the weather and items of gossip. The praiseworthy conversationalist has a number of avocational interests. Although denied occupational topics and gossip, he is able to introduce several avocational lines of thought. He has travelled, and observed keenly when travelling. He has developed a constantly enlarging horizon of knowledge.

(3) A good conversationalist studies the interests of people. He relates his avocational information to the major interests of his friends. His conversation enlightens others, not concerning himself, but regarding themselves. He does not talk about the "big I,"

but creates an important "you." He centers his conversation in the personalities of his listeners.

(4) A good conversationalist is a trained listener. He is not a monologist. He does not do all the talking. He gets other people to talk. It is a part of his function to get his would-be listeners to describe their unique experiences. He endeavors to learn something from everyone whom he meets.

(5) A good conversationalist is a director of conversation. He is a skillful questioner. He elicits information from the bashful and halts the talk of the wordy. He not only does not monopolize conversation himself, but he permits no one else to do so. He does not simply make his own contribution to the discussions of an assembled company, but he sees that everyone else does likewise.

The communicative self is close to the heart of social life. With a very simple or even a very elaborate set of communicative machinery, the communicative self makes social intercourse possible. It arises from social contacts. It affords the basis for the recognition of likemindedness; it turns likemindedness into closely knit social intimacies.

The communicative self makes possible a social consciousness. It enables individuals to generate social ideals and to realize a complex order of social cooperation. With its ever-increasing array of gesture-meanings language constitutes perhaps the most fundamental social institution. Without it, neither the family, school, church, nor the state could arise. In brief, the communicative self is the social self in action.

6. *The Mirthful Self.* At first thought the subject of laughter does not seem to be serious enough to merit scientific discussion. It, however, is a phenomenon which manifests itself continually in social life. Further, some of the world's greatest thinkers have pondered over the causes of laughter.

According to Aristotle comedy is an imitation of character, or characteristics, of a lower type than the imitator typifies. The laughable is something degrading in the object or person at which one laughs—this is known as the theory of degradation. Thomas Hobbes developed the theory of superiority. According to this conception one laughs because of an expansion of feeling which is brought on through realizing his superiority over the person, or thing, or situation at which he laughs. Addison held that pride is the chief cause of laughter.

Kant explained laughter on the basis of nullification of expectation, that is, laughter arises "from the sudden transformation of a strained expectation into nothing." The theory of incongruity was advanced by Schopenhauer. Laughter is caused by the sudden realization of an incongruity between a conception and the real object with which it is in some way connected. Herbert Spencer advanced the idea that laughter indicates an effort which suddenly encounters a void. Sully states that laughter is due to a sudden release from a strained and tense situation. Bergson expresses the belief that laughter is primarily caused by the appearance of mechanical inelasticity in human life. These single theory explanations of laughter are enlightening, but partial and hence inadequate. The



synthetic treatment of laughter which is given by Boris Sidis is stimulating and extensively illustrated but incomplete.<sup>2</sup>

The writer believes that the feeling of mirth arises from the social self and related antecedents and that its causes are very many and intricately interwoven. The mirthful self is the social self suddenly experiencing any one of an endless variety of unexpected, incongruous but relatively harmless occurrences. An elemental condition of laughter is an agreeable tone of consciousness. In this regard, Professor Bergson seems to overlook an important factor, for he says that the appeal of laughter is to intelligence, pure and simple, and that "laughter is incompatible with emotion."<sup>3</sup> It is true that laughter is incompatible with sorrow and as a rule with anger, but on the other hand it bubbles over naturally from the fountains of joy. In fact a feeling or emotional basis of pleasantness and agreeableness must exist before any situation appears humorous to the individual.

In order to see the humorous side of life one must enjoy a fair degree of physical health and of mental exuberance. If he has suffered long hours of tedious labor without sleep, if he has been the victim of recent financial reverses, if loved ones are dangerously ill, the mirthful self is likely to be quiescent. The play tendencies and the playful spirit are fundamental to the expression of mirth. It is from the most playful and exuberant hours of group life that the heartiest laughter breaks forth.

<sup>2</sup>See Sully's *An Essay on Laughter*, Bergson's *Laughter*, and Sidis' *Psychology of Laughter* for extended discussions.

<sup>3</sup>*Laughter*, pp. 5, 139.



Another factor which is basic to laughter is the gregarious instinct. Laughter is born from social contacts. Whenever two or more persons who are kindred spirits are gathered together under agreeable circumstances, they are likely to burst out into laughter at any moment. If a person who is alone is heard to laugh long and heartily he is at once interrogated, and if he repeats frequently the process, he is regarded with suspicion. Thus, the conditions precedent to laughter are an agreeable tone of consciousness, physical and mental health, favoring circumstances, the play tendencies, and gregariousness.

In the conditions precedent to laughter there is a set of relatively simple causes. The simplest cause of laughter is probably physical tickling—the infant laughs automatically when the palms of his hands or the bottoms of his feet are touched or rubbed slightly. In a severe form this factor leads to hysterical laughter.

Another elemental cause is physical and mental exuberance. The simplest incongruity will set off the joy-in-living spirit of a group of girls, and the result will be ripples of silly laughter. In this way giggling usually originates. The boisterous laughter of youths may be traced to similar origins.

Relief from strained situations sometimes produces laughter. Observe the children, released from hours of study and recitation, rush forth from the school building with joyous peals of laughter. Sudden release from either physical or mental strain is a cause of laughter.

Likewise, exhaustion when unexpectedly relieved may result in hysterical laughter—a subnormal type. Physical tickling, surplus energy, relief from tension, and sudden release from overstrain constitute four physico-psychological sources of laughter.

The second important group of factors is the psycho-sociological. In this class the simplest is group contagion. A child may laugh because he hears another child or adult laughing. A member of an adult group may laugh because he is unconsciously stimulated by the laughing of others. This type is a direct expression of sympathetic emotion.

A member of a group will often laugh in order to seem interested in the story or incident that is related. Even though the matter may not appeal to him as humorous, he participates in the laughter out of respect for the host or the speaker.

Laughter sometimes results from the desire not to be conspicuous. The listener may fail to catch the point of a story, but joins in the group laughter. When other persons are enjoying apparently a choice bit of comedy, it often seems wiser to participate even though the point has not been grasped than to be conspicuous by appearing cold or stolid.

Laughter is occasionally forced. An individual is insulted by a slighting remark. He does not want to recognize the incident, therefore he will parry the thrust by laughing. One may be asked an embarrassing or impertinent question, but in order not to show his feelings in the presence of spectators, he will turn the matter aside with a laugh. The implication is that

the problem is not nearly as important as the questioner believes, or would have other people believe, and consequently the one who is questioned is relieved of embarrassment or confusion.

Laughter is sometimes utilized to cover pain. One's pride may lead him to invoke a laughing mood. Pain is frequently camouflaged by laughter. Tears may be concealed by laughter. A four-year-old boy picked himself up after a hard fall, rubbed his bleeding knee, and laughingly said: "Wasn't that a joke on me?"

Children, and some adults, will indulge in laughter in order to attract attention. The girl who laughs the loudest may be one who is wearing a bright new ribbon or the latest fad in sweaters, or the boy who laughs above the boisterous laughter of the gang may be a conscious candidate for hero worship.

Persons are paid to make others laugh. They undergo periods of training in order to become skillful in deliberately creating laughter. The professional reader, the platform lecturer upon humorous themes, and the actors in high-class comedies are usually constructive in their aims and results. Of all paid entertainers, the average vaudeville performer or burlesque actor makes the crudest attempts. Plain silliness is preferable to the sexually suggestive jokes at which respectable people laugh when attending a musical comedy.

Probably the most common cause of laughter is found in the incongruous actions of other individuals. A dog chases his tail, a boy with a basket of eggs falls down, a dignified man runs after his wind-blown hat—these are never-failing, mirth-provoking incongrui-

ties. The Charlie Chaplin films succeed because of the portrayal of incongruous movements, actions, and situations.

The instructor in a history class noticed a student who was gazing out of the window and called upon her to recite. When he suddenly pronounced her name, "Miss Smith," she cried out, "Hello." She had been startled from her day-dreaming, and her incongruous reply set the class into an uproar. The humor of *A House-Boat on the Styx* is partially due to the bringing together in time and place of famous characters with their widely divergent ways and experiences—the result is an incongruous juxtaposition of events and personalities.

In this connection Henri L. Bergson has pointed out that incongruity consists frequently in mechanical movements or gestures where the naturally human is expected. The comic physiognomy is essentially a mechanical facial gesture. The mechanical gesture of the hand of a public speaker upon repetition becomes ludicrous. The dignified person who falls, falls hard, that is, mechanically. The goat who rears and butts whenever his forehead is pressed acts mechanically—and hence comically.

Then there are incongruous ideas which are common causes of laughter. Some of these types of incongruity in ideas have been analyzed by Boris Sidis. (1) Illogical statements. Many of the "Pat and Mike" stories are of this character. Pat was breathlessly running along a country road in Ireland one day when he was accosted by Mike who asked him why he was hurrying so fast. "I have a long way to



go," replied Pat, "and I want to get there before I am all tired out."

(2) Grammatical and rhetorical errors. Common illustrations are found in the assertions of young children. Note the following examples.

"Don't unbusy me."

"The sun is rising down" (setting).

"You two people are sitting down and we two people are sitting up" (standing).

(3) Idiomatical and related mistakes. Children, foreigners, and uneducated persons are often the victims of the mistaken use of words and phrases. The foreigner in any land falls into countless misguided uses of a strange tongue. These errors are illustrated in the "Togo" stories by Wallace Irwin:

"I studied dictionary so I could unlearn my poor ignorance."

"I welcome lobster cordially, yet I never could make them set quietly on my digestion."

"While I was setting peeling potatoes of suddenly come Indiana yell befront of my back while stool leg on which I was occupying flop uply so confused that I were deposed to floor with potatoes pouring over my brain."

(4) The play on words. When a Scotch regiment was marching to the front in France, a French soldier who was watching them said: "They can't be men, for they wear skirts, and they can't be women for they have moustaches." "I have it," said another poilu, "they're that famous Middlesex regiment from London."

(5) Overstatement or understatement that is mod-



erate and implied. Lying is not humorous. *A House-Boat on the Styx* affords many illustrations of overstatements. After careful calculation and patient waiting for thirteen days the hunter finds that the sixty-eight ducks which he has been observing have formed in a straight line. The powder is minutely estimated and a valuable pearl—since the marksman has no bullets—is used as the instrument of destruction. The sixty-eight ducks are killed. The pearl traveled through the bodies of sixty-seven and retained enough force to kill the sixty-eighth, in whose body it was found—and saved.

(6) A sudden change from the serious to the trifling or ridiculous. Boris Sidis refers to "Pat" who was being upbraided for not being better educated and who gave the following explanation: "I was a bright man at birth, but when I was a few days old, my nurse exchanged me for another baby who was a fool."

(7) Unintended suggestion. A church in a western town must hold long services for it recently announced: "The regular services will commence next Sunday evening at 7 o'clock and continue until further notice."

One day two lawyers who were arguing the opposite sides of a case became angry at one another and one of them pointing to the other, said: "That attorney is the ugliest and meanest lawyer in town."

"You forget yourself, you forget yourself, Mr. Smith," said the court, rapping for order with his gavel.

To make fun of others constitutes an entirely different set of causes of laughter. The group laughs at almost any mistake or idiosyncrasy of the individual. If the error is easily discernible, the group laughter may be spontaneous. If the mistake is deep-seated it may not be detected at once and simultaneously, and the laughter of the group may be delayed. Sometimes the group is prejudiced against an individual, or it may even be organized to embarrass him—and he becomes the victim of concerted, even of malicious, laughter.

There is laughter which is simple ridicule—the individual is merely derided. There is laughter which is satirical ridicule and is caused usually by the employment of humorous exaggeration, although caustic elements may be used. There is the ironical laugh which is induced by covert satire. Then there is laughter which is purely and openly sarcastic, biting, and generally anti-social. Social ridicule of whatever degree is powerful because it directly affects the socially reflected self.

Social laughter is a corrective. It arouses fear, "restrains eccentricity," and prevents the individual from becoming a stone hitching-post. Similarly, it prevents social groups from becoming mechanically inelastic. Group laughter compels the members to keep in touch with one another, and familiarizes them with the different points of view. In other words, the mirthful self is highly gregarious. When persons laugh together, they become better acquainted. Mirthfulness increases the social tone. Many a tense situation is relieved by a humorous turn. Laughter purifies,

clarifies, socializes.

On the other hand, mirthfulness individualizes. If one would voice a strange idea, he must brave social laughter. From the opposite angle, the mirthful self is antagonistic to sympathy. If one puts himself completely in the place of another, he will rarely laugh at the other. Thus, the mirthful self may be unsympathetic, impersonal, objective, and even individualizing.

The mirthful self is the successful self. Mirthfulness builds up both the physical and mental nature of the individual. It shakes him up, stimulates him, and re-creates him. It sets his organism in tune, and enables him to laugh at his duller moments and his blunders. Progress has been made when one's mirthful self habitually laughs at one's defeated self. No national character in America so well exemplifies this trait at the present time (1920) as does ex-president Taft. By this token one can "come back," renew his mental youth, and multiply manifold his social usefulness.

7. *The Socially Dependable Self.* The dependable self embraces a set of well-balanced habits. Strength of character arises from habits. Character includes disposition and temperament. Disposition is the sum total of one's instinctive tendencies, and is largely determined by hereditary gifts. Temperament is one's constitutional way or ways of evaluating life,<sup>4</sup> and like disposition, is chiefly hereditary.

The socially dependable self, or character, is built

<sup>4</sup>Cf. William McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, (eighth edit.), pp. 258 ff.

upon both disposition and temperament. It comprises not simply habits, but habits which may be built up in ways that the individual may himself determine. Character involves the extent to and the ways in which one organizes his actions.

Character also includes the desires and interests. Desires are rooted in the instinctive and feeling side of life. They are elemental and typhonic when once started in motion. They are racial impulses. They are often expressed crudely, abruptly, and they may shift suddenly from one to another object of satisfaction. Consequently, the socially dependable self is one in which the desires have been brought under definite control.

Interests are subjective-objective phenomena which have one source in desires, another in instincts, such as the curiosity instinct, and in objects in the environment. They are usually less fluctuating and more often concealed than the feelings or even the desires. They come to be grounded in the thought side of personality and are not easily modified. They are especially dependent on the appeal of the environment. They are more objective, less passionate, and more dependable than desires.

The dependable self is psychical; the socially dependable self is psychical and moral. Strength of character is socially insufficient. A criminal may have strength of character but have used it in anti-social ways. Education does not necessarily give social dependence, because education may train the individual only in self-strength, self-culture, and show him how to manipulate his fellows to his advantage and to



their loss. "Why did you come to college?" I asked a young man of strong character a few months ago, and he frankly replied, "So that I can learn how to work other people."

The socially dependable self is born of a training which presents the increasing welfare of man as a goal. In a life of group interactions, honesty, reliability, balance, chastity, courage of convictions are essential. The individual develops a socially dependable self first in his relationships with his home group or in his play group, i. e. the gang; then in his dealings with larger groups, such as his occupational coterie, when we pronounce him occupationally ethical; then in his actions involving national welfare, when we term him a patriot. The socially dependable self is not fully developed, however, until the ideals of public welfare within the nation in times of peace as well as of war and the ideals of world welfare all the time are controlling factors. Likewise, the socially dependable group-self, whether of a family or of a nation, is not completely realized until it acts habitually in recognition of the well-being of its constituent units and of the larger groups of which it is a functional part.

The realization of a perfect personality, in conclusion, takes cognizance of three sets of factors. (1) There is the original human nature, composed largely of instinctive tendencies. (2) There is social action, i. e., the give-and-take between individuals. It is the social environment which is essential to the development of human nature. Social contacts determine what phases of the individual's nature will be devel-



oped. Both heredity and environment are determining influences in personality. (3) Then there is the individual's initiative by which he can make himself over, and construct habits in almost any direction that he chooses to project his original nature.<sup>5</sup> Human nature has the power of changing itself.

The individual must intelligently distinguish between self-love and selfishness.<sup>6</sup> Self-love includes the conservation and the subsequent careful expenditure of one's energies in behalf of public welfare; selfishness is the miserly hoarding of or the wasteful rioting with one's energies in attempts to gratify primarily one's own self. Intelligence is necessary in order to distinguish between selfish and unselfish living.

Conscience is an elusive but essential element in building a perfect personality. Although the psychologist has not yet given a satisfactory description of conscience, it nevertheless exerts tremendous power. Conscience is the most socialized self passing judgment on all the lower selves. Since this highest self is an ideal self, rarely realized at the time, it is often impractical. One's conscience, or the activities of one's conscience, is measured at any particular moment by the distance which one's ideal of social living has advanced beyond his actual living. When the individual complains that his conscience troubles him he ordinarily means that in some actual deed he has not lived the social vision that he sees. In its highest

<sup>5</sup>For a philosophical discussion of this topic see *Human Nature and Its Remaking* by W. E. Hocking.

<sup>6</sup>Developed in an unpublished lecture by F. W. Blackmar.

calling, conscience is the main agent in making socially dependable selves and in perfecting personality.

## PROBLEMS

### (THE COMMUNICATIVE SELF)

1. What is the social origin of language?
2. Name one new word or phrase that you have recently added to your vocabulary and describe the circumstances under which you made the addition.
3. Why do people have a strong desire to communicate with others?
4. What is the chief function of communication?
5. Why is there so much conversation about trivial matters?
6. What is the chief attribute of a successful conversationalist?
7. Why is it difficult for many people to converse at a formal reception?
8. What is a vocal gesture?
9. Is a word a syncopated act?
10. Why are facial gestures similar the world over, whereas each race has a different vocal language?

### (THE MIRTHFUL SELF)

11. Why is laughter a subject important enough for serious discussion?
12. Why is it worth while to develop the habit of seeing the humorous side of life?
13. What are the physical expressions of a hearty laugh?

14. What is Shakespeare's meaning when he speaks of being "stabbed" with laughter?

15. What does Milton mean when he writes of "laughter holding both his sides"?

16. Why do we laugh at the incongruous or degrading experiences of others instead of feeling grieved?

17. Why is a city dude in the country a mirth-producing object?

18. Why is a "hayseed" in the city the subject of laughter?

19. Is man more afraid of social ridicule than of severe physical punishment?

20. Illustrate: Laughter kills innovations.

21. How do you explain the statement that "the true hero is one who can ignore social laughter"?

22. Why do people laugh at stories which involve stuttering?

23. Why is the walking of a drunken man considered laughable by many persons?

24. Why does a wry face, although simulating pain, cause the spectator to laugh?

25. Why does the entrance of a dog into a lecture room filled with students produce laughter?

26. Why does the breaking down of a chair during an address provoke laughter?

27. Why is the "comic sheet" laughable?

28. Why is it laughable to see the waves dash unexpectedly over a person who is walking along the beach?

29. Why is a trivial interruption that occurs during a prayer service often laughable?

30. Distinguish between humor and wit.
31. Why are deaf people and not blind people used in comedies?
32. What is the most common cause of laughter?
33. What is the leading social value of laughter?

(THE SOCIALLY DEPENDABLE SELF)

34. Why is character socially essential?
35. Are all dependable persons social?
36. Are all social selves dependable?
37. Why have not more socially dependable selves been turned out by our educational system in the United States?

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## CHAPTER VI.

### SUGGESTION-IMITATION PHENOMENA

1. *Suggestion.* Suggestion and imitation are different aspects of the same phenomenon. Suggestion is the initiating part and imitation is the resulting phase. Suggestion is the process whereby an idea or mode of action is presented to the mind and accepted more or less uncritically. Imitation is the process of copying an idea or mode of action and carrying it out more or less immediately in a relatively unchanged form. The entire process constitutes a suggestion-imitation phenomenon.

Suggestion depends upon the motor character of ideas, or the dynamic nature of thought. An idea tends to carry itself into action. An idea will always express itself in action unless inhibited by counter impulses, habits, or ideas. If some one merely mentions apple pie, even between meals, I am quite certain to feel hungry for apple pie. If some one casually refers to a baseball game that is in progress near by while I am writing these lines, I shall find myself unconsciously laying aside the pen and looking for my cap. Furthermore, I will go to the game if there are no seriously inhibiting impulses, either instinctive, habitual, or conscious.

One's inmost thoughts tend to be expressed. Bluff-

ing fails. A college student who bluffs is soon recognized, first by his fellow-students and immediate friends, and then by his instructors. The palmist and medium utilize the principle that thoughts tend to expression. They maintain a continuous conversation, apparently meaningless at times, and read closely and expertly the slightest changes in the facial expression of the sitter—and then make good guesses.

We reveal our true selves often by our unconscious attitudes. When most natural, or "off our guard," we manifest our true nature. Our secret thoughts crop out unexpectedly and unconsciously to us. A secret thought sooner or later is bound to disclose itself, often to the owner's chagrin. It is in the off guard moments that the inmost self is bound to announce itself. By these off guard expressions, we are judged—and rightly.

Suggestion then is the unconscious or conscious intrusion into the mind of an idea which is received more or less uncritically. The motor character of an idea will do the rest—which is imitation. This definition differs from that of Dr. Sidis,<sup>1</sup> who holds that the suggested idea meets at first with more or less opposition.

Suggestion is direct or indirect. If direct, it usually comes in the form of a command, and with prestige or authority. It is illustrated by the parental command to the child who promptly obeys, by the priestly injunction to the worshipper, by the officer's orders to the private, by the hypnotist's command to his subject. Hypnotism affords a productive field for

<sup>1</sup>*The Psychology of Suggestion*, p. 15.

the study of direct suggestion, but comes within the purview of abnormal psychology and not of social psychology. As a social phenomenon it is as yet not sufficiently understood to be commended as useful. Under present conditions, the specially trained psychologist is the only person who is entitled to use hypnotism.

Indirect suggestion operates unrecognized by the subject. It has been described aptly by E. A. Ross as "slantwise" suggestion and as representing a flank movement, rather than a frontal attack as in the case of direct suggestion.<sup>2</sup> The adult mind is frequently more apt to be influenced by this method than by any other. The average child, on the other hand, responds more or less readily to both direct and indirect suggestion. The distinction between these two classes of suggestion is simply in the way in which the suggested idea gains entrance to the mind.

The illustrations of the constructive use of indirect suggestion are manifold. "When I wish my young brother on the opposite side of the dining-room table to sit up straight," says a young lady, "I straighten up suddenly myself, without comment, without interrupting the conversation, and without even glancing at my brother, and he invariably responds." This simple case illustrates a far-reaching application of the principle of indirect suggestion in exerting a constructive moral influence upon others. Many teachers and parents nag, scold, and order, "Don't do this," or "Don't do that," and children react contrarily. Other teachers and parents set one moral example

<sup>2</sup>*Social Psychology*, Ch. II.

after another in a straightforward way, and children are attracted and try to follow the steady, strong pace. Didactic moralizing is often ineffective because it centers attention in a negative way upon forbidden conduct, whereas a striking moral example makes an appeal to the heroic impulses and to the love of action.

"A rather large boy, John, was transferred from the seventh grade to the ungraded room, of which I had charge, because in the seventh grade 'he would do absolutely nothing but arithmetic and drawing,'" reports a public school teacher. For a few days John was permitted to follow his own inclinations to a large extent and did good work in his two favorite subjects of arithmetic and drawing, but no other work. "Knowing from the unpleasant experiences of his former teachers that it would be useless to insist on his studying the despised geography or history lesson, I said nothing about these subjects, but mentioned only the two subjects which he enjoyed. One day, however, while discussing a geography lesson with a group of pupils, I asked John if he would draw on the blackboard a certain map for the use of the geography class that day, complimenting him in the presence of the class upon his ability to draw. Each day thereafter I asked him to draw some assignment in the geography lesson, taking care that the assignments would require more and more reading in geography on his part. A similar method was pursued in history, with the result that at the close of the year John was doing creditable work in both geography and history—the subjects in which he had failed in the seventh grade." This use of indirect suggestion calls



for limitless patience and mental dexterity, but saves boys to society.

A librarian noticing that the young people were reading low grade novels, pasted on the inside of the front and back covers of these books a statement to this effect: "Other books of this type are — —." Here she gave the names of three or four works of fiction, being careful to mention books of a little better grade than the one in which the notice appeared. In a short time the young patrons of the public library were reading a better grade of books. The process was repeated, with the result that in a year's time the librarian had changed the type of fiction reading in her library.

A merchant, having too many slow-pay customers, offered prizes for the best essays on the subject: "How to collect poor accounts." Considerable talk developed on the subject of long-term credit. As a result, the merchant was saved from bankruptcy.

In a given public school, prejudice had developed against a few Japanese and Chinese children who were in attendance. The teacher announced a debate upon the subject: Resolved that China has advanced further democratically in the last ten years than Japan. She appointed three children on each side of the question and asked one-half of the room to gather information for the affirmative debaters and the other half to work for the negative speakers. All the pupils fell to studying about the peoples of China and Japan and the struggle to secure democracy in each of these countries. By the day of the debate, marked interest in and sympathy for both the Chinese and the Japan-



ese had developed. As a result of this use of indirect suggestion, the teacher experienced no further trouble because of race prejudice.

The powerful character of indirect suggestion has been proved countless times. By its use strong-minded and well-trained persons have been misled. At Camp Forrest, Georgia, the men were lined up one day before a row of trenches with their gas masks, which were to be tested, in an alert position. At the sound of the klaxon, guns were fired, and shells exploded. The men had to put on their gas masks and to stand around until the smoke passed over. Presently several of the men in order gained the attention of the instructors, and observed that they could smell gas and that the masks were leaking. In a few minutes when the men were permitted to remove their masks, they learned to their chagrin that there had been no gas at all. As in this case, many of the fears of every-day life are ungrounded—the product of indirect suggestion.

The unlearned, especially, need to be on their guard against indirect suggestion. An immigrant of several years standing opened a banking business in a Pennsylvania town. For a time he had little patronage from the new, incoming aliens of his race. Presently he purchased a large safe and put it in the show window. At once the money on deposit increased rapidly—not because he had proved himself an honest banker, but for the reason that he had a reliable-appearing safe.

Boys often wield a strong influence over their younger comrades by indirect suggestion. Mark

Twain has revealed this situation perfectly. For example, Tom Sawyer has the unpleasant, irksome job of whitewashing a fence. When a boy friend passes, Tom boasts of his ability to whitewash and deliberately daubs the fence. The sight causes the newcomer to challenge Tom, to seize the brush, and to exhibit his own skill. By this process the fence is whitewashed—with Tom looking on all the while. Tom had "elevated fence painting to the rank of the most popular sport in the home town," and on a day when fishing and swimming had been scheduled.

Children sometimes influence their elders through indirect suggestion. When George was visiting at the home of a playmate, the latter's mother removed a pan of hot cookies from the oven. George looked wistfully at the cookies and said: "My mother told me not to ask for anything." He received a cookie—without asking.

Illegitimate use of indirect suggestion is often made by politicians. The public needs continually to safeguard itself against the indirect suggestion that is resorted to by demagogues. In a certain city the people were asked to vote bonds to construct an aqueduct. For some time before the election day there was much said in the newspapers about the shortage of water supply for the city, and finally rigid regulations were made concerning the use of the water. The people became scared and voted the bonds, but after the election, the rigid water regulations were rescinded, even though the additional water supply would not be available for years.

There are fortunately many wholesome ways in

which indirect suggestion may be used in public situations. When Roosevelt was police commissioner in New York City, he received an application for police protection by an anti-Jewish speaker who was going to hold a meeting in the Jewish section of the city. The request was granted, but it did not take the anti-Jewish demagogue long to appreciate the indirect suggestion when he found that he was protected by a detail of twenty-five Jewish policemen.

Insinuation is a highly intellectualized form of indirect suggestion. It may easily become exceedingly dangerous, because it stimulates the imagination. If in recommending a young person for a position, I conservatively say that the young man will do fairly well, the imagination of the employer immediately suggests several possible weaknesses of the candidate, rather than one and that perhaps more or less negligible. By the use of the word "fairly" I arrest the attention of the employer, and his imagination at once is likely to do the young man injustice. Consequently, if I use the term "fairly," I must explain why or the insinuation will unjustly wreck the chances of my friend.

Another set of terms, namely, immediate, mediate, and contra-suggestion has been used by Boris Sidis, and indicates the ways in which suggestions are translated into action.<sup>3</sup> If a suggested idea is acted upon promptly and in line with its impulses, the phenomenon is immediate suggestion. If time elapses and modifications occur, the type is called mediate suggestion. Some persons and many children respond in an opposite way to that which is suggested, and illustrate con-

<sup>3</sup>*The Psychology of Suggestion*, p. 23.

tra-suggestion. Contra-suggestion is born usually of an exaggerated sense of individuality, and of inadequate opportunity to learn the lessons of social co-operation.

2. *Suggestibility.* Suggestibility is the degree to which a person is open to suggestion. Normal suggestibility includes fixation of attention, elimination of inhibitory impulses, and immediate or mediate consummation. Abnormal suggestibility, which is the state of hysteria or of hypnotism, is a condition in which the subject, within instinctive and habitual limits, is completely a slave to the will of the operator.

Suggestibility is common to all individuals, but in varying degrees under varying conditions. Professor Ross<sup>4</sup> and Dr. McDougall<sup>5</sup> have so thoroughly discussed these variations that they need not be presented at length here.

(1) Suggestibility depends upon the degree of gregariousness. Animals which live in flocks or herds are more suggestible than those which forage alone—compare the suggestibility of the sheep with the tiger. Since man is highly gregarious, his suggestibility is very pronounced.

(2) Suggestibility depends upon racial nature. Southern races are more suggestible than Northern; Italians, than English. A hot climate makes suggestible peoples while a frigid habitat keeps the feelings calm, and suggestibility low.

(3) Suggestibility depends upon temperament. The emotional and nervous are more suggestible than

<sup>4</sup>*Social Psychology*, Ch. VII.

<sup>5</sup>*An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Ch. IV.



the phlegmatic. Because of their slower reaction time, the latter are enabled to profit by the time elements which usually undermine suggestibility. He who bides his time is commonly more calculating than suggestible.

(4) Suggestibility depends upon sex. The authorities are generally agreed that men are less suggestible than women, but nearly all the authorities on the subject are men. It would be interesting to learn the findings of women investigators. According to the available data, women as a class have not had as wide a range of experience as men. As a result women are not able to bring to bear as many controls upon a variety of suggestions as do men.

On the other hand, in times of financial craze men go wild in their desires to invest the hard-earned savings of themselves and their wives. Who is more suggestible than men in the minutes when millions are being made or lost in the stock market? In such cases the wife is often the cooler-headed. Men fall before the suggestibility of a gambling-table, but how many wage-earning women gamble their money away on pay-night?

(5) Suggestibility depends on age. The young as a rule are more suggestible than the old. The child and adolescent are lacking in organized knowledge with which to face suggestions. Consequently they are more suggestible than individuals of experience, travel, and organized information upon many subjects.

(6) Suggestibility depends on degree of fatigue. The fatigue toxins which circulate through the system dull the brain centers and decrease the ability to make



rational judgments. A person is more suggestible in tired than in refreshed hours. Suggestibility increases with fatigue.

(7) Suggestibility depends on lack of organized knowledge. He who has a complete fund of organized facts, drawn from all phases of a given field, will not be suggestible in that connection, although he may be very suggestible in other matters upon which he is not thoroughly informed. Suggestibility decreases in proportion to the increase of organized knowledge.

(8) Suggestibility depends on the prestige of the sources of suggestion. The average person is very suggestible in the presence of a leading authority. Unfortunately, an individual with prestige is accepted as an authority by many persons on a large number of topics outside his field of deserved prestige. What the "mayor" or the "bishop" says on subjects far removed from the fields of politics and religion is accepted without question by the victims of prestige suggestion. Prestige slows up the processes of reason.

(9) Suggestibility depends upon the degree of crowd or group emotion that prevails. In a large crowd it is natural to feel insignificant and to act with the crowd rather than to follow the mandate of cognition. In fact, cognition may be prevented. Group emotion sways all excepting the most intellectually stubborn.

The least degree of suggestibility is found in the person of well-organized habits, of a vast range of organized experiences and systematized knowledge which he by habitual processes turns quickly upon the

given suggestion. But not all suggestions are harmful. To scrutinize a suggestion may prove its worth and its acceptability. All suggestions should be examined as coolly and thoroughly as possible and rejected if found of doubtful value, or accepted if meritorious—and spread.

It is possible to think overmuch of certain fears and die of auto-suggestion, or to concentrate on certain constructive ideas and save oneself from destruction. Sickness or health, pessimism or optimism can often be explained in terms of auto-suggestion.

Suggestion is a powerful agent of either social construction or destruction. Society can use it to build itself into an autocratic or a democratic state. Society through its educators can indoctrinate little children with almost any set of ideas that is desired. The power of advertisers or demagogues is puny in comparison with that of the educators of children—for in the last instance suggestibility is at the flood tide.

3. *Imitation.* Imitation is the unconscious or conscious copying of an act or idea. It is the motor part of the suggestion-imitation process. Certain so-called imitative acts are simply a phase of communication or language. The boy who clenches his fist when he meets the clenched fist of another boy is not imitating the act of the second youth, but is simply making an appropriate response. The suitable response which is called forth happens to resemble the combative attitude but is not an imitation thereof.

Unconscious and conscious imitation are the counterparts of indirect and direct suggestion respectively. Unconscious imitation is usually preceded by indirect

suggestion, while conscious imitation is induced by direct suggestion.

Actions are more easily imitated than ideas; they are especially subject to unconscious imitation. When attention is centered on the conversation of an individual, one is unconsciously prone in replying to copy the gestures and mannerisms of the speaker. Gestures are so subject to unconscious imitation that they spread rapidly and may become even nationally common. The child is prone to copy irrationally the striking, spectacular actions of others. In this way, the motion picture that portrays stealing, burglary, sex coarseness has a harmful effect upon the adolescent.

"Haven't you noticed that a crime that is pictured in the 'movies' is usually punished before the film is ended?" a young delinquent was asked who attributed his downfall to the motion picture. "Oh! yes," he replied, "but after I get the idea of how to commit a daring act (from the 'movie'), I always am willing to take a chance that I won't get caught."

The experience of a lady of training, culture, and refinement affords an illustration of unconscious imitation of another type. "When that stuttering song, 'K-K-Katie,' first came out, my little niece delighted to sing it, much to my chagrin. I despised it and abhorred it. But a few weeks later, much to my own amazement and her satisfaction, my niece caught me singing it, as I set the table for dinner!"

Examples of conscious imitation may also be found on every hand. The daily observations of a parent, or a teacher, are filled with illustrations. After a baby twenty months old saw the carpenters smoke

cigarettes, he put a box of crayolas into his coverall pockets, and "smoked" crayolas, imitating every move and gesture of the men. One day a twelve-year-old boy wore an overseas cap, and the next day the neighborhood was swarming with overseas caps—made of wrapping paper, newspapers, and other materials. Bergson's theory of the creative impulse is announced, and at once newspaper writers and leaders of clubs begin to expound it as if they had adopted it. The cash register is invented, and is universally purchased by business houses. "Over the Top" is advertised, individuals talk about the book, and the desire to read it spreads over the country—culminating in a tremendous sale.

Conscious imitation operates in any field directly in proportion to the alleged superiority and inversely in proportion to the social distance of the action or idea that receives attention. The chief elements in this fundamental law of conscious imitation have been described at length by Tarde and E. A. Ross. The parent is imitated by the child; the bishop, by the young preacher; the scientist, by the laboratory assistant. Society women are the idols of debutantés, who in turn dazzle the "sub-debs." Charlie Chaplin has a clientele of ambitious imitators. City people are copied by rural folk. The college upperclassmen set the pace for the freshmen. "Courtesy comes from the court." In other words, there is "a descent of example."

Alleged rather than real superiority is often the real magnetic factor. Real prestige is not distinguished from acquired prestige. Although the former is based on worth of personality and the latter upon ex-



traneous factors, such as name, fortune, and mere reputation, the latter is as powerful in influencing the populace as the former. Even rational imitators are frequently blinded and misled by a meteoric glare. An alleged brilliant idea will immediately attract a following and may gather great force. The hereditary rich have said that to inherit vast wealth is the greatest thing in the world. They have acted as if working for a livelihood is a servile status. Their theory is that "life-long loafing is more worthy of respect than life-long industry," or that persons who have to work are "miserable boobs." As E. A. Ross has pointed out, the nine-tenths in any society who work have allowed the one-tenth who are born rich to persuade them that they are despicable because they work. An abominable idea which has been promulgated by an alleged superior class has been accepted by the real superior classes.

The greater the superiority, real or alleged, the greater the power to produce imitation. The colonel steps aside when the general appears. All eyes turn from the governor when the presidential car arrives.

The greater the mental and social proximity, the greater the imitation. Lawyers imitate eminent jurists, but turn their backs upon distinguished poets. We imitate most largely within our own fields of interest. The chief exception to this corollary of conscious imitation is that too close proximity may produce too great familiarity, with a resultant decline in imitation. But the elemental law of imitation is that the higher in prestige—either real or false—is imitated by the lower.



There are cases, however, in connection with unconscious imitation, where the inferior are imitated by the superior, *e. g.*, the softening of the consonants and the opening of the vowels by Southern white people in unconscious imitation of the Negro.<sup>6</sup> The lady of culture may temporarily adopt a passing fad. The worthy congressman may use a cheap, transparent trick of the professional campaigner.

Nothing is imitated exactly according to copy, because of the individual equation of the imitator and of the changes that have occurred in the social situation. "Platonism produced no other Plato: Christianity yields no other Jesus nor Paul."<sup>7</sup> Imitation always includes a degree of modification. Every imitator is at the same time an inventor, and every inventor is also an imitator. Since individuality always colors or shapes every imitation, it is rarely pure imitation, but also invention—invention often of poor grade. Witness the difficulty of the child in learning to write well—how hard it is for him to copy good writing.

Imitation is primarily a conserving factor in society. It secures the continuance of established ways of doing, and also, of new methods. Lincoln generalizes upon the subject of democracy, and through imitation that theme passes from individual to individual, from page to page, decade to decade, race to race—and it is preserved. In 1876, Alexander Bell invented the telephone, which through imitation has become almost universal in middle and upper class homes. Unknown

<sup>6</sup>E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, p. 150.

<sup>7</sup>W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, p. 250.

inventors produced Arabic numerals, which through imitation have been commonly adopted throughout Occidental civilization.

Imitation assumes three main forms of social expression. (1) Fashion imitation is competitive imitation of the new and current. It manifests special characteristics such as the fad and the craze. (2) Convention imitation is non-competitive copying of the formal. (3) Custom imitation is the imitation of established and ancestral ideas and methods.

When put to the test of service, every imitation falls into one of three classes—irrational, rational, or socio-rational. Many customs, but a smaller percentage of conventions and of fashions, can pass the test of serviceability. Upon careful scrutiny many so-called rational imitations are found to be useful only within a small range or to a class of people, and harmful, dangerous, or even destructive outside these limits. Socio-rational imitations are not only useful within narrow social confines, but are helpful throughout the range of their influence. In the two subsequent chapters the distinctions will be made in detail between fashion, convention, and custom imitation, and between irrational, rational, and socio-rational imitation.

## PROBLEMS

### (SUGGESTION AND SUGGESTIBILITY)

1. Why are you suggestible?
2. In what particulars are you least suggestible?
3. What is the relation of the motor character of ideas to suggestibility?

4. What rule may one follow in driving a nail in order to avoid hitting his thumb?

5. What is muscle-reading?

6. What is the relation of so-called mind-reading to muscle-reading?

7. Why does your throat ache "after listening to a speaker who forms his voice badly"?

8. What is the suggestion in the politician's slogan: "Let us pass prosperity around"?

9. What difference does it make whether clerks ask, "Shall we send the package?" or, "Shall we send the package, or will you take it with you?"

10. From the standpoint of suggestion, what is the difference between the two signs: "Keep off the grass," and "Why not keep on the sidewalk?"

11. What suggestion does "a brass-trimmed, marble-faced, mahogany-upholstered bank" make to an immigrant from South Europe?

12. What suggestion does a \$6000 limousine make to the average honest but poor man?

13. What suggestion is made by a dentist's sign which shows a large tooth deeply imbedded in the gums?

14. What do the extravagant dresses of the wife or daughter of a lawyer or a physician suggest to the client or patient?

15. Why can one easily walk a narrow plank that lies on the ground, but not one which extends across a deep chasm?

16. How do you explain "the deadliness of the innuendo"?

17. Why is faint praise more damaging than

downright depreciation?

18. Why is it usually true that the best way to get the offer of a coveted position is not to seem too anxious for it?

19. Is a person suggestible when asleep?

20. Give an original illustration of auto-suggestion.

21. Is an underfed person more suggestible than a well-fed person?

22. Are men more suggestible than women?

23. Why is it dangerous for a traveller in the Kentucky mountains to pull out a handkerchief from his hip pocket?

24. How do you account for the moral influence of certain teachers, and the lack thereof of others who are equally well-intentioned?

25. What is the danger in talks "on sex hygiene before the segregated pupils of the public schools"?

26. Is it safer "on meeting a formidable animal to stand than to run"?

27. Explain the suggestion in the statement, "He protests too much."

28. When is a person most suggestible?

29. When is one least suggestible?

#### (IMITATION)

30. Give an original illustration of unconscious imitation.

31. Illustrate: Imitation is a conserving factor in society.

32. Illustrate: "We are most imitative in the things not the object of conscious attention."

33. Explain: Imitation is a vital factor in social progress.
34. Explain: "Everybody in the same village walks on an average at the same rate of speed."
35. Explain the statement that sentiment is "more electric than opinion."
36. Is an ideal a better religious nucleus than a dogma?
37. Should there be censorship of motion pictures?
38. Why is the moral responsibility of the novelist great?
39. Does art need censorship more than science?
40. Who is the more dangerous to society, the disseminator of wrong ideals, or of wrong opinions?
41. Explain: "The vortical suction of our population is stronger than ever before."
42. How do you explain psychologically that "nothing succeeds like success"?
43. Explain from the standpoint of social psychology that "nothing succeeds like success"?
44. Which is imitated the more easily:
  - (1) Indolence or ambition?
  - (2) A hopeful or a fearful attitude?
  - (3) Yawning or sneezing?
  - (4) Saving or spending?
  - (5) Vices or virtues?

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## CHAPTER VII.

### SUGGESTION-IMITATION PHENOMENA

(Continued)

4. *Fashion Imitation.* A fashion is a new way of acting or thinking which only a small percentage of the group has been able to choose because of the attendant competition and other limitations. The field of fashion ranges all the way from breakfast foods or styles of dress to philosophic theories. If markedly different from the conventional and customary, a fashion is classified as freakish. If it is adopted somewhat generally for a period of time, the competitive elements tend to disappear, and it becomes a convention. If it proves widely useful and stands the test of time it becomes a custom. Herein are the bases of fashion imitation, convention imitation, and custom imitation.

The social psychology of fashion reveals eleven different elements.<sup>1</sup> (1) There is the imitation process itself through which fashion becomes current. By imitating the example of others, the individual follows in the path along which others are going; his interest in social adaptation is satisfied; and union with other individuals of his class is established.<sup>2</sup> The forces of

<sup>1</sup>Six of these factors have been presented by E. A. Ross in his *Social Psychology*, Ch. VI, and in unpublished lectures.

unconscious and conscious imitation lead one easily and often against his common sense to adopt the prevailing fashion.

(2) The individual is frequently drawn into the fashion vortex through the fear of social disapproval if he does not conform. Large numbers of people remonstrate against a new fashion, but presently they are seen to have adopted it—because of social pressure unwisely exerted. It is now an axiom among many persons that one might as well be out of the world as out of fashion. This pressure is especially powerful upon women in matters of dress. Men continually feel and give in to its force.

(3) An opposite element is the desire for individual differentiation. The desire to give oneself an individual stamp and the impulses toward variation and social contrast are gratified through fashions. A new mode, especially in dress, which permits endless slight variations is at once at a premium. No one wishes to be considered mediocre or like the average. Everyone believes himself to be different from the mass, and fashion enables him to flatter this belief. Fashion is used to gain for oneself the appearance, although not the reality, of genuine individuality. A shrewd observer has remarked that it is feathers which set off peacocks, turkeys, pheasants, and roosters from one another, and that without the differentiating feathers, these birds would present a similar appearance. It is erroneously assumed that the adoption of a fashion automatically raises one to a higher social plane than that occupied by non-conformers.

<sup>2</sup>Georg Simmel, "Fashion," *International Quarterly*, X:133 ff. Cf. Tarde, *Laws of Imitation*, pp. 244 ff.

Fashion not only unites, but it separates. It satisfies at one and the same time the demand for unity and for segregation. It meets simultaneously the needs of class unity and of individual distinction. Fashion inequality often defies democracy. When social status is determined by one's ability to waste money on expensive and useless fashions, democracy is undermined and patriotism is challenged. In another way fashion imitation enables the lower classes to imitate closely the higher groups, and to approach them in appearance. Fashion imitation is a leveller-up, and hence to a degree democratising. Even subject peoples rise through imitation, chiefly fashion, toward the levels of their ruling-nations.

(4) Fashion thrives upon novelty. In those countries, of course, where customs are worshipped, the novel gains prestige with difficulty. But where fashion imitation has gained standing, the prestige of the new takes on an unwarranted glamor. The importance that is attached to the new increases concomitantly with the development of fashion imitation itself—one movement accelerates the other.

(5) Invention is a necessary fashion antecedent. Without invention there would be no new things to imitate and to become fashionable. Every epoch of fashion imitation is also a period of invention. It is true that many inventions do not extend very far beneath the surface and consequently are often worse than useless. But out of much inventing, an occasional invention will prove valuable, and through the sifting processes of time will become separated from the passing fashions of the day and receive permanent

adoption.

(6) Reputability furthers fashion. The current knowledge that people are imitating a new style, or are ready to do so, gives the fashion a first-class endorsement. Many fashions live for a time entirely upon reputation and prestige. The fact that one's acquaintances have endorsed or adopted a new idea implies that this idea must have worth. When a petition is presented for my signature, I will sign more readily if the names of some of my friends are already attached. The larger the number of such names upon the list, the more readily do I add my name. Each of my acquaintances, however, may have signed the petition because some one else had done so, and the first signer may have been moved merely by the importunity of the bearer of the petition, through misunderstanding, or by purely personal or selfish motives!

(7) Fashion thrives upon the spectacular. Brilliancy, high lights, flash and fire—these are conspirators with fashion, because they give prestige in the eyes of many, because they attract widespread attention of the whole multitude. When the hat with peacock plumage passes down the aisle there is a craning of all necks and a whispering of tongues, wise and silly. Sensationalism in fashion also gives individuality and distinction—the value of which is overestimated by the sensationalist. The preacher with the spectacular methods captures the crowds and personal distinction.

(8) The commercialized activities of designers and promoters strengthen the reign of fashion. There are people who have become expert in creating new



styles which appeal to the fashion pace-setters and clientele. Before one style has been put on the market, others in the same commercial field are being designed.

Then there are the professionals who work in conjunction with the fashion designers and whose business it is to create wants—both false and true—that will drive people to buy the new fashions which the designers have prepared. Many advertisements and fashion shows produce a wasteful, competitive consumption of goods. Fashion shows also stimulate many people to buy beyond their means and thus undermine thrift. Fashion shows also create unsatisfied and unsatisfiable wants in the minds of the less fortunate classes. The worthy and unworthy alike, where economic tension exists, are made dissatisfied to an uncontrollable degree. The walking fashion plates are a chief cause of the spirit of Bolshevism. A ten thousand dollar motor car is handsome and elegant, but creates social unrest wherever it moves.

The professional promoter of fashion must succeed in creating an atmosphere of expectancy and of favorable anticipation among the people who can afford to buy and also among those persons in the class just below those who are financially able. For this reason, the professionalist often uses the serial, accumulative advertisement—and the unsuspecting public unconsciously begins a campaign of talk and of publicity in behalf of the new mode that is about to appear.

(9) Fashion appeals to freedom. The cry of every new political party is: Be free from the "bosses" of the old parties. The new religious sect sends out the invitation: Come out from the yoke of past religious

dogmatism. Every economic panacea flings out the banner: Free yourself from the slavery of the industrial master class. The call to freedom which new movements of all types use in order to win the populace makes a fundamental appeal to the individualistic impulses of human nature. So strong is this pull that people rush to the support of this or that propaganda without carefully examining its intrinsic nature. The call to be free from old inconveniences or slaveries prevents people from seeing the yokes of serfdom which may be hidden in the new.

(10) The counter stimulations of fashion enthusiasts increase fashion imitation. The vicious circle of fashion imitation should be thoroughly understood by all the devotees of fashion. The pace-setter<sup>3</sup> leads off with a new style in a given field. Other persons immediately follow—in order to be taken for the pace-setter and to share in his prestige. Still others copy—in order not to be conspicuous. As soon as the mode becomes somewhat widely adopted, the originators of it and the pace-setters devise and introduce a new style by definitely modifying the initial fashion or by turning to an opposite extreme. They set the pace in a new direction, and immediately discard the original fashion. In this manner fashion imitation acquires a faster and faster speed. The pace-followers try to overtake the pace-setters, while the latter wildly seek a new style in order to “sidestep” the pursuing multitude. To this process, which always assumes insane and wasteful proportions, E. A. Ross has applied the

<sup>3</sup>See the discussion by E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, pp. 99, 103.

term, "social racing." Perhaps "fashion racing" would be more accurate. The high cost of living is partly due to fashion racing. Many articles that people buy are purchased, not because they are needed or because they are beautiful, but because neighbors or friends own similar fashionable goods. Fashion racing with its process of endless counter stimulations unduly accentuates fashion.

(11) The spirit of progress gives life to fashion. Progressiveness is willingness to take chances with a new idea or method. Progressiveness expects that some new methods will prove useless, but in order to discover worth-while inventions, it will take wide risks. Because of this risk-taking on the part of progressiveness, many fashions secure patronage.

The craze and fad are exhibitions of exaggerated fashion imitation. The craze is characterized by a large degree of excitement. Under such a spell, people will temporarily adopt almost any irrational scheme. If the necessary excitement can be created, the result in terms of imitation can be predicted with a fair degree of accuracy. Financial speculation has been perhaps the chief field of crazes. At this writing the morning newspaper on my desk contains several quarter-page advertisements of oil wells that "are about to produce." I notice that these oil wells are more than a thousand miles distant—where I cannot investigate them—and that the drills are going down and the prices of shares are rapidly rising. Within ten days the price of a share of stock will positively go up from three to five cents or from fifteen to one hun-

dred dollars. In fact, I am told that a gusher may be struck at any moment, in which case the value of stocks will increase beyond the most generous anticipations and I, if I own sufficient shares, will find myself a millionaire. The very prospect excites me. Then I remember how many drills have gone down without reaching oil, how many persons have invested their money in oil and lost, how little I really know about the proposed investment,—and then my excitement passes and I continue with the writing of this chapter.

Excitement breeds crazes, not only in the financial world of speculation, but in other phases of life, particularly the religious. As the greatest financial craze perhaps was that which occurred about 1720, when the slow-moving, conservative English mind was seized with the excitement attendant upon the financial prospects of the South Sea Company, so the greatest religious craze was probably that known as Millerism, which developed in the United States between 1840 and 1845. William Miller went about preaching the end of the world. As a result of a large number of addresses, he secured thousands of followers who, upon the appointed day, donned their ascension robes and went out into the open fields. Although the end of the world did not come at the appointed time, a new date was set and the undaunted followers of William Miller increased in numbers.

The "pogroms" in Russian Poland under the régime of the Czars illustrate crazes. The peasants become frantic under the extortions of the Jews, who in turn have been compelled to pay large sums of money

regularly to the Russian authorities for relatively meager privileges. In blind rage a "pogrom" is started. Often aroused against the Jews by the Russian authorities and instigated in part by the Church, the peasants start to wreak vengeance upon the Jews, the class directly above them, and who they are easily led to believe are the cause of all the harsh conditions of peasant life. But the "pogrom" does not stop with destruction of property. The frenzied peasant-mobs tear helpless children from helpless parents and brutally slay them before the eyes of those parents. The aged are mercilessly tortured and then killed. The excitement spreads from village to village, and then after a few days subsides, and the peasants return to their accustomed tasks, without having improved their conditions in the slightest.

The fad is a closely related phenomenon which arises in connection with peculiar forms of novelty, rather than with excitement. Something conspicuously new and having a semblance of attractiveness appears, and because of the prestige which is accorded to novelty and to superficial attractiveness, people adopt the innovation, without considering its worth. Any fashion of the hour that is based on novelty will serve as an example of fad.

Every urban community in our country at any time harbors several fads, ranging from purely local interest to nation-wide appeal. But groups are exceedingly fickle in their courtship of fads. One month popularity may center upon the carrying of kewpies upon automobiles; a few months later the kewpies will



be displaced by the American flag, and then by Allied flags; shortly all have disappeared. The Charlie Chaplin fads have passed in waves over the country, rivalled only by Mary Pickford curls, and jokes on the Ford.

The social psychology of dress and clothing throws additional light on the nature of fashion imitation. Among animals passive adaptation results in the growth of feathers, fur, or other protective covering of the body. Protection is the primary need which clothing serves.

Sex differentiation, for example, in the feathers of birds, indicates another purpose of body covering—adornment. The female bird chooses her mate. The males with the most beautiful plumage and the singing voice are chosen. Males without feathers that are resplendent possess less chance of sex selection, fail to reproduce, and die out.

At the beginning of the human scale clothing serves the same two purposes as among the higher animals—protection and sex-ornamentation. Passive adaptation is partially supplanted by active adaptation, and natural feathers and fur are displaced by clothing that is made from the skins and furs of animals and from fibrous plants. Feathers are artificially used for sex and prestige ornamentation. The male, who is chosen by the female, resorts to all sorts of ingenious though often painful devices in order to increase his attractiveness. Ornamental scars are made upon the dark-skinned body. With the light-skinned early peoples of the temperate zones scarification, not easily dis-

cernible, is displaced by tattooing. Indigoes and similar dark substances are used to make permanent ornamentations upon the white skin. Ornamental purposes are further served by attaching rings, through perforations, to the ears, nose, lips, and by fastening them around the arms and ankles. Fantastic forms of male hair dress develop and beads of all colors are used to enhance bodily beauty.

With the development of clothing for protective and ornamental purposes a third causal element appeared—modesty. Ornamental clothing often tended, and still does, to sex stimulation. Consequently, clothing not only caused modesty, but modesty in clothing acquired a tangible status. Three purposes, thus, are served by clothing—protection, ornamentation (chiefly on sex planes) and modesty.

With the rise of wife-capture, the warrior-state, and the patriarchal family, man became the wooer and woman the wooed. When woman was sought for by male courting and when her restricted sphere of work with its monotony and routine demanded variation, she concentrated attention on her clothing not primarily from the protective or modesty bases, but for purposes of ornamentation. The more beautiful she could make her appearance, the greater her chances of attracting the competitive glances of suitors. Woman has assumed a heavy load of sex-ornamentation. This burden has weighed her down and greatly hindered her mental progress.

Among the hereditary leisure classes husbands sometimes encourage their wives; and parents, their daughters to dress luxuriously—for mere display purposes.

By such conspicuous and wasteful consumption of goods, husbands and parents are enabled to advertise their wealth. Thereby women are unwisely encouraged to place far more emphasis upon the ornamental than upon the more substantial elements of protection and modesty. There is truth in the assertion that man, among certain classes, has made woman an ornament and kept her in a doll's house. The display emphasis, on occasion, becomes so exaggerated that the protection in clothing which is demanded by health considerations is openly ignored, while sex immodesty is vulgarly flaunted.

So extensively has woman of the hereditary leisure classes given attention to dress (ornament) as distinguished from clothing (protection and modesty), that some women secure the height of enjoyment out of surpassing other women in gorgeousness of attire. At an afternoon gathering of leisure class women, each subtly observes how the others are gowned. At a men's club, on the other hand, men's wearing apparel is rarely a topic of conversation, since matters of more objective interest, such as business or politics, engage the attention.

Men have not entirely escaped from the customs of primeval days when they were the ornamented sex. Kings and courtiers still dress in pompous regalia. The Scotch kilt is a survival of early male embellishments. Members of large fraternal orders indulge yearly or biennially in a reversion to the days of the gorgeous plumage of the male. On such occasions the women are outdone.

The present circumstances attendant upon dress

have brought to sane-minded women several problems.

(1) The question of economic cost is serious when so much stress is placed upon expensive materials, upon having a new gown for every formal occasion, and when styles swing from one extreme to another in rapid succession. It has been shrewdly observed that the cost of a "fashionable woman" is beyond computation. It has been well said that a marriage proposal means much more today (when spring and fall hats each cost twenty-five dollars) than formerly (when the young wife wore a shawl for head covering, which she had made herself).

(2) The mandates of modern fashions in dress have enslaved woman. Women are often nonplused by the search to find that which is in style and yet pleases. A tremendous amount of energy is expended in the consumption of dress goods. This energy might well be released in productive mental activities.

(3) The rapid shifting in styles and the prestige of the mere novel arbitrarily set aside a beautiful style before it has had a chance to be fully appreciated. If the struggle were for increasingly beautiful clothing, a worthy cause would be honored. But under commercialized control there is little if any increase from year to year in the artistic quality of dress.

(4) The extremes in woman's dress continually verge on the immodest and sexually vulgar. It is these extremes which attract the most attention and which cast undue discredit upon the sex. Newspapers give wide publicity to these abnormalities, which without publicity would tend to disappear.

(5) Efforts by women to establish a Dress Reform

League have never been far-reaching. Such a protection against the tyrannies of fashion in dress is needed, but attempts of this order have proved futile because of woman's lack of experience in organizing, her lack of training in doing good team-work, the tendency of leaders of dress reform to impose "mannish" styles of clothing upon women, and the failure to get nationwide action.

There are many evidences that fashions in all things which are so subject are changing more rapidly than ever. The pace is increasing, due to improved methods of communication, the development of a "hustle" civilization, and inexpensive methods of making imitations of all kinds. With the return of peace, there has come in certain quarters increased fashion frenzy. A buyer for a well-known American dry goods house reports to the writer that he is unable to buy goods expensive, extravagant, and wasteful enough to meet the demands of the wealthy patrons of his store.

On the other hand, the opposition to the tyranny of fashion is gaining ground. Not only is there an increasing number of independent voters in our nation but there are also growing groups of independent thinkers with reference to fashion absurdities. In the lead are the business woman and the athletic woman, but the former sometimes hinders the cause by her mannishness and the latter sometimes by her slouchiness and disregard of the esthetic. There are, fortunately, increasing numbers of individuals who place worth of character above willingness to become slaves to fashion imitation.



In conclusion, it should be said that the chief merit of fashion is that it contributes to progress. Fashions are the experimental laboratory of progress. As the chemist tries a hundred experiments before he finds a useful new combination of elements, so society tries out a hundred new ideas or styles in order to find one fashion of utility. Every invention in any field must stand the test of fashion imitation. If it is worth while, as now and then is the case, it becomes widely adopted, its adoption achieves a degree of stability, it passes from a competitive to a non-competitive basis, and changes its status from the fashionable to the conventional.

## PROBLEMS

### (FASHION IMITATION)

1. Why has Paris been the center from which new fashions in woman's dress have emanated?
2. Is it true that nothing is fashionable until it be deformed?
3. How do you account for the fact that fashions tend to the extreme?
4. Is it true that any particular fashion "can never be generally in vogue"?
5. Is the cash register fashionable?
6. Illustrate the difference between fashion and progress.
7. Do fashions change now more rapidly than formerly?
8. Does extensive fashion imitation refine or debase one's tastes?

9. Why is the high gloss of a gentleman's high hat considered more beautiful than "a similarly high gloss on a thread-bare sleeve"?

10. Why is a given fashion often considered beautiful when in style, and unsightly when out of style?

11. Are things beautiful in proportion to their cost?

12. Who are the more subject to fashion changes, persons guided by their feelings, or by their reason? Why?

13. Explain: "One might as well be dead as out of fashion."

14. "Who are more responsible for fashion absurdities, the women who wear them, or the men who are pleased by them?"

15. Do women give particular attention to dress in order to please themselves, other women, or the men?

16. To whom are the fashion shows the greater benefit, the merchant or the customers?

17. Who are to be blamed the more for useless fashion expenditures, the consumers racing for distinction or the manufacturers and merchants racing for profits?

18. How would you explain the fact that there is less rivalry in consumption of goods "among farmers than among people of corresponding means in the city"?

19. Why is it easier to save money in the country than in the city?

20. Is it true that the standard of living rises so rapidly with every increase in prosperity "that there

is scarcely any let-up in the economic strain”?

21. Give an illustration of a craze that you have observed.

22. Who are more susceptible to craze, “a hopeful, prosperous people” or “a hopeless, miserable people”?

23. Is a dynamic society more craze-ridden than one that moves along the lines of custom?

24. Why do many young men upon graduating from college “engage in moustache contests”?

25. Make a list of the five leading fads in your community at the present time?

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## CHAPTER VIII.

### SUGGESTION-IMITATION PHENOMENA

(Continued)

5. *Convention Imitation.* When a fashion is characterized by wide acceptance, it becomes a convention. Convention, however, is less universal and less permanent than custom.

Convention imitation is based both on prestige and utility. Occasionally a fashion acquires unusual prestige and through extended imitation, sinks into blind and widespread acceptance. Conventional standards are usually composed of much that is irrational. The extraordinary high heel is a useless and dangerous fashion which through prestige has become conventional. In this and many other cases of common conventions, the origin of the convention is found in examples set by the hereditary leisure class. Through prestige, countless conventions govern conduct and tastes.

Utility, also, creates conventions. Useful inventions quickly pass from the fashionable to the conventional, such as the typewriter, the automobile, the tractor. Automobiles, however, serve two purposes—commercial and pleasure. The former are conventional; the latter, fashionable. Pleasure cars permit competitive ornamentation; they are used as forms of

conspicuous consumption of goods. Automobile accessories are usually in the fashionable class.

Conventionality shares with fashionableness the field of contemporary imitation.<sup>1</sup> A convention is non-competitive, is widely adopted as the standard, and is less deliberate than fashion. It may be irrational, but it is not faddish or governed by the mob rule of excitement.

Conventionality, like custom, reveals servile obedience. Conventions are customs in the making; they frequently are customs in the fields of manners or morals.

6. *Custom Imitation.* Custom imitation is the unconscious or conscious acceptance of ideas or ways of doing which developed and spread during generations preceding the present. It is non-competitive and non-deliberative, like convention imitation. The impulses which lead one to convention imitation likewise impel one to accept without analysis the standards of the past.

Custom rules with an iron hand. Custom blinds. Custom is supported by the power of habit. The members of a primitive tribe who were accustomed to carry all loads on their heads were furnished with wheelbarrows and shown how to use them, but they refused to follow instructions. They persisted in carrying the loaded wheelbarrows upon their heads—so great was the strength of custom.

Although it functions throughout life, custom imitation is especially strong in the years of childhood

<sup>1</sup>The best discussion of conventionality has been given by E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, Chs. VII-XI.



and adolescence. After the individual reaches maturity and the later years of life, he asks and thinks in customary ways without often asking why. The fact that a way of doing has been followed successfully in the past implies present usefulness. But utility in the past is not necessarily a guarantee of present serviceableness, because conditions and needs may have changed. Hence, even customs of high repute should be tested occasionally by current needs.

A written constitution may be well suited to its day, but in some ways be a hindrance under the changed social conditions of a later century. Individuals have established endowments by will for worthy purposes; but conditions shifted and the endowment legacy no longer met needs. Moreover, the legacy cannot be changed if in the meantime the giver has died. Endowments for teaching children to card, spin, and knit were worthy at the time, but when inventions in these fields were made and carding, spinning and knitting became machine processes, these endowments, permanent by law, became useless. The custom of keeping windows in houses closed tightly was meritorious in the days when the wind blew in under the rafters, between the logs, and through the floors, but is unhealthy when houses are built better. Race prejudice was necessary in the time of fang and claw, but harmful under the reign of increasing good will. Political autocracy was justified when 99 per cent of the people were illiterate but is anti-social when the large majority are educated and thoughtful.

There are sections of life, both societary and individual, which fall directly under the control of cus-

tom. Language, religion, and law escape with difficulty from the cast-iron grasp of custom. It is custom which maintains the incongruities in a language, dogmatism in a religion, and blind adherence to precedents in law. Custom is likely to rule on the feeling side of life. New ideas do not readily penetrate the feelings; they must appear in the garb of the old—as customs; whereas under the rule of fashion old ideas in order to survive put on the livery of the new.

Under a régime of custom imitation, the leaders are usually elderly men. At least they are men who stand for beliefs that have become established. On the other hand, under the sway of fashion, the leaders are much younger; they have not yet reached their prime and have a willingness to try the new.

In the physically isolated places of the earth, such as mountain regions or islands that are aside from the main arteries of travel, custom imitation is in the ascendance. Likewise in the socially isolated divisions of society, such as the “slums,” custom imitation rules. Moreover, in the socially isolated phases of individual and family life, custom predominates. The newest furniture is put in the living room while out-worn furnishings are used in rear rooms. In all three sets of circumstances there are lacking essential contacts with and stimulations from the new.

Tarde has shown that epochs of custom imitation alternate with periods of fashion imitation. Sometimes custom and convention will be endorsed by one political party and fashion by the other—revealed in the classification of the conservative and the liberal parties, or the conservative and liberal wings of a

single party.

There is a normal and powerful tendency for a crust of custom to form over the psychic life of every group. There is a continuous carrying forward of the mores. The group, thus, has to safeguard itself against stagnation by encouraging a certain amount of inquiry in regard to customary beliefs. If this protective measure is not steadily encouraged, the group will be smothered and crushed beneath the weight of outworn customs, or dynamic forces within the group will gather strength until a revolutionary break is made at some point through the enveloping crust. The value of custom imitation is in its tendency to conserve the best ideas and activities of the past (along with much that is chaff, which has to be winnowed by criticism), and in its stabilizing character.

7. *Rational and Socio-Rational Imitation.* Rational imitation is the imitating of that which has merit in any phase of life. It is imitating that which is efficient, while the imitating of the inefficient is irrational. It includes cross sections of fashion, convention, and custom imitation.

Since customs are ways of doing which have weathered the storms of years, and human nature changes very slowly, a larger proportion of customs are rational than would at first appear. Attention is commonly called to those customs which have become ridiculous because of new life conditions, while the large number of customs which function smoothly and usefully are rarely mentioned. To the degree

that a custom is accepted critically and on the ground of serviceability, the process is rational. Even a degree of custom imitation which is not characterized by deliberation is rational.

Convention imitation is less rational than custom imitation. Conventions often gain expression in the semi-superficial phases of life where glamor or perfunctory respectability rule. Reputability sometimes covers a multitude of foolish conventions. When conventionality is examined, however, in the industrial or the scientific process it ranks high rationally.

Inasmuch as fashion imitation rests largely upon novelty and mere reputability it is ordinarily irrational. Of a hundred new fashions in several fields that might be selected at random probably less than ten per cent could be proved of substantial value.

Rational imitation includes a considerable proportion of custom imitation, a lesser degree of conventionality, and a small percentage of fashionableness. Customs and conventions must be submitted continuously to present-day tests of efficiency, or they will block progress. Fashions also need to be submitted to the test of efficiency, or they will provoke tremendous social losses and dissipations.

Certain phases of group and individual life are under the rigid control of rational standards. Business success follows high standards of efficiency. Scientific investigation must meet the requirements of accuracy, efficiency, and utility.

Among current customs and conventions which are irrational, there are the following:

- (1) French heels.

- (2) Hard, stiff collars for men.
- (3) Wearing furs on a hot summer day.
- (4) Wearing woolen coats by men on a hot day.
- (5) Promiscuous kissing of defenseless babies.
- (6) Piercing ears for earrings.
- (7) Wearing gloves when they are not needed for protection.
- (8) Thin, filmy styles of dress for women in cold weather.
- (9) Considering thirteen an unlucky number.
- (10) Knocking on wood to preserve one's good fortune.
- (11) Wearing spurs by officers who do not ride horses.
- (12) Wearing large hats in church.
- (13) Throwing rice at a wedding couple.
- (14) Wearing hoods on academic gowns.

A vital aspect of rational imitation is socio-rational imitation, which applies not only the ordinary standards of efficiency but also those of human welfare. It adds sociality to rationality.

It has been common to use the tests of efficiency and reasoning but not necessarily socio-rational criteria in the business and manufacturing world. To crush out small competitors has been considered efficient and rational by the large concerns, but they have not been moved in so doing by socio-rational motives. To strike at a critical hour in industrial production has been considered efficient by labor leaders, but in so doing they have not recognized socio-rational demands.

Strength of character and efficiency are terms which



connote rational methods of living and working, but both may be and are used in destructive and disastrous ways to society. Theoretically and carried out in its fullest meaning, psychological efficiency ranks high, but practically it often results in turning men into automatic machines, employees into mechanisms, and spiritual values into material phenomena. Strength of character is no guarantee of socialized action. Villains and criminals often possess great strength of character, but they use it in anti-social directions. Socio-rational imitation adds the standard of social welfare to that of psychological efficiency and strength of character.

Socio-rational imitation is the highest form of rational imitation. In the past rationality has been defined largely in terms of individual happiness and welfare. This idea always had staunch support in hedonism and related ethical theories. Then rationality was given a larger meaning and made to include individual action in accordance with the welfare of small groups, such as one's family group, the business unit, the local club or fraternal organization. It is still considered rational to enact tariff legislation which will benefit a relatively small number of individuals as much as possible and enable them to charge the great mass of consumers in our own country more than they sell the same goods for (at a fair profit) in a foreign country. There are those who believe today in a political democracy in order to secure economic gains by "log-rolling," by undermining law, by preaching the doctrine that labor and capital have nothing in common.

The difference between rational and socio-rational imitation is one of degree. Rationality needs to be extended so that the acts of the individual and of the nation will be measured not simply by local or selfish ends but by humanity standards. Nations are still prone to act along paths that are nationally selfish and to call such action rational. Nations submit hesitatingly and distrustfully to socio-international procedure. And well they may, until all the leading nations achieve a broader basis and a wider horizon than they have known in the past for international conduct. For nations, rational imitation has meant chiefly nationally selfish practices, which have been proclaimed rational. A socio-rational example, however, has been set by the United States when through her president she said that she has no selfish national ends to gain, that she desires no conquest, no dominion, that she is but one of the champions of the rights of mankind.<sup>2</sup>

A socio-rational way of imitating is the most valuable method of imitation which is known to social psychology.

## PROBLEMS

### (CONVENTION AND CUSTOM IMITATION)

1. Explain: "The starched collars that plague my neck are a yoke of servitude; I would put them away if I were strong enough."

<sup>2</sup>Address to Congress by Woodrow Wilson, April 2, 1917.

2. Why is the display of good manners conventional among the leisure classes?

3. Illustrate: "Almost everywhere propriety and conventionality press more mercilessly on woman than on man, thereby lessening her range of choice and dwarfing her will."

4. Name three leading conventions of the day.

5. Why does a Christian gentleman take off his hat in church and a Mohammedan his shoes?

6. What are manners for?

7. Explain: Manners become worse as one travels from East to West—they are best in Asia, fairly good in Europe, bad in America.

8. Explain: "Such generally admired beauties of person or costume as the bandaged foot, the high heel, the wasp waist, the full skirt, and the long train are such as incapacitate from all useful work."

9. Give an original illustration of the statement that physical isolation favors customs.

10. Give a personally observed illustration of the statement that social isolation favors customs.

11. Why has the dress suit for men remained more or less the same the world over?

12. Why may a man wear the same dress suit for years, whereas a woman must have a new dress for almost every formal occasion?

13. What survivals—no longer useful—do you see in the quaintly cut dress coat?

14. Why has it been the custom in the United States to retire generals at sixty-four years of age?

15. Why has it been customary to choose men who are past middle age as popes and judges?

16. Of what custom is Hallowe'en a survival?
17. Is the law library the main laboratory of the law student?
18. What are the good phases of the caste system?
19. Whence did the idea arise that "manual labor is degrading"?
20. Why do so many people believe that pecuniary success is the only success?
21. In what custom did the hood on the academic gown originate?
22. Is our food a matter of personal choice or of convention?
23. How would you classify a man who wore a new red necktie when the white conventional evening dress tie is expected?
24. What customs can you name which have developed in the United States?
25. Why are people in old countries more interested in culture than people in new?
26. Does the study of languages tend to encourage the habit of conformity to the new?
27. How does the mastery of the classics affect one's social stability?
28. Is it true that majorities do not necessarily stand for truth and justice but often for the customs and convictions of the past?
29. What is meant by "the neophobia of the old"?

(RATIONAL AND SOCIO-RATIONAL IMITATION)

30. Is it rational to follow authority?

31. Indicate a rational way of "ascertaining woman's sphere."

32. What are the strongest foes of new and socio-rational ideas?

33. Make an original list of five irrational customs.

34. Which develops a more open, rational mind, the laboratory method, or the text-book method?

35. Is it rational for a religious leader to require his followers "to renounce the extravagances of fashion and to dress simply"?

36. How does the study of hygiene, psychology, and sociology help one to become crank-proof?

37. Why do Americans who eat raw oysters criticize the Japanese for eating uncooked fish?

38. Why do American women criticize Chinese women for compressing their feet longitudinally when they themselves try "to escape the stigma of having normal feet" by "a formidable degree of lateral compression"?

39. Why do we ridicule the customs and beliefs of other peoples while we remain oblivious to the weaknesses of our own customs and fashions?

40. What effect does knowledge of the customs and beliefs of other peoples have upon your own customs and beliefs?

41. Does one's manner of living, or manner of work change the more rapidly? Why?

42. If you were trying to induce "Jews and Christians, Orangemen and Catholics, Germans and Slavs, Poles and Lithuanians" to sink their enmities, how would you proceed?

43. Who has the wider outlook and the freer mind,



the average teacher, or the average parent?

44. In what sense is rational imitation conservative?

45. How is rational imitation radical?

46. Give a new illustration of the statement that "one of the greatest pains to human nature is the pain of a new idea."

47. Explain: "Most of us jump into our beliefs with both feet and stand there."

48. If everybody should become a rational imitator, would progress cease because of the lack of people to try strange and peculiar ideas?

49. Why in this civilized country are so many fashions irrational?

50. Does education always imply rational imitation?

51. What is the main difference between rational and socio-rational imitation?

52. Why have we just begun to talk about socio-rational imitation?

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## CHAPTER IX.

### INVENTION AND LEADERSHIP

1. *The Social Psychology of Invention.* Invention and leadership are related phenomena. In a broad sense, leadership includes inventing, discovering, prophesying, organizing, and also directing natural and social forces. The analysis of leadership must be preceded by a study of the social psychology of invention.

The history of invention is concerned not with "the unoriginal moments of any man's life, nor with the stolid procession that never had a thought of their own," but with the brightest, happiest, creative moments of the most fortunate minds of all races and in part with the most beneficent contributions of mankind.<sup>1</sup>

(1) Invention means coming upon, seeing into, and perceiving new relationships. Two hitherto unconnected ideas come together in the mind, a mental flash occurs, the ideas are correlated, and invention results.

To see a new relationship is the essence of invention. In ancient Babylon, individual characters were stamped upon brick, but it was not until centuries later that the simple process of putting the individual char-

<sup>1</sup>O. T. Mason, *Origins of Invention*, p. 28.

acters together and of substituting printing for writing was invented. When Heracles undertook the task of cleaning the Augean farmyard where 3000 oxen had been stabled for thirty years he first used his imagination, and instead of trying laborious methods he perceived that by turning the course of the Alpheus and Peneus rivers through the stables, the gigantic task would be accomplished in short order. According to Herodotus, Cyrus the Great was halted in his attack upon Babylon by the massive city walls, until a new idea flashed into his imagination, whereupon he ordered the waters of the Euphrates turned aside, and sending his army along the river bed and under the walls of the city, he took by surprise the hosts of Nebuchadnezzar, who had not anticipated such a stratagem.

(2) Inventions spring from individuality. To the extent that one's individuality finds expression in his work he invents. Every imitation is accompanied by at least a small degree of initiation. Since the imitator sees life at a somewhat different angle from the initiated, he will unconsciously, if not deliberately, incorporate new elements into the process—which is fundamental to all invention. The copying of the acts of another is influenced by the personal equation of the imitator. It is impossible for one person to copy exactly the handwriting of another, except presumably by diligent, painstaking, and concentrated effort. Hence invention and imitation are opposite poles of the same phenomenon—every imitation results in at least a slight modification, or invention.

<sup>2</sup>J. M. Baldwin, *The Individual and Society*, p. 149.

"Invention is as natural as imitation,"<sup>2</sup> since it is the normal expression of individuality. Invention commences early in life. When the child begins to speak, he begins to invent. He names (a process of invention) his parents and himself (pa pa, ma ma, ba ba). He is full of new and original potentialities. Parents and teachers have their minds set upon standardizing him. But in the necessary disciplining, the parent and even the teacher often neglect to study and to encourage his inventive ability. The unique phases of his personality are likely to receive no studied attention unless they take the form of obstreperousness and recalcitrancy. It rarely occurs that he receives other than repressive treatment.

The teacher in one of our public schools could do nothing with a small Italian boy who was unruly beyond description. The principal gave up the boy and turned him over to a special school. There the teacher quietly watched the newcomer when he was playing in the schoolyard. His new playmates soon discovered his special ability to sing. Before the first day was over at the parental school, the wayward youth was playing truant, singing for pay to his new found admirers. He was singing rag-time, but with a voice that the parental school teacher recognized as remarkable. "Tony," said the teacher, "can you sing something from any of the Italian operas?" Immediately in tones of amazing purity, Tony sang *La donna e mobile*. "Would you like to take some music lessons?" asked the teacher. With tears quickly welling into his eyes, Tony's heart melted and his mind leaped with the flash and fire of a new enthusiasm—



and yet an enthusiasm as old as the Italian race. He caused no more trouble to the school, and more important, his ability to create art—that is, to invent—received recognition and effective encouragement.

In hearing new words and terms, the child commonly invents meanings for them. When he invents a wrong interpretation, his parents may scold him. They fail to see that what is a mistake to them is an invention of the child and that they may be suppressing what is most creative in their child. The little girl who upon seeing a homely yellow cat, said: "There goes an orange meow," had made a crude and simple invention of terms. The child who wanted to be tucked into bed at night and said: "Tighten me up on both sides, Daddy," expressed in her own way an inaccurate but new connection of activities. In standardizing children there is danger of being blind to the inventiveness that crops out through individuality. The danger lurks everywhere, from the methods of parental disciplining to the habit of some university instructors who grade high the students who memorize everything that the instructors expound, but do nothing else.

Invention, then, usually springs from the individualistic side of personality, in much the same way that imitation is a resultant of sociality. Self initiative and assertion produce innovations. Inventions have not usually been made for the purpose of rendering public service but to satisfy some desire, or to secure an answer to some problem. Incidental to the process is the individual's love of inventing. The more creative the invention the greater the satisfac-

tion which comes to the individual.

(3) Effort leads to invention. The dynamic element in all instincts is fundamental to invention. The motor character of ideas is found in invention. Long, persistent mental toil is nearly always the price of an invention; the lazy rarely innovate. Almost all the greatest inventors have been indefatigable workers.

Invention may be as natural as imitation, but it is immeasurably more difficult. The inventor frequently finds himself against a stone wall, and it is only by concentrated effort in apparently hopeless and endless experimenting that the problem is solved. Individual initiative, agility of mind, and focalized attention—these are essential to invention.

(4) Curiosity culminates in invention. The natural trend of the curiosity instinct is toward discovery. It is the inquiring mind which discovers, invents, creates. Inquiring, questioning, longing are the antecedents of invention.

The curiosity instinct interprets life in terms of problems—problems which call for answers and solutions. The inventive mind always is characterized by problems—problems which call forth incessant energy and focalization of effort. It is the person who has no questions to ask who rarely invents. Questioning is a precious trait, because it precedes invention.

(5) Invention is problem-solving. Invention arises from individual needs, from problems, from attempts to extricate oneself from difficulties, from a reasonable degree of worrying. The starting point is a problem; the next essential is a desire to solve the problem; then collection and analysis of data are

necessary; and finally, a new and useful relationship is discovered.

In this process the inventor may come upon an entirely unexpected relationship; the invention, or discovery, may be different from the one for which the long search is made. In studying an apparatus designed to repeat Morse characters, Mr. Edison was looking for possible ways of improving the instrument when his attention was attracted to peculiar humming noises. He perceived a resemblance of these sounds to the human voice—and caught a vision which led to an unanticipated invention, the phonograph. Daguerre left an underexposed plate in a cupboard and later found that it was developed. He could not understand the cause. In the cupboard, however, he found a capsule of mercury, a metal which discharges steam at ordinary temperature. He experimented with underexposed plates and mercury—the result was the daguerreotype.

Problem-solving is fundamental to all invention and discovery. A desire, a need, a problem; concentration of attention upon the problem; the trial and error method of experimentation; finally, the expected or the unanticipated discovery: such is invention. Hence it may be seen that the process is relatively simple and the possibilities of making useful inventions are open to almost any energetic mind.

It may be stated here that psychologically there is no essential difference between discovering and inventing. Consider the discovery of America: first, there was a problem, namely, to travel by direct route to India; then the brilliant idea that Europe was re-

lated or connected with India by the Western seas; then, the search, the long journey, the steadfast westward gaze, and the holding against tremendous odds to the westward course; finally, land, not India, but a new continent.

(6) Invention is produced by an inventive atmosphere. Invention is "catching." The spirit of invention spreads and inventive enthusiasm runs high. Nations experience inventive epochs. An age of fashion, as opposed to one of custom, represents inventive craze as well as imitative craze. Behind countless superficial, artificial fashions is the spirit of invention, and out of the process a few worthy inventions are produced.

About the year 1500 there was a group of land discoveries—discovering land became the fashion. Land discoveries flocked together. Since 1917 there has been a series of air-transportation inventions. One air-transportation invention or achievement stimulates countless individuals to greater efforts; thus new records in this field are continually being made.

The inventive atmosphere is partly created by social stimulation. A whole nation can pass into a social stupor, and individuals be put to sleep by social inertia, and live and die without being aware of needs which can be met by invention. Social satisfaction and stagnation kill inventiveness. On the other hand, social activity and recognition promote the inventive spirit.

Industry and business have eagerly sought the inventor of material processes, and consequently the inventions in these fields have overshadowed all

others. Recognition in the realm of art in our country comes tardily, and creative art as a result has been held back.

(7) Invention is sometimes caused by necessity. "Necessity is the mother of invention." By virtue of circumstances Robinson Crusoe became an inventor. Many a phlegmatic and unimaginative person has found himself in situations where he was obliged to invent. Exhaustion of productive lands compelled experimentation in dry farming and irrigation. An ultimate scarcity of crude oils will force the invention of a substitute for gasoline as a source of power for driving automobiles, and then of a substitute for the gasoline engine.

(8) Invention is modification. Nearly all new ideas and appliances which reach the United States Patent Office are classified as improvements. In other words, an invention is usually a projection from a group of older inventions.

The invention of the steam engine was not made in its entirety in the year 1769 by James Watt, neither did it take place on the day that the attention of Watt was centered on the rising and falling lid of the tea-kettle. The invention of the steam engine goes back to the aelipile made by Hero of Alexandria in the second century, B. C., to a type of steam windmill that was worked out by G. Branca about 1629, to the steam apparatus which was manufactured by the Marquis of Worcester in 1663, to the application of steam power to various kinds of machines by Thomas Savery about 1700, to Papin's idea of the piston, to Newcomen's piston engine, a model of



which Watt was repairing when in 1763 he set to work to eliminate the waste of steam due to alternate chilling and heating of the cylinder. With this problem in mind, Watt worked for six years before he had perfected the separate condenser in 1769, the date at which it is popularly said that the steam engine was invented. This invention, therefore, involved more than the observation of a tea-kettle; it included countless improvements that had been made by many persons throughout a long period of time.

The modifications which constitute inventions are of three classes: (a) natural evolutions, (b) transformations, and (c) marked deviations.<sup>3</sup> Qualitatively, this order represents an ascending scale. The difference is one of degree. As a result of the increasing difficulty which is involved, this schedule constitutes, numerically, a descending scale. (a) Inventions that are natural evolutions of previously discovered relationships are the easiest to make and the most common. To change a gourd into a receptacle for carrying water, to use a stone as a weapon, to make a cave into a cave-house, or to give a slant to perpendicular windshields—these are natural evolutions. They range from innumerable small changes, scarcely worthy to be called inventions, to transformations of materials.

(b) Some inventions are complex combinations of known relationships. The results are transformations of the constituent elements. To connect a bucket and a rope with a wheel for the purpose of

<sup>3</sup>See the extended discussion of this theme by F. Paulhan, *Psychologie de l'invention, livre II*.

drawing water from a well, to attach a foot lever to a spinning-wheel so as to change the immediate source of power and free the hand, or to put pneumatic tubes upon automobile wheels: these are transformations in ordinary usages.

(c) Marked deviations from current knowledge and skill are the highest forms which invention takes. They involve the recognition of relationships apparently unrelated. They range up into the most brilliant findings, conceptions, and creations of geniuses. The invention of the cipher, the discovery of fire, the application of steam to machinery, the making of an instrument for transmitting and reproducing human speech between points that are miles apart, the conception that the earth is round, the creation of a national epic: such are a few examples of marked deviations.

(9) Inventions are neutral. They may destroy or construct society. A new chemical combination can be used to human advantage or disadvantage. The invention of gunpowder, nitroglycerin, T N T may be made the servants or the destroyers of man. The printing press is an instrument for carrying the best socialized teachings of the New Testament around the world, or to disseminate morbid indecencies. An aeroplane may carry food to dying children or bombs to destroy children.

(10) Inventions are cyclical. An ordinary invention passes through a cycle of existence. Tarde has recognized three stages in such a cycle—an incline, a plateau, and a decline.<sup>4</sup> (a) The incline is often very

<sup>4</sup>*The Laws of Imitation*, pp. 126, 158, 174.

sloping. Inventions are sometimes accepted with great reluctance and after long delays. The steam engine, traveling at the fearful rate of ten or fifteen miles an hour was long considered by many people a work of the devil. The automobile has received readier acceptance. The steepness of the incline of common adoption depends upon the nature and the number of the prejudices which must be vanquished and upon the mental speed and activity of the people. A book that is far ahead of the age in which it appears will likely remain unrecognized during the life-time of the author. Beethoven died almost unknown. Mendel's laws of heredity were not recognized until forty years after their discovery.

(b) The plateaux of an invention may be short or long, depending upon its usefulness and the mental activity of its environment. A "best seller" may remain such for only one month or it may continue such for twenty months. The bicycle enjoyed a short-lived popularity, because of the perfecting of the more serviceable automobile. The sailing vessel enjoyed first place for centuries as a means of ocean transportation, until the steamboat demonstrated its greater utility.

(c) The decline may be abrupt or gradual. As a rule the decline is gently sloping, for an invention that is widely adopted acquires the sanction of custom and holds on with tenacity long after it has been superseded in serviceability by another invention. Inventions tend to become encased in the feelings, and to die slowly. Superstitions possess a long drawn out decline. Occasionally, however, an invention is made,

such as a new machine or a new industrial process, and established machines and processes are discarded suddenly.

There are many inventions which live on—with no decline in sight, such as the ethical teachings in the New Testament, the metric system, printing, the idea that the earth is spherical. Others survive as parts of new and better inventions, such as the wheel—in the wheelbarrow, the wagon, the automobile, the watch.

(11) Inventions are cumulative. Inventing leads to further inventing. Inventing may become habitual.

The succession of inventions is not entirely accidental. America could hardly have been discovered by Europeans through conscious plans until the idea had been conceived and accepted that the earth is round. The wagon could not have been invented before the wheel; the sailing vessel, before the boat; cooking processes, before the discovery of fire; the watch-spring, before steel. Therefore there is a logic of inventions as well as of events.

Inventions produce inventions. They are gregarious; they come in droves. Every valuable invention releases possibilities of further inventions. Inventions are not entirely sporadic, but follow one another in a rough sequence.

No invention is complete and final. Every invention presages others. An invention is a potential parent of generations of unborn inventions. The pressure upon the truly imaginative, thoughtful person to invent is strong. Persons are called to be creators and joint heirs with the Great Creator.

(12) Civilization is an invention. We live in a world of inventions. Through imitation, inventions are omnipresent. Every word in this book is the invention of some one. The chair in which you sit; the pictures upon the walls; the building which houses you; food, from the rolled oats or puffed wheat in the morning to the Neapolitan ice cream in the evening are inventions. In eating, your hands and mouth are busy with inventions. The automobile, the street, the office, the telephone, the alphabet, language—all is invention. We live and move and have our being in invention.

Civilization is a synthesis of inventions. How many invented processes are combined in the fountain pen or the typewriter with which I work. Consider the inventions in a baseball game. Who can disentangle and write the history of the inventions in the Constitution of the United States?

Everything and every idea bears the injunction: Let us invent. Educational systems have overworked imitation, but scarcely tapped the possibilities of encouraging invention. Individuality, initiative, concentration, invention, creation—this is the logic of invention.

## PROBLEMS

1. Can you name anything that you daily use which is not an invention?
2. Why are so many of the persons who have made inventions unknown to us?



3. What psychic characteristics are essential in an inventor?
4. Explain: The time is ripe for an invention.
5. If it is natural to invent, why do we not invent more than we do?
6. Explain: There are few persons who are qualified to use inventions.
7. Distinguish between invention and leadership.
8. Distinguish between copying and adopting the methods of others.
9. Can you name an invention which is not used both for and against the welfare of society?
10. If Edison had lived in Central Africa, what would have been the nature of his inventions?
11. What five inventions come first to your mind as the world's greatest inventions?
12. Describe the probable mental process which immediately preceded the invention of the bow and arrow.
13. Give from your observation an illustration of any one of the twelve phases of invention which are mentioned in this chapter.
14. What elements in the social psychology of invention can you name which this chapter does not mention?

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## CHAPTER X.

### INVENTION AND LEADERSHIP

*(Continued)*

2. *The Social Psychology of Leadership.* The leader is a social inventor. He is the chief factor in the invention-imitation process. Three important questions will be considered in this chapter. (1) What are the fundamental elements in leadership? (2) What are the principal types of leaders? (3) Under what conditions are geniuses matured?

Leadership arises from the self-assertive impulses of personality. It is a crystallization of self-initiative. Tendencies to think, to act, to achieve are basic to leadership. In a similar way the curiosity impulses and problem-solving impulses are fundamental.

Individuality produces leadership. Every person possesses by birth some characteristics which distinguish him from every one else. It is this margin of uniqueness which gives each individual a natural leadership advantage. When we describe a person as a round peg in a square hole, or as having missed his calling, we mean that he has ignored his margin of natural uniqueness. Vocational guidance partially depends upon discovering the individual's margin of variation. This margin gives every person a field of development and activity in which no one else can com-

pete with him. In this non-competitive phase of personality there is unlimited room for self-expression, invention, and leadership.

Out of this margin individuality develops. Uniqueness of inherited traits combined with uniqueness of experience spells individuality. Thus every person builds up a point of view which is distinctly his own, which sets him off from all his fellows, and which is the essence of originality.

A fine physique is essential for certain types of leadership and helpful in all. As a substitute for a tall stature, Napoleon appeared before his soldiers on a horse. E. B. Gowin found that the executives of insurance companies are taller in stature than the average person who holds an insurance policy, that bishops are taller than the rank and file of clergymen, university presidents than presidents of small colleges, city superintendents than principals in small towns, sales managers than salesmen, railroad presidents than station agents.<sup>1</sup> The group ranks a tall man superior to a short man, but the group judges unscientifically.

Physical energy and endurance are more important qualifications than height alone. They more than compensate for stature. In the long run they enable the individual to build a reputation and to make a record of achievement which are essential to permanent leadership.

Mental energy and endurance is a more consequen-

<sup>1</sup>These leaders also weigh more than average individuals, but they are undoubtedly better fed and better cared for physically—circumstances which partially explain the greater weight, and are a result as well as a cause. Cf. E. B. Gowin, *The Executive and His Control of Men*, which contains a large amount of data upon leadership of the executive type.

tial element in leadership than physical abilities. In the clash of mind with mind superior psychical qualities quickly assert themselves and win recognition. It is unfortunate, however, that countless persons sacrifice physical energy in securing a one-sided development of mentality. Pity rather than praise is justly accorded the college "grind," or the business man who sacrifices health for financial success. "I work fifteen hours a day," proudly asserts a professional leader, but later finds himself the victim of nervous and physical exhaustion and unable to enjoy the fruits of his achievements as a leader.

A still more important factor in leadership is focalization of psychic energy.<sup>2</sup> The genius is a person whose psychic energy is highly focalized. If the process has been carried out by nature, the product is the born-genius. If the focalization is done by the individual himself, the result is a genius by hard work and concentration. The first is a genius by inheritance; the second, by personal initiative. The born-genius has had the nature and type of the focalization of his psychic energy determined for him, for example, in the line of artistic or of mathematical ability. The genius by hard work chooses for himself the direction in which he shall focalize his energies—vocational counsellors have an important function to perform in the making of this type of genius. The persistent concentration of the attention of an ordinary person in one line of mental endeavor will give that individual the rank of a leader in that sphere.

<sup>2</sup>A term used by Lester F. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, p. 36. Cf. Ch. XVIII of *Pure Sociology*.



Geniuses by virtue of deliberate focalization are far more numerous than born-geniuses. They are better balanced, more practical, but less brilliant and spectacular. They are the product of the individual's freedom of choice. If nature has not focalized one's psychic energy for him, he may do so for himself.

A genius is often a person "who takes infinite pains." Many a student deservedly ranks high, because of his capacity to work indefinitely at the details of his tasks, while at the same time he gives proper attention to fundamentals. A former student of mine who is now a university professor would work incessantly in making accurate and illuminating charts and graphs to illustrate his papers in each of his classes. He continually did more than was required; he won promotion because he worked painstakingly.

Furthermore, a leader must be a "moral dynamo." He must command confidence and respect to a special degree. Ideally, he must be master of himself before he can maintain the esteem and especially the loyalty of others. To the extent that he does not possess supreme control of his own passions and desires he is handicapped in controlling other people. Oftentimes he must have moral courage to stand out from his fellows and even against them. He must not allow himself to be blown about or to run slavishly with the crowd and public opinion.

The successful leader must possess superior innate ability and faith in his own powers. He must not boast or swagger, but exhibit poise, indifference, and self-control under danger. By virtue of his exceptional ability, of his faith, and of his poise, he is some-

what inscrutable. It was the inscrutableness, for example, of Washington and Grant which increased their leadership-prestige.

The leader is a seer. At least he sees clearly a few of the fundamental needs of his group. He sees through these problems to their solutions. He perceives what the times demand more clearly than do his fellows; he possesses more foresight than they. He is reasonable—socially reasonable. When he works through group problems adequately and practically, a position of leadership is assured him.

The leader is emanatory. He throws out one idea or suggestion after another. His followers turn to him for new ideas and proposals as plants turn toward the sun for light and heat. He sends out programs. Dr. Francis E. Clark, or "Father" Clark, the founder of the United Society of Christian Endeavor, announced a new two-year world program at each biennial convention. One program would not be carried out completely before another would be enunciated.

The leader possesses authority, either personal or civil. Personal authority springs from ability plus training. Civil authority comes from appointment or election to office, and carries with it the prestige of public position or rank. The inefficient may receive political preferment and occupy for a time a position of leadership. Both personal and civil authority may overbalance the individual and create an autocrat.

The ability to organize individuals often makes a leader. To arouse individuals in support of a new cause, formulate plans of organization, analyze the abilities of each individual, and see that each seeks and

finds his proper place in the organized whole—these traits constitute leadership.

The leader must be worthy of obedience. Loyalty is at least one-half of all leadership-obedience phenomena. Obedience implies confidence in the purposes of the leader. A person with social purposes commands social power. In brief, leadership involves societary problems, concentrated attention upon these problems, trial and error methods, searching for correct solutions, and the discovery and the enacting of societary programs.

A leader drives or draws. In a military, autocratic country the former type predominates; in a democratic nation, the latter form receives recognition. Among semi-civilized tribes leaders are usually of the arbitrary type; among highly civilized Christian peoples, leaders develop the finer qualities of magnetism.

The autocratic leader is commonly a representative of a powerful organization. He personifies borrowed force, he frequently appropriates impersonal, arbitrary ways from the institution which fosters him. In a democracy autocrats are hated. If the leader shows by his speech and actions that he considers himself a social superior, he courts downfall. Discharged private soldiers are often heard to say: "I'm through with saluting officers." If pressed to explain their attitude, they commonly reply: "When we were overseas, our officers 'rode' us." Ordinarily, autocracy has no place among the leaders in a democracy.

The magnetic leader, on the other hand, is characterized by his willingness to serve. He is human. He is of the herd and like a good shepherd. He must not

get too far ahead of his group lest its members fail to recognize him and ignore him or even crucify him. If a leader sincerely and unostentatiously meets group needs, he will command not only the respect, but the love of his followers.

Leaders are primarily executive or intellectual. The difference is partly in heredity and partly in concentration of attention. The executive is characterized by greater physical force, "push," and energy, but by less breadth of knowledge and by less depth of theoretical thinking than the intellectual leader. He is usually in closer contact with people and community conditions, and is more red-blooded and aggressive. He generally commands the higher salary and receives recognition from society sooner than the leader in scientific, or literary thought. The intellectual leader works for ends that are farther removed, leads a less exhaustive life, enjoys greater freedom, and by later generations is often rated higher.

Leaders are either group manipulators, group representatives, group builders, or group originators.<sup>3</sup> The group manipulator is sensitive to group emotions and able to express in agreeable ways the desires of the people. Often by oratorical or spectacular methods, he obtains wide popularity, political preferment, or great wealth. As a rule he fails to give his constituents adequate returns for their investment in him. His objective is not their advantage but his own gain. He frequently leads his followers after false gods.

<sup>3</sup>The classificaton of leaders which is given by Martin Conway in *The Crowd in Peace and War*, Chapters VI-VIII, unduly expands the crowd concept, and at the same time inadequately provides for genuine group builders and originators.

Having once gained the confidence of the group, he forces his will upon his victims. He often hypnotizes his constituents. In this class there is the advertiser who announces something which catches the fancy but possesses little utility or beauty, the seller of oil stock who makes dazzling forecasts, the ward boss who promises his listeners a new era of prosperity. The group manipulator takes note of the vague desires of the crowd, crystallizes these inchoate yearnings, and capitalizes them in terms of personal aggrandizement. He drives his subjects hither and yon at vital sacrifices to themselves and not infrequently to his own ultimate destruction. His strength is in his understanding of human nature and in his hypnotic influence. When these fail, he is lost. No leader can eventually succeed who smothers or stamps out the self-expression of the group members.

The group representative, while a personification of the unexpressed feelings as well as of the formulated opinions of his constituents, is also the spokesman of their will. A judge is a group representative. Under the pure democratic form of a republic, the legislator is expected to represent public opinion. In our country, we often fail to keep our legislators apprised concerning our attitudes even on fundamental issues—unless we represent professionally a special interest. As a result, legislators are continually subjected to the danger of degenerating into manipulators or “politicians.”

The group builder, in the deepest sense of the term, tries to find out the best interests of his group and to lead accordingly. Selfish desires are taboo. The con-



cern of such a leader is entirely in the welfare of his fellows and in helping them to live and act together with increasing harmony, justice, and progress. He is willing to give up his life that the group may be saved. He determines the causes of social friction, injustice, or inertia, outlines steps of reconstruction, and pilots the way. The group builder works through all the good will that he can summon. He organizes social good will within his group and harmonizes antagonistic attitudes wherever possible without sacrificing societary principles. If he must antagonize, he proceeds in a social spirit and wherever feasible substitutes understanding for ignorance, good will for ill, and organization for chaotic strife. He does not try to conquer, for conquering, *per se*, fails to win respect and love, and leads to the dangerous desire for further conquering. The group builder tries to discover what is harmonious, just, and constructive for his group, and then endeavors to weave these ideals into the life of his group.

The group originator is first possessed by a great idea. From that basis he proceeds to the winning of individuals to the acceptance of that idea. He may press forward through organized effort—the common method today—or by unorganized activities, as in the case of the Founder of Christianity. He aims to create leaders, to stimulate the spirit of leadership in conjunction with the spirit of obedience in every individual, and to provide for the largest and richest development of personalities.

Special talent and genius produce leaders in all fields, but what are the conditions under which these

qualities mature? The biologists have not yet given a satisfactory explanation of the appearance of special talent and of genius. The fundamental causes are not known. Special ability is as likely, or almost as likely, to appear in a child who is born in a tenement as in one who is born in a mansion.

The appearance of special ability is not confined to one sex. Historically, woman did not have opportunity to translate her latent talent into achievement, and hence it is not known how much ability woman possesses. In recent decades, however, in our country, woman has been forging ahead rapidly and availing herself of increasing opportunities—a tendency which presages a greatly augmented degree of leadership on her part. In competing with men in nearly all lines of human endeavor she is demonstrating her versatile abilities. In the public schools today girls remain long after boys become uneasy and leave. As a class, women are availing themselves of a more liberal education than are men. Since a liberal education is basic to societary leadership, women may attain the controlling positions in forming public opinion and hence of determining the nature of social progress.

It is generally admitted—a point of vast significance—that more geniuses are born than ever attain prominence. The belief of Galton that every genius will overcome his environment and push his way through to eminence<sup>4</sup> is ill founded. Disease, poverty, immoral conduct and similar factors prevent potential geniuses from reaching the maturity of their powers and even cause their deaths in adolescence or child-

<sup>4</sup>*Hereditary Genius.*

hood. The contention of Lombroso that the genius is a pathological phenomenon, to be treated as a mental degenerate, or even as an insane person,<sup>5</sup> finds support in many instances, but as a rule is manifestly without scientific standing. The strength of the argument lies in the fact that genius often represents such a high degree of focalization of psychic energy in some one direction that the individual may easily become unbalanced.

If we grant that far more geniuses are born than become eminent, we must learn the causes of this social loss. The heart of the matter is found in the answer to the question: What are the necessary conditions for the maturing of genius? Odin,<sup>6</sup> a French writer of the nineteenth century, Lester F. Ward,<sup>7</sup> and recently, G. R. Davies<sup>8</sup> have discussed with increasing scientific accuracy the decisive factors in transforming inherited talent and special ability into actual achievement. A study of the facts shows five fundamental conditions. (1) A social environment which is mentally stimulating is necessary. Genius cannot mature under a widespread spell of mental stagnation. There must be mental contacts which strike fire and some general appreciation of the achievements that a genius can effect.

(2) As a rule, thorough training is necessary. There are few successes today that do not rest upon a complete mastery of the given fields. It is becoming increasingly true that special ability must have a com-

<sup>5</sup>*The Man of Genius.*

<sup>6</sup>*Genèse des grands hommes.*

<sup>7</sup>*Applied Sociology, Part II.*

<sup>8</sup>*Social Environment, Ch. IV.*

mensurate scholastic and practical training as a basis for complete self-expression. The greater the potential ability the more valuable an extensive and intensive training. The education of the individual must begin early in life, proceed systematically, and be prolonged in order that all the potential qualities may be fully and permanently developed.

(3) There must be freedom from the struggle for bread. If energy is continually expended in securing the necessities of life, genius is hampered. There must be sufficient means, as a rule, to provide opportunities of travel and research. The individual must be free to provide himself with the best tools and to furnish himself with the best equipment that is available—or else fall below his largest possibilities.

(4) Genius must occupy a position of self-respect and of social respect. A genius is handicapped if he grows up in a neighborhood of vile associates, as a member of a despised race, or where luxury spreads an enervating virus.

(5) If genius is not socialized, it may be wasted in anarchistic or anti-social directions. A large amount of special ability is squandered simply because it works at cross purposes with fundamental social processes.

In summing up the discussion on genius it should be said that genius tends to create its own opportunities, but that it often fails. An unenlightened environment often fails to give ability encouragement or even recognition, and it dies out unrecognized by even its possessor. The impingement of the economic and social environment often crushes out genius. It has been estimated that for every genius among the poorer

classes who attains prominence, 99 remain potential or are early crushed out. Society must come to the rescue. Complete education of the poorer classes will create more opportunities for development of talent and genius than these traits can make for themselves.

In this connection vocational guidance has functions of the greatest importance. It must develop methods for detecting geniuses and persons who are capable of becoming geniuses by hard work. A still more important function is to diagnose adolescents and encourage them to enter lines of activity, not primarily where they can earn the most money, but where they can best express their whole personalities. From the development of a rich personality arises the deepest joys of life and the greatest opportunities for societary leadership.

The summary concerning genius involves certain conclusions regarding the larger field of leadership. In times of social change, unrest, and transition, leadership is at a premium. In periods of grave social disturbance and distress, the autocratic leader is the hero; in the decades of gradual social evolution, the magnetic leader is the effective director of human events. Since much of the history of the world has been marked by social upheaval and since the world loves the heroic and the spectacular, the hero type of leadership has been exalted and the quiet, pervasive, and magnetic type underrated. Under all conditions the social problem-solver becomes the effective leader, and the world's problem-solvers become the world's leaders. Society, on the other hand, must provide society-wide education and other favoring ad-



vantages in order that problem-solving ability may have ample opportunities for unfolding. The world's problem-solvers who succeed furthest in turning achievement into human improvement and who are the most successful in stimulating the socialized creative spirit and in enriching the quality of personalities are the world's greatest leaders.

## PROBLEMS

1. Whom do you consider the five greatest leaders in the United States today?
2. What is meant by individual ascendancy as opposed to social ascendancy?
3. Is "the proverbial individualism of the farmer" the same as individuality and potential leadership?
4. Why are we blind to the extent of our indebtedness to society and "therefore apt to imagine our individuality much more pronounced than it actually is"?
5. When is one's personality at its lowest ebb?
6. Are leaders egotists?
7. Explain: Be your own Thomas A. Edison.
8. Illustrate: A leader represents a focalization of psychic energy.
9. Explain: It is the work of a leader "to pull triggers in the minds of his followers."
10. Are boys who are reared in wealthy homes, or in poor homes, the more likely to become good leaders?
11. Should a leader draw or drive people?

12. Does progress in social stability "lessen the hero values of the leader, and exalt his directive capacity"?

13. Who is the better leader, he who presents fully developed programs to the people, or he who stimulates the people to suggest and develop programs themselves?

14. Can a student do closely assigned and mapped-out work in several college classes, and at the same time develop qualities of leadership?

15. Should an elected leader of the people really represent the wishes of his constituents, or should he exercise his own judgment?

16. Is the control of patronage a source of strength to a statesman?

17. Should a general go to the front when technically he can direct the fighting better from the distant headquarters?

18. How can a leader of splendid ability but of immoral habits be prevented from demoralizing the group?

19. Why does leadership assume maximum importance in times of transition?

20. What are the basic qualities of a successful public speaker?

21. What are the characteristics of a successful advertiser?

22. How may a successful advertiser be a dangerous member of society?

23. What are the differences between convincing an individual in the classroom and convincing him when he is a member of a crowd?

24. What are the characteristics of a successful yell leader?

25. Why do the sons of leaders such as self-made men, rarely show the qualities of leadership which their fathers manifested?

26. Why is the term, "self-made" man, erroneous?

27. Have "all advances in civilization" been due to leaders?

28. Would you say that "the obtrusiveness of personality and temperament in literature, painting, and music is a sign of advancement or a mark of backwardness"?

29. Should leadership in the family be centered in one person, or should the leadership be divided?

30. Do women generally vote as their husbands indicate or do they exercise independent judgment?

31. Are the rural or the urban communities in the United States in the greater need of leadership?

32. Why are some of the world's most valuable leaders unpopular?

33. When should a leader be an agitator; when, a compromiser; and when, a "standpatter"?

34. In what ways can you distinguish between a demagogue and a statesman?

35. Would a course in the Social Psychology of Leadership have a useful place in the college curriculum?

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## CHAPTER XI.

### THE NATURE OF GROUPS

Man is gregarious. He lives and moves and has his being in associations. Human groups may be classified as either temporary or permanent. All are in transition—even the so-called permanent groups.

1. *Temporary Groups.* Temporary groups are represented by the crowd, the mob, the assembly, and by the public (a quasi-temporary form of association).

Some crowds are heterogeneous, *i. e.*, are composed of persons who at the given time possess conflicting purposes. A number of persons at a busy street corner are a heterogeneous group—they have varied purposes and are going in different directions. The real crowd is homogeneous; its members have a common aim. Further, each member is aware that the other individuals are stirred by the same purposes as he is.

The homogeneous crowd must have a leader. It moves frantically until it gets a leader. The members of a homogeneous crowd ordinarily suffer a lessened sense of individual responsibility, because responsibility is distributed among all. Anonymity tends to prevail. Excitement reigns, feelings rise, and the rational processes of thought are hindered. The members experience a heightened state of suggestibility.

People act less rationally when under crowd influence than as individuals. Feelings rather than reason secure control. Crowds act quickly but reason slowly. The crowd is recidivistic; its members revert to lower standards than ordinarily.

Freedom of speech is rarely tolerated by a crowd; anyone who attacks the follies of the crowd is hooted. A crowd of capitalist financiers would refuse to listen to the harangue of a Bolshevik; and a crowd of Bolsheviks would not sit supinely under the lashing of a capitalist.

A person who makes an important decision while under the influence of the crowd has a hard struggle before him. Such decisions must usually be followed consistently by personal, thoughtful, and sincere attention on the part of interested people.

To get people together in a crowd offers a quick way to unify them. But the charlatan and mountebank are prone to manipulate people through crowd influence, whereas the educated advocate confines himself to addressing assemblies. To address a crowd one must usually belittle himself and reap a harvest of unstable decisions.

More wild enthusiasm for a given project can be created in a crowd than anywhere else. But such enthusiasm is generally swift to vanish—it lacks the depth which is worthy of any important enterprise.

There are spectator crowds and participator crowds. The spectator group may be single- or double-minded; it may be united or bi-partisan. The bi-partisan spectator crowd is in constant danger of degenerating. An athletic contest brings out two spectator

crowds. First one spectator crowd and then the other will give vent to expressions such as these: "Kill them," "Give them the axe," "They are a rotten bunch." If the contest is close, the members of both spectator crowds will likely give way to their feelings and revert to blindly biased and almost savage partisanship—forgetting that the fundamental element in the contest is to afford physical training to all the members of both teams and exhibitions of skill for the enjoyment of the onlookers. The evils of intercollegiate athletics thrive because of recidivistic tendencies of spectator crowds. There would be no intercollegiate football games were it not for the presence of spectators—hence the responsibility of spectator crowds is grave. If the influence of such a crowd causes students literally to hate neighboring educational institutions, then the main functions of athletics and education alike have been prostituted.

The participator crowd is a mob. It is a group of people who stone, smash, frighten, burn, kill. The participator crowd may be constructive, but usually becomes vicious. The mob is a group of persons in an unusually high state of suggestibility. It is a crowd that has become frantic. It is not necessarily a group of ignorant or wicked persons, but often is a group of ordinarily intelligent individuals who for the time being have resigned their individual standards. The mob is a monster, possessing gigantic power which causes it to throb throughout its being. It is a tornado, using its pent-up forces irresponsibly and ruthlessly.

The mob curve rises by a succession of curves until

the objective of the mob is attained or until its force is spent. Then the curve falls rapidly, almost helplessly perpendicular.

Panic is a mob phenomenon that is caused by sudden and overwhelming fear. Napoleon was right when he instructed his officers to tell their men of danger beforehand in a quiet, non-exaggerated way. In a panic the self-preservation instinct rules absolutely and violently.

On September 28, 1919, when the mayor of Omaha attempted to quiet the mob that was searching for a Negro, the mob threw a rope around the neck of the mayor, dragged him, and attempted to hang him—the chief executive of a metropolitan city and the elected representative of law and order. It is clear, therefore, that such a mob is a relic of barbarism; it has no useful function in a democratic state, built upon principles of legal justice. The atrocities which a mob will commit, whether it be a mob of Russian or Polish peasants in a “pogrom” or a mob of American citizens in a lynching escapade are execrable. They can successfully be prevented only by a new birth of respect for social order and systematic progress.

An assembly is a group of people in which ideas rather than feelings are struggling with one another for supremacy. An assembly is characterized by dignity, order, and thoughtfulness. It is so closely related to the crowd that it is subject to reversion at any moment to the crowd or mob. An assembly is a group of people who are controlled by cultural habits and by parliamentary rules of order. On occasion an assembly as dignified as the United States Senate de-

fies the controlling sense of individual and social decorum and the rules of order.

Parliamentary rules have been compared by E. A. Ross to a straightjacket upon a monster which is in constant danger of breaking loose.<sup>1</sup> Rules of order function in keeping feelings down and the reason in charge. Personalities are taboo, the chair must always be addressed, the voting must be by aye and nay, and order must at all times be observed. Parliamentary rules at best are brittle hoops and easily snap. Let one man contradict another sharply and the two may rush together with clenched fists and angry shouts, even though the assembly be a Chamber of Deputies. Let the smell of smoke and a ringing cry of "Fire" enter a crowded church and the solemn assembly will burst the bonds of decorum, custom, rules, and reverence, and transform itself into a fighting mob, trampling women and children under foot.

The assembly is a very useful social institution. Time, expense, and energy are saved by getting people to come together and by addressing them as a unit rather than as separate individuals who are scattered over a large territory. To assemble people and explain thoughtfully a program to them secures better results than to yell at them in a crowd. They gain sufficient stimulus to jar them out of lethargy and yet not such an amount that they effervesce in unstable promises.

The assembly not only arouses people from social drowsiness and repose, but gives them new desires and interests. An assembly often shakes people loose

<sup>1</sup>*Social Psychology*, p. 57.



from selfish habits and secures their open, thoughtful committal to group aims, to financial support of group movements, and participation in group activities. When in an assembly, the socially reflected self of an individual affects him powerfully. He adopts a broader viewpoint than he would accept at home. He is influenced also by the personality of the leader, who is usually an individual of character. Through the spoken word, clothed in the richness of his personality, the speaker can exert a powerful and constructive influence.

An assembly can be addressed frequently to better advantage than an individual. The speaker does not experience the embarrassment which he feels when conversing upon a delicate phase of the individual's conduct. He can suggest to an assembly moral and social changes which would be taken as an insult if made personally to certain offenders who may be in the assembly. There is just enough anonymity to enable individuals who need reprimand to say to themselves, "He means some one else," and yet there is enough force in the speaker's remarks to penetrate their lives deeply. There is sufficient anonymity to enable them to look unconcerned and to prevent their anger from rising, thereby allowing the new and higher standards of conduct a thoughtful and fair hearing. Similar criticism of personal conduct, if administered individually or vehemently in a crowd, would arouse an angry storm or a long-standing antagonism.

Despite its worthy traits, an assembly of size is rarely a satisfactory deliberative or executive body.

A committee of thirty is too large for effective work because the chief points for decision become lost in the idiosyncrasies of thirty different personalities. Five or seven well-selected persons will constitute a group large enough to bring forward all the main factors in a given problem and at the same time work expeditiously. Each will assume more responsibility than the individual members of a committee of thirty.

Discussion is necessary, but too much talk hinders progress. A large committee produces an excess of talk. To safeguard a committee against wasting its energies in verbiage as well as to guarantee a strong sense of individual responsibility, the members must be few.

The public is a quasi-temporary group. It lacks the structure and prescribed limits of a permanent group and the face-to-face or bodily presence characteristics of the assembly or crowd. It is a group "without presence." Although without the physical presence of its members, it possesses a substantial degree of permanence. It is made possible by the development of the modern means of communication. Consequently, individuals feel, think, and even act alike, without coming together. The public is a recently developed communicating group without physical presence.

The public is made possible by the invention of the printing press, the railroad, the telegraph, and the telephone. The printing press has been given primary credit by Sighele for creating the public and substituting it for the crowd.<sup>2</sup> The railroad shortens

<sup>2</sup>*La foule criminelle*, p. 225.

distances and enables newspapers to reach the outskirts of cities and even remote rural localities in a comparatively short time. Further, the telegraph has almost eliminated distance, permitting any news to travel thousands of miles in a few minutes. Hence the railroad and the telegraph give wings to the printing-press and the feeling of actuality to the public.<sup>3</sup>

Each reading public tends to develop its own type of journalism and to produce newspapers which have its own good and bad qualities and which are its own creatures.<sup>4</sup> Large numbers of people who are scattered over a wide territory regularly read the news organs of the given publics to which they belong, feel simultaneously the same way in regard to the wanton attack upon anything which belongs to a given public, and express their feelings and opinions simultaneously, being aware that at the same time the other members of that public are experiencing the same feelings and giving expression to the same opinions.

A staunch member of the Republican party subscribes only to Republican newspapers. If handed a socialist journal, he would feel insulted. The socialist subscribes faithfully to the socialistic press, but tears up Republican newspapers without deigning to look at their headlines. The churchman peruses regularly the religious journals of his choice, but casts out the free-thinking publications, while in the same neighborhood the free-thinker scoffs at religious papers.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 225, 226. Cf. Gabriel Tarde, *L'opinion et la foule*, Ch. I.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 241. "Sans doute chaque public produit les journalistes que ont ses instincts, ses tendencies ses qualites, et ses defauts, qui sont, in un mot, es creatures."

Each public, therefore, creates and fosters its own instruments of communication. What would happen in the United States if for one year all Republicans were to read only socialist newspapers and all socialists were to read only the Republican press?

Within the public the newspaper is tempted to cater to the lower nature of its members. The commercial newspaper finds that it pays financially to become sensational, to appeal to prejudices, or to stimulate morbidity. The daily press is prone to omit the publication of vital social facts, or to minimize them, and to elaborate the minor details of burglaries, divorce scandals, prize fights.

The newspaper often plays its own public against other publics. Consequently, the naïve reader gets a biased view of his own group and an erroneous impression of opposing groups. What labor newspaper relates the good deeds of employers, and what capitalist paper extolls the long-suffering and heart-yearning of the wage-earner and his family?

The public is deficient in some of the virtues of the assembly and is not subject to all the weaknesses of the crowd. To the extent that newspapers suppress the truth or play upon the feelings, or by "scare" headlines create false sentiments, the public is the victim of the foibles of the crowd. To the degree in which the members of a public can sit quietly in the home or office and think logically, they possess advantages superior even to those of the assembly.

An individual can belong to only one crowd or assembly at a time, but he usually claims membership in several publics at the same moment. He may

belong simultaneously to a Taft public, a Billy Sunday public, a Ty Cobb public, and a John McCormack public. His interests as a member of one public may run counter to his interests as a member of another; hence, he will be compelled to pair off impulses and to act more rationally than if a member of a face-to-face group. The twentieth century is becoming "an era of publics"; the public is succeeding the crowd as a prevalent form of grouping.

In times of national danger from without, an entire nation becomes a public. Smaller publics subordinate their interests to the larger cause. Instead of several publics, each with its own set of opinions, or public opinions, there arises suddenly one vast public, and one powerful public opinion.

The subject of group, or public, opinion will be presented in Chapter XIV, as an agent of group, or social, control. The public is the transition group between temporary and permanent aggregations or organizations of people, and public opinion is the source from which arise fundamental group values.

2. *Permanent Groups.* There are at least fourteen different important types of permanent groups, ranging from an association of two persons to the world group. These types are the family, the play group, the neighborhood group, the school group, the occupational group, the employees' and the employers' groups, the fraternal, the political and governmental, the religious, the racial, and the sex groups, and the planetary group. These collectivities suffer changes fluctuating between slow and rapid, and exhibit organizations varying from closely knit and exclusive



to coherent and intangible.

Permanent groups are the outgrowth of temporary groupings—the relationship is filial. The order of development is as follows: first, human needs, then a temporary group to meet those needs, finally, the evolution of a permanent group or social organization. Out of countless temporary groupings, a few permanent types have attained historical prominence, but continuously subject to change and to the laws of social evolution.

The family, for example, has developed in response to the needs of race continuance; it has gone through the metronymic and patronymic stages and is now in a transitional period, from which there is arising a co-operative commonwealth of the two contracting parties. The family has run the gauntlet of polyandry, polygyny, and other forms of marriage, and has achieved a worthy degree of usefulness through monogamy.

An occupational group, likewise, shows an evolution, which is of the following order: human needs, crude ways of meeting these needs, the invention of methods and tools, the rise of specialization, the conscious, unconscious, or accidental gravitating of certain individuals into the given occupational group, the appearance of a definite occupational or caste consciousness, and the establishment of an occupational ethics and of occupational organizations. In society beginnings, men were hunters and fighters, and later, herdsmen; women were untrained home-makers, crude hoe-culturists, and crass manufacturers. Under settled social conditions men transferred their atten-

tion to hoe-culture and transformed it into agriculture, and to manufacture and ultimately changed it into machinofacture. The higher needs of life, freedom from manual toil, and the demand for specialization produced the professions.

Occupations prejudice. The banker depreciates the ministry, and *vice versa*. The theologian tends to become dogmatic. The business man is prone to judge by money standards. Since lawyers continually come in contact with anti-social individuals who must be dealt with vigorously, they are apt to overrate force as a social factor. Further, the lawyer is an advocate. After a time the habit of taking sides may hinder him from becoming judicial. When he reaches the bench, he may tend to argue cases for the lawyers, or he may make up his mind habitually early in the case and before the evidence is all in. "I have no objection, your Honor, to have you argue this case for me," said a prosecuting attorney, "but I hope that you won't lose it, for I have a mighty good case." This attorney was gently protesting against the occupational habit which the given judge had carried over into his judicial days from his previous training as an advocate.

When a college professor applied to a labor union for membership, he was told that he must teach in the class-room eight hours a day if he would be admitted. The skilled workmen could not understand how less than eight hours of actual teaching could constitute a day's work. The social psychology of occupations and professions shows that occupational and professional habits of thought are danger-

ous to one who would be just and courteous in his attitudes toward those who are employed differently.

Permanent groups vary from purely instinctive to socially purposive.<sup>5</sup> The best illustration of purely instinctive grouping is found among animals, e. g., insect societies. The primitive horde and the family are less instinctive than an insect society. The modern family including courtship is often instinctive, although showing a few signs of conscious purpose that are worthy of these institutions. The modern state is largely instinctive, although Germany recently showed a national purposiveness of anti-social character. Economic organizations, such as corporations and labor unions, are distinctly purposive. Educational associations are strikingly telic. Purposive groups vary from organizations which struggle vigorously for their own advancement irrespective of the welfare of other groups or of society to those which wholeheartedly and unselfishly strive to serve wherever they may.

Permanent groups, thus, begin with the purely instinctive aggregations at the lowest extremity of the social scale, include transitional types, and end with the purely telic groups with social purposes. Nation-states are still far below the highest stage of unselfish telic development, and hence the difficulty in establishing a stable League of Nations.

Permanent groups are either sects, castes, classes,

<sup>5</sup>J. M. Baldwin in *The Individual and Society*, pp. 36 ff., classifies groups as instructive, spontaneous, and reflective.

<sup>6</sup>This classification has been outlined by Continental writers, such as Tarde (*L'opinion et la foule*, pp. 177 ff.), and Sighele (*Psychologie des sectes*, pp. 45 ff.)

or states.<sup>6</sup> The sect is a group of individuals who differ markedly but who are united by a common ideal and faith—such as religious denominations and political parties.

The caste arises from identity of profession; it is the most compact of all social organizations. After a person has become established in a profession he has become a member of an existing caste and is under its *esprit de corps*. Consider how difficult it is for a man to change from one recognized profession to another line of activity and what contumely is heaped upon the clergyman who changes to the insurance business, upon the lawyer who shifts to brick-laying, upon the teacher who becomes a dairyman. It is disgraceful to change from a higher to a so-called lower calling, even though a mistake was made in the initial choice of an occupation. It is even a doubtful or questioned procedure for a person who has reached middle life to change from a lower to a so-called higher calling, even though the individual has been converted to an entirely new view of life. Nevertheless, this inelasticity in public opinion is on the whole justifiable, despite the fact that in the broad sense it creates castes.

The class possesses a psychological bond that is found in a unity of interests. The class is less precise in its limits but more "formidably belligerent" in its attitudes than the caste. Observe the outstanding class divisions of the day, such as the distinction between the laboring and capitalistic classes, with their bickerings, strifes, intrigues, and underlying hatreds.

States are the most extensive group organizations

with strong prerogatives that have yet evolved. They possess common bonds of language, national values, and national prestige. National loyalty, which is somewhat synonymous with patriotism, will be considered in Chapter XIII. Conflicts between nations and the social psychology of war will be discussed in Chapter XII. The natural climax of the state idea is now taking form in a world organization or world state, which among permanent groups will eventually occupy the chief position.

## PROBLEMS

### (TEMPORARY GROUPS)

1. Define a crowd.
2. Are the people in a railroad station a heterogeneous or homogeneous crowd?
3. Why does the crowd generally have a leader?
4. What are the advantages and the disadvantages of organized cheering?
5. Why is one's individuality wilted in a dense throng?
6. Why do feelings run through a crowd more readily than ideas?
7. In order to unify people why is it necessary to touch the chord of feeling?
8. Why is the crowd-self irrational?
9. Explain: "In a psychological crowd people are out of themselves."
10. Explain: A crowd is recidivistic.
11. Why does a crowd refuse to tolerate freedom of speech?



12. Why is the crowd-self ephemeral?
13. Explain: "The squeeze of the crowd tends to depress the self-sense."
14. Where did parliamentary rules of order originate?
15. Is a jury a crowd or an assembly?
16. Are your highest emotions aroused when you are alone or a member of a crowd?
17. Do you feel a serious loss more keenly when you are alone or in a group of friends?
18. Will the news of personal success cause you greater joy when you are alone or in a group?
19. What effect will your study of the social psychology of the crowd have upon your attitude toward the crowd?
20. What is your present attitude toward a lynching mob?
21. What is the meaning of the term, mob?
22. Have you been in a mob? If so, how did you act?
23. Is a holiday jam in a railroad station a mob?
24. Is the social psychology of a mob of Hottentots the same as the social psychology of a mob of college professors?
25. Where can the blame for mob action justly be placed?
26. What are the best means for bringing a mob to a rational point of view?
27. What is your attitude regarding an assembly?
28. What is the chief characteristic of an assembly?
29. Name three types of assemblies.

30. Why is it easier to speak to an audience of 200 people than to a group of twenty persons?
31. Is it easier to address 200 persons in a hall that seats 1000 or in one which seats 150?
32. What are the outstanding characteristics of a public?
33. Name three leading publics to which you now belong.
34. Explain the statement that this is an era of publics.
35. What is mass attention?
36. What are the different ways by which an individual can secure mass attention?

(PERMANENT GROUPS)

37. Define a group.
38. Distinguish between permanent and temporary groups.
39. In what permanent groups have you participated today?
40. Name one temporary group in which you have been a member today.
41. How are the two sex groups different psychically?
42. How is a fraternal group different psychically from a neighborhood group?
43. What is meant by the social psychology of an occupation?
44. What are the psychological differences between a rural and an urban group?
45. Explain: "The high potential of a city."

46. Should the capital of a commonwealth be "its chief city or some centrally located town"?

47. Distinguish between the psychical characteristics of Boston, New York, and Washington, the intellectual, business, and political capitals, respectively, of the nation.

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## CHAPTER XII.

### GROUP CONFLICTS

#### 1. *The Nature and Function of Group Conflicts.*

Conflicts between groups are vital group phenomena which arise from primitive struggles for existence. These struggles are motivated by the fighting instinct. Pugnaciousness in the individual when combined with pugnaciousness in other individuals assumes mass proportions, organized methods, and gigantic power. Families compete with families for social standing, business vies with business for trade, and nations war with nations for commercial advancement and territorial expansion.

Conflicts occur continually between the individual and his group. The small son defies both parents, the adolescent boy violates the rules of the team, the adult breaks the laws of society. An individual becomes a leader of a clientele and the conflict becomes one between a minority and the parent group. A new idea is expressed by some strong-minded individual, and immediately other individuals begin to align themselves with or against the new propaganda. The leader and the adherents of the new program enter into conflict with the parent organization.

Conflicts between groups are sometimes primarily open and announced, as in the case of political parties in a national election. They are frequently conducted



under cover and behind apparently friendly advances, e. g., rivalries between business houses. Even in open political campaigns, it is often difficult to learn the attitude of various influential organizations, because of secret alliances and agreements.

Certain conflicts are highly destructive; others are mutually advantageous. The conflict between a corporation and a competitive individual entrepreneur usually ends in the destruction or at least the absorption of the small business by the corporation. Two neighboring farmers, however, who are competing for honors in regard to corn yield per acre will both gain, as well as society. Two granges in productive competition may both reap advantages with no losses. Through conflict two universities may so inter-stimulate one another that students and faculties of both institutions and the public all profit.

Conflict between groups is an element of progress, unless the conflict becomes too unequal, unless it assumes the form of competitive consumption of goods, both economic and non-economic, or unless it fails to rise to high, open, and socialized levels. The strength of any one of these provisos is great; and of all of them together, tremendous. Society must guard itself against destruction by keeping intra-conflicts within productive bounds. Today the United States is in grave danger because capital and labor have clinched and are fighting, regardless of the public. If individual spectators are killed or adjacent property is destroyed, the fight goes on just the same. The nation must take a hand in the struggle and say: "This brutal fight shall be stopped, or we will all go

to the dust together. Your conflict must proceed only along the lines of productive competition."

Conflict between marked unequals results in the annihilation of the lesser unequal, and in no appreciable gain to the other. A strong football team that rushes through a weak line for fifteen touchdowns learns little football; the weak team learns no football. Neither gain and the public is cheated. The college professor who talks "over the heads" of his pupils receives no stimulations from his class, and neither do they from him. Both lose.

Competition in the consumption of socially valuable goods instead of competition in the production of human values, is socially disintegrating. Competition in the consumption of pleasure automobiles is wasteful and unpatriotic. Conflicts which involve deception, physical combat instead of open discussion, and a repudiation of social values lead to barbarism and savagery.

No conflict means no interstimulations and hence no group progress. Too much conflict creates so much excitement that progress is halted. Conflicts must serve socially constructive ends exclusively. Needless social friction and social destruction must be prevented. It is at this point that T. N. Carver's theory of social progress should be stated.<sup>1</sup> Professor Carver recognizes an evolution in the forms of conflict, but seems to assume that the group, and particularly the national group, is an end in itself. He starts with the elemental type of conflict, namely,

<sup>1</sup>*Essays in Social Justice*, Ch. IV and *Principles of Political Economy*, Ch. IV.

destructive, and familiar to us as war, sabotage, robbery, and duelling. A higher form of competition is deception, which like the first type is characteristic of some animals, and which is common among human beings in forms of swindling, counterfeiting, adulterating, and mendacious advertising. A third, higher, and almost entirely human form of conflict is persuasion such as political (campaigning for office), erotic (courting), commercial (advertising and salesmanship), and legal (litigation). Then there is productive conflict, such as rivalry in producing goods and rivalry in rendering service. Competitive consumption is sharply distinguished from competitive production of economic goods.

Beyond these points, the analysis does not go. It needs to be developed further in its psychological phases. It emphasizes the biological bases of conflict; it stresses perhaps too much the survival of the fittest in the sense of the survival of the strongest; it deals little with conflicts between motives, moral standards, and societary values. It is difficult to see how a group whose highest activity is competitive production of economic goods can avoid the world-wide condemnation which fell upon Germany. There must be competitive production of harmonizing and co-operating activities. There must be a competitive production of moral and spiritual values. If not, then the production of economic values will exceed the production of ethical and socialized values and the nation will fall into materialism, decline, and decay.

As the economic struggle bulks large in Professor Carver's writings, so psychological conflicts are

stressed by Gabriel Tarde. To Tarde there are three leading forms of conflict, or opposition, namely; political, economic, and social; or war, competition, and discussion. These terms in order are used to indicate a decreasing degree of destructive action and an ascending scale of constructive opposition. The first two classes, war and competition, are usually destructive—Tarde underrates the social value of competitive production of economic goods. The third class, discussion, is generally constructive—Tarde fails to indicate clearly the deception which sometimes underlies discussion and the wasteful character of much discussion.

Discussion is a mental duel. Further, it often causes mental torture, e. g., when a prosecuting attorney persecutes the defendant, or when a newspaper "exposes" the private affairs of innocent victims of evil.

Two ideas, or institutions, or systems of technique may engage in a duel. Tarde has discussed at length the psycho-societary duel,<sup>2</sup> illustrations of which are the duels between Christianity and atheism, between Protestant Christianity and Catholic Christianity, between aristocracy and democracy, between steamships and sailing vessels, between high tariff and low tariff, or between *though* and *tho*, and between the Victrola and Edison talking machines.

The psycho-societary duel ends in one of two ways.<sup>3</sup> (1) One idea meets another and annihilates it. In the minds of thinking people, the idea of a round

<sup>2</sup>*Laws of Imitation*, pp. 167 ff.

<sup>3</sup>Tarde gives a three-fold classification.

earth has completely superseded the idea of a flat earth. The annihilation may take place slowly, or suddenly by resort to arbitrary means, such as war or governmental fiat. The tractor is slowly triumphing over the farm horse. For those who understand, the discovery of the tubercle bacillus ended suddenly previous conceptions of the cause of tuberculosis. The contest between voluntary and compulsory military service was settled suddenly in the United States in 1917 by Congressional action.

(2) The psycho-societary duel may end in compromise. Strong elements of each protagonist will be combined in a set of phenomena. The languages of the Saxons and the Angles met the languages of the Celts, Latins, and Greeks and the result was a new, composite vehicle of speech. Words themselves are often combinations of inherently antagonistic roots. Coal miners compete for earnings with coal barons—and the result is generally a compromise. As the orbit of the earth represents an equilibrium between centripetal and centrifugal forces, so our democracy is a compromise between anarchism and absolutism. A business college is a compromise between actual business experience and a regular college education. The covenant for a League of Nations is a series of compromises between antagonistic interests.

In both types of duels the conflicts are between inventions—usually a new invention (or discovery) which is attempting to drive out a somewhat outworn but well-established invention. When a new social invention meets an established invention, the result is either annihilation of one by the other, or in the case



of somewhat equal conflict, the formation of a new, compromise invention.

F. H. Giddings has pointed out how conflicts between groups that are nearly balanced in strength (secondary conflicts) lead to progress, because out of conflict between more or less equal social forces arises tolerance and compromise, then co-operation, alliance, and mutual aid.<sup>4</sup> Since the contestants are balanced in power, neither can win; they must tolerate one another. From this toleration there comes at first a minimum mental interchange, then the establishment of interrelationships, and ultimately of co-operation. Nations today are in the main current of this process. The amount, however, of national co-operation is still small and suspicion based on national selfishness is rampant.

Conflict is the best way to settle the dualism between opposing social forces, according to Georg Simmel.<sup>5</sup> The main purpose of conflict is to create organization. A hundred athletes compete for places on a team and then the winners co-operate in forming the team-organization. But this theory is unduly harsh. Conflicts do not all take place upon the blind levels of force. Antagonistic elements may become socialized and blend into a new whole. The dualism of social groups may exhibit decreasing conflict and increasing co-operation. A laboring group and a capitalist group may become socialized and each recognize the vital part that the other plays in the success of an industrial establishment. Each may become willing

<sup>4</sup>*Principles of Sociology*, pp. 100 ff. ,

<sup>5</sup>"Sociology of Conflict," *Amer. Jour. of Sociol.*, IX: 490.

to arbitrate differences and to co-operate in industrial production. Professor Simmel speaks of the whole history of society in terms of the striking conflicts between socialistic adaptation to society and individualistic departure from its demands. This is the duality which is expressed biologically in the conflicts between heredity and variation, and which is found sociologically in the interactions between heredity and environment. The results are new forms of life (biological organisms), new types of mental life (inventions), and new social structures (institutions).

Conflict has been treated as a correlative term with co-operation by Gustave Ratzenhofer<sup>6</sup> and Albion W. Small.<sup>7</sup> Everywhere in the processes of social adjustment the element of conflict appears, and the line of progress moves from a maximum of conflict to a maximum of reciprocity.<sup>8</sup> Under a maximum of co-operation conflict will not be eliminated, but will function in modified, dignified, and controlled ways. Maximum is not absolute reciprocity. Maximum reciprocity between a model husband and a model wife would provide for certain conflicts which would stimulate the growth of both personalities in a way that would not occur if both were exactly alike.

Another element in this fundamental societary phenomenon of conflict, according to Durkheim, is that opposing groups which are fighting for differentiated interests find it necessary to combine in order that both may advance.<sup>9</sup> On the desert a mesquite springs

<sup>6</sup>*Die sociologische Erkenntniss.*

<sup>7</sup>*General Sociology.*

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 325.

<sup>9</sup>*De la division du travail social.*

up. Seeds of cacti also grow; "and the cactus and the mesquite combine their armature of thorns for mutual protection. Then wind-blown grass seeds lodge about the roots, and grasses grow and seed beneath the sheltering branches, and next small mammals seek the same protection. . . . Thus does a large part of the plants and animals in the desert dwell together in harmony and mutual helpfulness."<sup>10</sup>

In summary it may be said that conflict is an indispensable element in progress, that its lowest levels are brutal and viciously destructive but that its highest reaches are stimulating, spiritual, and wholly constructive. The socialization of conflicting interests produces unification which is strength. Small competing businesses unite. The antagonistic American colonies united. The mutually jealous Allies united. Progress is born of a moving equilibrium of stimulating, constructive, and socialized conflicts.

2. *The Social Psychology of War.* Since war is the most destructive type of conflict known to mankind and since it persists in raising its ugly form above the highest phases of modern civilization, it will here receive special attention. How strange it is that civilization has not yet found a better means of settling national disputes!

As shown in an earlier chapter, war has its origins in the pugnacious instinct of man. These tendencies doubtless served useful purposes in primitive society. Once man had to depend on his fists and his bow and arrow to defend himself. Men who could not fight

<sup>10</sup>W. J. McGee in *Source Book for Social Origins*, by W. I. Thomas, pp. 55, 56.

well succumbed. With the development of private property, organized defense became necessary. Tribes that were unskilled in fighting lost their lands, were captured and enslaved, or were wiped out by the powerful tribes whose fighting strength made them a law unto themselves and hence unmoral or immoral in their attitudes toward weaker tribes. The modern philosophic flood tide of this doctrine was reached in the teachings of such men as Nietzsche and Bernhardt.

The only groups whom primitive fighting tribes respected were those whose warring abilities were established. Fighting propensity ruled the world for millenniums. As a result the fighting instinct acquired greatly exaggerated power in the constitution of the individual and the group. The wolf and tiger qualities of men and groups were abnormally fostered and supported.

In parallel stages the counter movement to war developed. Among animals and primitive people small groups of individuals lived harmoniously together. The social spirit gained momentum. Within groups individuals learned to respect differences of opinion and to build a code for settling disputes. Observance of this code prevented civil wars. The pistol duel was a sophisticated survival of personal fighting in those groups which had established a legal procedure.

Courts of law have developed in our country until they rule the desires of practically every individual when moved to settle a dispute by violent means. It is only the sportive or criminal American who carries a revolver, or the immigrant from traditional lands

who carries a concealed dagger. Individuals have learned the art of living together peacefully and harmoniously. They have learned to be moral and social.

But groups, especially large groups, find it difficult to be moral. Reputable citizens assert that corporations have no conscience, and that nations are moral derelicts. Every citizen of our land should be proud, therefore, to support in thought and action the proclamation of President Wilson when in 1917 he asserted that the United States has no selfish national ends to serve.

It is a sad but true fact that nations on the slightest provocation glare at one another like wolves. They do not yet possess dependable inter-national habits of a moral character, which would in themselves guarantee the stability and efficacy of a League of Nations. They still view one another with jealousy and suspicion—and perhaps justly so. Nations, however, as fast as they become nationally unselfish (as tested by deeds) and as soon as they learn to live harmoniously and justly and constructively together should confederate for unselfish international ends. Even they must be ready for war until all other powerful nations have demonstrated clearly their conversion to democratic world purposes. When nations deal with one another according to the principles of openness, mutual respect, and fair play, swords may be beaten into plowshares and spears into pruning-hooks. Even then there will be considerable need for pruning-hooks.

One of the greatest ideas that President Wilson ever expressed was to the effect that the business of



national representatives is to organize the friendship of the world.<sup>11</sup> International friendship is not so plentiful that we can afford to allow it to remain unutilized and unorganized. Without it, the League of Nations is doomed to failure; on the other hand, one of the main businesses of the League and of every nation within the League will be to promote it.

War breeds some good as well as much evil. Military training guarantees the advantages of out-of-door life and the building of strong chest and leg muscles. It successfully counteracts the slouchy habit of walking and standing which is almost a national disgrace in our land.

The soldier "gains in courage." He is mass inspired. Indirectly and through the private and public applause of and rewards to bravery, he becomes increasingly brave. After a few months of military drill, the diffident youth—if he does not succumb—is transformed into a potential hero.

The soldier develops "an enlarged morality." Instead of working for self, he finds himself joined with others in the support of national interests and public welfare. From self-service he is turned to others-service. His eyes are shifted from his own welfare to national welfare for which previously he may have cared little.<sup>12</sup>

The group which fights increases its unity. Dissident elements are brought closer together and at least temporarily united. Attack from the outside drives people together. This fear of a common danger is a

<sup>11</sup>From address before the Chamber of Deputies in Rome, January 3, 1919.

<sup>12</sup>Tarde, *Laws of Imitation*, pp. 358, 359.

better unifying factor than the hope or experience of common happiness which arises from economic prosperity.<sup>13</sup>

War favors virility. The strong are honored. Luxury is made odious. Before the World War the United States was showing signs of fatty degeneration. Thrift was being forgotten and smug economic complacency was enthroned. The war revealed to our nation the true situation with startling clearness. To a degree, war-suffering reveals weak places nationally, and evokes national interest in behalf of all the citizens. This national activity, however, tends to assume a harsh, compulsory, undemocratic character. Further, at the close of a successful war, a nation tends to swing back to careless, riotous living.

War necessitates organization. Witness the way in which our country organized for war—through the draft law, the government operation of railroads, the Liberty loan “drives.” From such procedure a nation should learn valuable lessons in organizing in peace times for constructive and socialized ends.

The weaknesses of military control are many. While the officer assumes responsibility, the private is relieved of directive work and becomes machine-like. It is his business to obey, and not to question or “to reason why.” Military life tends first to make the officer and then the private autocratic. One day a big, handsome officer in a German regiment, wearing decorations of bravery, and receiving the personal commendations of the Kaiser, was approached by a little girl five or six years old with a letter in her

<sup>13</sup>J. S. Mackenzie, *Outlines of Social Philosophy*, p. 247.

hand which she wished to post in a box behind the tall officer. She stood on her tiptoes but could not reach the box—it was too high. She looked longingly for aid, and finally, summoning all her courage, she handed the letter to the officer. “He took it mechanically, with one or two glances back and forth between it and her. His intellect was evidently less bright than his uniform. Presently the idea took shape in his brain that this slip of a girl had called on him for help. With an arrogant toss of his head and a contemptuous snap of his wrist, he threw the letter to the ground.”<sup>14</sup>

The cost of war in dollars and cents—one of the least of its costs—is tremendous. It has been estimated that the financial cost of the World War was 250 billion dollars. If this sum were in one dollar bank-notes and were laid end to end, it would extend 29,198,000 miles, or 1160 times around the earth or 145 times to the moon. If laid side by side and end to end, these bank-notes would cover 920,000 acres. The paper in them would weigh 250,000 tons.

Incomprehensible as is the financial cost of the World War, the greatest effort of the imagination cannot describe the cost in human suffering. If it were possible to review the dead instead of the living soldiers and if they came past the reviewing stand in double file we should get an impression of the human cost of war. Suppose that the British dead were called first—the double lines would pass the reviewing stand day and night for 100 days. Then the French dead would file past for 190 days longer; the German dead, for 220

<sup>14</sup>Reported by Albion W. Small, *Amer. Jour. of Sociology*, XXIII: 167, 168.

days; and the Russian dead, for 230 days more—a total of 740 days and nights, or over two years. Then suppose that the wounded could be reviewed and that they could come in double file at the same pace—this procession would last day and night for five years. Suppose finally that loved ones who suffered at home because of the war casualties could march rapidly in double file past our reviewing stand. This procession, it is estimated, would last day and night for fifteen years. This entire panorama of suffering, twenty-two years long, ought to convince even the hardest-hearted of the cost of war and convert him into an ardent advocate of a League of Nations for the settlement of national difficulties by constructive measures.

War is brutalizing. Returned soldiers who went “over the top” refrain from describing the scenes that they witnessed or in which they participated. “War confronts human beings with situations in which they must act inhumanly.”<sup>15</sup> If you are going to kill systematically, it is necessary to hate systematically. After a war has continued for some time, hatred increases and ideals decline, and any measures which will help to bring victory or to postpone defeat are likely to be justified. War lying and calumny rapidly increase. War is “a brutal acknowledgement that nations have failed to live together harmoniously.”

War keeps alive the inferior. It immediately rejects those who cannot pass a satisfactory physical and mental examination—they are left at home. In

<sup>15</sup>G. F. Nicolai, *The Biology of the War*, p. 113.

battle the bravest take the greatest chances and suffer the largest casualties. During a long war the best physical specimens of manhood, including the bravest, are killed, and the nation's work must be carried forward by and its racial stock replenished from its lower physical and mental grades. After a very long war the future generations will be the descendants of "stay-at-homes, the idiotic and sickly."

But war cannot be ended merely by pointing out its evils, by denouncing it, or by declaring that "this is a war to end war." Widespread attention must be given to measures for building up the friendship of the world and of helping the international machinery to run harmoniously, justly, and constructively.

Further, the combative instinct must be elevated to spiritualized and socialized forms of expression. We can scarcely afford, as shown in Chapter III, to eliminate it absolutely. But we can change its methods and direct it to societary ends.

Moral and social equivalents of war must be provided. Courage must be fostered by making life less easy for those who now are idling away their time in frivolous pleasure, and by making the game of life more worth while for those who are struggling forward against overwhelming economic odds. Physical education must be expanded to give to all the valuable training which military life gives to selected physical groups. Education in citizenship for everyone will create a new sense of public responsibility. The common presentation of international and world needs and ideals will evoke a new world spirit,



3. *The Social Psychology of Race Prejudice.* If war is the most spectacular form of conflict, then race prejudice is the most subtle and insidious. It is an impassable barrier to race assimilation. Nearly all race problems in the United States today could be solved if it were not for race prejudices—both ways.

Race prejudice is an antagonistic attitude of a person of one race toward the members of another race. It is usually a non-scientific pre-judgment. The pre-judgment may have been caused by hearsay, by experience with a few non-typical members of the other race, or by sneering remarks, rather than by scientifically obtained evidence.

The social psychology of race prejudice reveals several causal elements. (1) An elemental fear of the strange underlies race prejudice. This is the only or at most the chief inherited factor in the phenomenon; the other causes come from the social environment. The individual who would survive must regard the stranger with caution. In primitive days, the stranger was necessarily assumed to be an enemy until he proved himself otherwise. The stranger today without credentials at the cashier's window is helpless. The stranger at the front door of a private residence is viewed askance. An American at a European court does not gain entry without acceptable introductions. The need for self-preservation and the wanton practices of many strangers have produced the elemental fear of the stranger.

(2) The strange tribe is an enemy tribe—until proved otherwise. Race preservation demands that each race must maintain its own values and its own

entity. Consequently, each race has built up a set of beliefs which stress the virtues and overlook the vices of that race, and which elaborate the weaknesses of other races. A race attaches "the idea of beauty to everything which characterizes their physical conformation." The members of each race come to believe that their race is the best race in the world.

The Englishman, the Italian, the German, the African Negro, the Eskimo each declares that his race is the superior race of mankind. For example, the African Negro believes that brown and black are the most beautiful colors, and pities the Caucasian because of his pale, sickly hue. After living for a few months among the black races of Africa, white Caucasian travelers have admitted a sense of shame because of the pale skins of their race—so powerful has been the opposite influence among the blacks. The Negress enhances her beauty by painting the face with charcoal while the Caucasian lady puts on a chalky white to increase her whiteness. The Negro considers his gods as black and his devils as white; the Caucasian reverses the order. If there are thirty-five leading races in the world today and the leaders of each are declaring that each is the best, then there is prevalent a thirty-five-fold contradictory statement that there are thirty-five "best" races.

(3) Ignorance causes race prejudice. Ignorance cannot be separated from a false emphasis upon race pride. We must really know other races before we are entitled to a positive opinion. Leading ethnologists have concluded that all races are potentially similar, that race differences are due to differences in

physical and social environment. For example, a part of the Mongolian peoples moved to Japan, where they have undergone many changes. Others of the Mongolian peoples moved westward and finally through their descendants became established in Europe in Hungary, namely, the Magyars, where they were surrounded by a sea of Slavs. In the United States, the Japanese and the Magyars meet today as immigrants, but neither of these groups of Mongolian brethren recognizes the other. In coming from the opposite sides of the earth and in circumnavigating the globe, these two races of originally the same stock have undergone widely different experiences and encountered different environments. Consequently, they vary in type.

False traditions and false education cause race prejudice. These errors can be corrected by a scientific study of the worthy and unworthy qualities of races in the light of the experiences of those races. Upon examination, each race is found to be superior in some particular to other races. At their best and at their worst the members of all civilized races in our country are found to be pretty much alike.

(4) Separation increases race prejudice. Separation breeds misunderstanding, false estimates, and hence, prejudice. In the overcongested districts of any of our large cities, the immigrant frequently learns of the United States at its worst, and likewise, the American sees the foreign-born at his worst. In the coal mines, the illiterate immigrant first of all learns or is compelled to learn American profanity—these vivid impressions remain with him and, unhappily,

constitute a part of his Americanization.

In the Far East, Europeans do not associate with natives. In Yokohama, according to Melville E. Stone, on ground which was donated to the foreign representatives for their consulates, the sign was placed: "No Japanese are permitted on these grounds."<sup>16</sup>

While race preservation demands a certain degree of race separation, yet race exclusiveness naturally generates prejudice, out of which rumors of war, and wars themselves often come. If there are no provisions for an increasing interchange of ideas and for opportunities for constructive contacts, friendship between nations cannot materialize.

(5) Differences in race appearance foster prejudices. These variations are often superficial. We cannot judge the worth of a race by the slant of the eye, the color of the skin, or the shape of the shinbone.<sup>17</sup> We are still ignorant regarding real race distinctions, and hence need to guard against assuming that differences in appearances connote basic disparities.

(6) Competition engenders prejudice. The Chinese came to the United States upon invitation and at first were welcomed. When their labor competed with that of Americans, hatred of them arose. Many people take a generous attitude toward the Negro, but if the Negro successfully competes for economic positions, then the white persons who have lost, immediately experience race hatred. Both economic and

<sup>16</sup>*National Geographic Magazine*, 21: 973-85.

<sup>17</sup>George Elliott Howard, *Social Psychology*, p. 57, and in the Publications of the Amer. Sociol. Society, XII: 7.

social competition set off dynamic charges of prejudice.

The result of race prejudice is isolation. Race prejudice isolates the race which feels it and the one against which it is directed. It plays havoc with whatever potential spirit of co-operation may exist in either. It barricades race against race.

Race prejudice easily becomes one of "the most hateful and harmful" human sentiments. It is arbitrary, vicious, and narrowing; it culminates in lynchings, pogroms, and war. One of America's ablest scholars has indicted it in the following incisive language:<sup>18</sup>

It has incited and excused cannibalism, warfare and slavery.

It has justified religious persecution and economic exploitation.

It has fostered tyranny, cruelty and the merciless waste of human life.

It has bred the spirit of caste; and it has done most to create the sweat-shop and the slum.

It is the archenemy of social peace throughout the world.

. . . It is a sinister factor in world politics.

Only through its removal shall we ever realize the vision of the dreamer—the brotherhood of man.

In a brief summary of group conflicts it may be said that they function as means to a social end; operate in the long run upon an ascending scale, namely, war,

<sup>18</sup>George Elliott Howard, *Social Psychology*, p. 57; and in Vol. XII, Publications of the Amer. Sociol. Society, pp. 6, 7.



competition, discussion; and give way to the rise of co-operation, alliance, and mutual aid. They arise out of the fighting tendencies and run the gamut from brutal ruthlessness to that high type of corrective effort which is promulgated by love. Conflicts culminate in spiritualized contests for rendering service. In their lowest forms they are struggles to see who can deceive most, who can exploit most, who can shirk most; at their best, they are contests to see who can serve his fellow man most.

## PROBLEMS

### (THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF GROUP CONFLICTS)

1. Illustrate a conflict between an individual and his group.
2. Illustrate a conflict between two groups of similar strength.
3. Illustrate a conflict between a small group and a large group of which the small group is a part.
4. Illustrate a conflict between two ideas.
5. Illustrate competitive consumption of economic goods.
6. Illustrate competitive production.
7. Why is discussion able to "hurry conflicts to a conclusion"?
8. When is discussion profitless?
9. What are the leading foes of new ideas?
10. Would you expect to find the truth of the matter in a given discussion with either extremist?

11. Should a false dogma be attacked directly, or undermined "by marshalling and interpreting the adverse facts"?

12. Should a conflict between types of water filtration or armor plate be referred to the voters?

13. What types of public questions should be submitted to the voters for a decision?

14. Why have theological controversies been more bitter than scientific disputes?

15. What are the strong and weak points of compromising?

16. Illustrate competition in rendering service to others.

(THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR)

17. What is the leading cause of war?

18. Is national anger a scientific guide to national action?

19. What is the chief good that comes from war?

20. Why do battles always take place between two armies, or between two sets of opposing forces?

21. What is the chief evil of war?

22. Is the man who has invented a deadly instrument of war a social benefactor?

(THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF RACE PREJUDICE)

23. Why do different races have different standards of beauty?

24. Is race prejudice innate or acquired?

25. Is there more race prejudice against the Negro in the North or the South?

26. Do small children draw the color line?

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## CHAPTER XIII.

### GROUP LOYALTIES

It is assumed here that man is inherently social, that he is in a sense a product of group life, and that beneath anti-social actions there is ordinarily a deep-seated gregarious nature. It is in the play-day of childhood that social sympathy and group loyalties are developed in the individual. In associating with parents and particularly with other children, the child experiences the growth of his social nature, or social personality.

Through associating with others, the spirit of toleration and appreciation develops. As a result of associating, tolerating, appreciating, a sense of loyalty takes form. In every stable group a social consciousness and a social mind is present.

By associating with other persons, the individual learns that they have feelings, longings, problems, sufferings which are similar to his own. Consequently, a reorganization of attitudes occurs, tolerance develops, and harmonious actions ultimately follow.

The opinions of the group tend to survive and to be integrated. The strongest current opinion becomes the established opinion in later years; it gains prestige with years. It becomes a part of the social values of the group. Into the mass of integrated established



opinion, and of formulating current opinion, the child is born. Within this psycho-sociological environment he grows up and from it his thinking receives its directions. Later, his matured judgment reacts against some of the elements in this combination of past and current opinions, and he may become the exponent of a change in group values, of new group values, or of the established values.

Integrated past opinion and misty current opinion center about the vital phases of group life. A fundamental social value is the life of the group itself. Each collectivity must hold its own life as an elemental social necessity. The group will fight for its own unity. Lack of group unity presages group disintegration.

Group morale consists of group self control, and self confidence among the rank and file and also in the leaders. Beneath this confidence there must be a genuine moral force of honesty, reliability, co-operation, and virility, which will constitute a driving and a resisting power.

Group life, group unity, and distinctive group possessions, both material and spiritual, compose the trinity of leading social values that have been created through human association. "An abiding affection for the fatherland and for principles of liberty, of opportunity, and of fraternity which the group may have worked out represent the highest social appraisals."<sup>1</sup>

1. *The Social Psychology of Patriotism.* Patriotism is group loyalty. It is the tangible group response which is excited by an attack upon the group values.

<sup>1</sup>F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 117 ff.

It is a complex sentiment; it is a specialized form of love.

Patriotism is as old as human affection. It originally was love of family or more particularly loyalty to the *pater*, or the patriarchal head of the family. Patriotism was at one time in its evolution synonymous with patriarchalism and with familism. It was once love of home; at another time, love of clan. In the days of Abraham it was loyalty to Abraham and his household. Among the mountaineers today in undeveloped regions of the earth where a clan organization rules, patriotism is clan loyalty.

In the hey-day of tribal society, patriotism was loyalty to the tribe; it was tribalism. Among the Bantus, patriotism is Bantu-loyalty. Among the Iroquois, patriotism was loyalty to the Iroquois.

With the rise of the state, patriotism became nationalism. Today among civilized peoples patriotism is almost synonymous with loyalty to the nation. It is a sentiment which manifests a deep attachment to geographic territory and other national values. The Psalmist illustrated the force of patriotism when he declared:<sup>2</sup>

By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea, we wept, when we remembered Zion.

If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning.

If I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not Jerusalem above my chief joy.

Patriotism is loyalty to *patria*—by birth or by adop-

<sup>2</sup>Psalm 137.

tion. The individual identifies his life with that of his country. He becomes an integral and controlling factor in its aims and activities. Patriotism enables the individual to expand beyond the limitations of his individuality and partially if not fully to identify himself with interests which are larger and more important than his own.

Under national patriotism, familism continues. He who is not loyal to his family scarcely knows how to be loyal to his nation. If one is not true to a small social unit, how can he be faithful to a large collectivity?

Under nationalism, tribalism also has a place. It takes the form of loyalty to local community, city, province, or state. Community loyalty is necessary in the building of a strong nation-state, otherwise there would be too great a hiatus between the national structure and the family structures. The national roof must be sustained by large and permanent pillars as well as by a large number of small supports. Familism and communityism take subordinate but vital places in nationalism.

The most powerful form of group consciousness that has yet developed is that form of national patriotism which arises in connection with national defense and national attack. At first it is usually highly emotional and charged with electrical feelings, but after a time it settles down into a stubborn struggle for group existence.

The members of a nation-state may be classified under several heads in regard to their loyalty to the state in which they live. There are several brands and

grades of patriotism. (1) Pugnacious patriotism is an expression of the combative instinct. There are many individuals who are continually on the lookout for trouble. In a larger sense, many persons are willing to rush their country into a war upon the slightest provocation. If an American in a foreign country has been insulted or killed—regardless of his guilt,—these pugnacious persons would have their country declare war immediately. Jingoists abound. Combative patriotism does not wait for an investigation of causal circumstances. It works continuously for an aggressive foreign policy; it is impatient with negotiation.

(2) Professional patriotism characterizes the military class. It is valuable in a society where force predominates. Its weakness is its tendency toward arrogance and hard-heartedness, and an exaggerated desire for promotion. The arrogance weakness has been discussed in the preceding chapter; the promotion ambition is illustrated in the extreme case of the officer who some years ago expressed a hope that the United States would declare war upon the Republic of Panama, after she had committed a slight breach of courtesy. When asked for his reason, he candidly replied: "Because my chances for promotion would be greatly increased."

(3) Profiteering patriotism raises its bland features in spite of the need for war sacrifices. After the entry of the United States into the World War, the cry was raised, "Business as usual." But everyone knew that if the war was to be won, business could not go on as usual. Before the United States declared war, the dividends of certain companies which were

manufacturing war materials rose rapidly, and after our war declaration, the war profits of these firms created millionaires. One American openly and shamelessly boasted: "This war has surely been a fine thing for me. If it lasts two years, I will have made enough money to live in leisure the rest of my life."

Another profiteering patriot sold to the government shoddy clothing for the soldiers and sailors. Still another set up wooden images of the Kaiser, and playing upon the war feelings of the passers-by, invited them to "Swat the Kaiser"—for ten cents a throw. A theater owner subscribed heavily to one of the war funds and then advertised that fact widely. His theater drew unusually large crowds of people, who felt that they should patronize such an unusually generous proprietor and "patriot." The profiteer hoists the flag, but locks up coal in his mines while women and children suffer from the cold. He buys up foodstuffs and holds them while prices rise and people starve.

(4) Faddish patriotism gives benefit "teas" in war times, despite the fact that such affairs provide an unnecessary fourth meal. A young woman who wore a service star was found to have no nearer relative in the World War than a cousin whom she had never seen. She easily justified to herself this action on the grounds that "all the other girls are wearing service stars." In certain cases the carrying of flags upon the front of automobiles includes a degree of faddish patriotism. Shortly after the United States declared war in 1917, as high as forty per cent of automobiles carried flags, but six months later the proportion fell



to less than five per cent. In the meantime, however, the real patriotism of the people had greatly increased.

(5) Patriotism is sometimes adventuresome. The slogan, "Join the navy and see the world," recognizes the adventuresome element in patriotism. In the World War there were many young men that volunteered who stated that they were moved strongly by the desire to go abroad and see "the sights," and who were willing to take a risk in returning alive.

(6) Conspicuous patriotism exhausts itself in applauding the flag or in patriotic statements, but whines when asked to observe meatless days and to refrain from using wheat bread. It carries the flag, but secretly indulges in profiteering and self-indulgence. It is generally hypocritical; it evaporates in patriotic statements. The conspicuous patriot loudly abuses others for not going to war—when he knows that he can remain safe at home.

(7) Pacific patriotism is two-fold. (a) There are group members who believe in peace at any price. As practical citizens they are mistaken and sometimes dangerous. It is necessary in times of group crisis to be willing to fight to save those social values which the group through the slow process of time has acquired. As long as powerful national wolves are loose in the world, it is folly to believe in peace at any price. In such a case a nation may be called on to fight not only for itself but for the values which civilization has slowly and painfully constructed. Peace-at-any-price individuals possess a willingness to undergo hardships and even to die for the principles they represent. They frequently possess those fine moral

qualities which cannot be found in the loyal but truculent chauvinist.

(b) The other type of pacifist patriot tries all honorable methods of solving international controversies before resorting to war. In ordinary peace times practically every American would come within this category. Such persons believe in the principles of peace rather than of war as means of progress. In time of war, however, such a declaration is likely to be grossly misunderstood. At such a time any type of pacifist is anathema.

(8) Provincial patriotism is exaggerated partisanship. It praises the tenets of one political party and denounces the entire programs of other parties. It magnifies and places the interests of one section of the country ahead of the welfare of the whole nation. It measures long distances with the yard-stick that it uses in its own provincial area. It opposed the Louisiana Purchase and the acquisition of the Philippines. It would settle the Japanese problem in the United States irrespective of international justice. It would prevent our nation from functioning fully in the League of Nations. Today, as in the time of Epaminondas, there are too many provincial patriots in the world.

(9) Chauvinistic patriotism is dominated by watchwords and phrases. It is the direct descendant of the boastful attitudes of lower races. It wildly shouts, "My country, right or wrong," when its country may be already on the rocks. It forgets that the slogan, "My country, right or wrong," made Germany a menace to the world. It does not possess the courage

to face national evils and to assist constructively in righting maladjustments, thereby strengthening the nation.

(10) True national patriotism is based on the belief that there must be nation-groups as necessary intermediate structures between the family and the community on one hand and the world order on the other. It begins more or less irrationally and is closely connected with the accident of birthplace. One comes to love his native land, even though its faults may be many. Wherever one finds food and shelter and kindly ministrations, one feels patriotic.

True national patriotism is national love divorced from all selfish motives. It develops with the recognition that one's nation group is playing a rôle of unselfishness in the world. It is expressed not only in exciting war times, but in the most monotonous days of peace. True patriotism functions in both peace and war, but it is far more difficult to be patriotic in peace than in war. In the routine days of the work-a-day world, private interests press forward and command attention. As a result, the individual forgets to go to the polls, neglects to study the merits of candidates, fails to keep in touch with his representatives in legislative and administrative positions—in short, to be truly patriotic.

(11) Super-patriotism is a high order of true national patriotism. It gives all for the sake of its nation when fighting in a righteous cause. Super-patriots include the Joan of Arcs and the George Washingtons, the heroes of Zeebrugge and the Argonne, and the unknown, brave mothers and fathers

who have given up sons and daughters anywhere in a righteous national cause.

(12) Besides loyalty to family, to community, to nation-state, the trend of social evolution is producing another type of collective loyalty—internationalism. The world is now on the verge of forming an international consciousness and a sense of planetary values. President Wilson's now famous pleas for world-wide democracy and the organization of the friendship of the world are forerunners of the rise of a new world society.

Unfortunately, international patriotism is divided into two opposing types. (a) Industrial internationalism holds that the industrial classes throughout all countries should organize in a world order and renounce the existing national governments which are the tools of capitalism. Industrial internationalism is an outgrowth of Marxian socialism and closely allied to Bolshevism. Industrial internationalism fails to recognize that its program runs counter to the laws of social evolution and of democratic growth. No stable international order can be built on class consciousness alone. A permanent world structure cannot be suspended in mid-air, supported chiefly or only by individual, familial, or communal units.

(b) Democratic internationalism is scientifically founded. Upon individuals, the family rests. Upon family groups, the community, city, or province depends. Upon individuals, families, and communities, the nation relies. Upon all these constituent elements, and only so, an enduring world organization can be constructed. Ordinarily family loyalty fits harmoni-

ously into national loyalty, without disrupting or weakening the former. Similarly, there is no reason why national loyalty should suffer by locating it properly within the boundaries of democratic internationalism. An individual who has learned rationally to be loyal to his nation will be no less a national patriot by catching a vision of the larger internationalism.

Democratic internationalism is built upon the highest virtues and the best moral characteristics of the nation. It recognizes that points of view naturally vary in different national habitats. It would not destroy nations since they are selfish, for the same reason that a nation would not destroy its citizens because they likewise are selfish.

Democratic internationalism would dignify nationalism and make it a nobler sentiment. It would end economic conflict between nations for the same reason that such conflict was stopped between the colonies when the United States was formed.<sup>3</sup> It would eventually seal the doom of military and naval barriers between nations for the same reason that it has never been necessary to separate the United States from Canada by fortifications and dreadnoughts.

Planetary good feeling will develop concomitantly with a world-wide cultural uniformity and enlarged means of communication. While commerce and religion have strong international organizations, education is still represented on a world scale only by international congresses on various subjects.

(13) Traitorism is loyalty to an outside group. Traitorism takes several forms. It may show a hypo-

<sup>3</sup>Other phases of this type of international patriotism may be found in Chapter VI of *The New Patriotism* by C. E. Fayle.



critical loyalty to the country to which genuine loyalty is due, and a secret allegiance to some other country. It sometimes flies the flag but exploits the helpless group members. It squanders money in sinful living. It evades the payment of taxes. It frequently defies the laws of the nation.

In recent years, immigrants have migrated to the United States from European countries where both political and industrial autocracy ruled and where revolution seemed to be the only method to get justice. Some of these immigrants, feeling keenly a sense of economic injustice in our country, have undertaken to spread revolutionary propaganda throughout the land. But they are traitors. They fail to see that the ballot is open and that when they and others who are now fighting against social injustice show enough co-operative spirit to elect a president of the United States they can have their way in this country where majorities and pluralities rule. When the working men of this country manifest sufficient co-operative spirit to elect a workingman president of the nation, the power to rule will be in their hands. In view of such generous possibilities in our democracy, revolutionary propaganda is atrocious; revolutionary propagandists are traitors to the principles upon which our republic has been built, and to which loyal Americans pledge their fealty and lives.

Our people need to develop in these transition days a new respect for law and order—this is the greatest need of the new patriotism. Persons of high or low estate must increase their interest in public welfare. People must enlarge their national patriotism by par-

ticipating in the formation of a planetary spirit.

Further, philosophy and religion have formulated still more comprehensive group loyalties. For example, Christianity has dared to project a loyalty which includes not only the present world society, but also that unnumbered host who have run well and finished this earthly race: in fact a vast society of which the living earthly group is but a manifestation. Christianity has been so radical that unto familism, tribalism, nationalism, internationalism, it has added universalism in the sense of a loyalty to a society—the Kingdom of God—infinite in size and character, without beginning and without end.

## PROBLEMS

### (GENERAL)

1. What is group loyalty?
2. Should the chief basis for religious fellowship be "agreement in belief or agreement in ideal"?
3. Why does the morality of diplomacy and war lag behind the morality of individuals?
4. Why do woman's legal rights "lag behind her generally acknowledged moral rights"?
5. What is the social psychology of shibboleths and slogans?
6. What is *your* definition of patriotism?
7. Explain: "A great deal of so-called patriotism is but the crowd emotion of the nation."

### (THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PATRIOTISM)

8. Name and illustrate a type of patriotism

which is not discussed in this chapter.

9. Can a good patriot be a bad citizen?

10. How do you rate the patriotism in the sentiment: My country, right or wrong.

11. Distinguish between instinctive and reflective patriotism.

12. Do you agree with Thorstein Veblen's statement that "patriotism is useful for breaking the peace, not for keeping it."

13. What is "patrioteering"?

14. Should there be an international flag?

15. When is it easiest to be patriotic?

16. When is it the most difficult to be patriotic?

17. Distinguish between patriotism, nationalism, and internationalism?

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## CHAPTER XIV.

### GROUP CONTROLS

Individual initiative continually conflicts with group standards. As a consequence, the individual is subject to many types of social restraint. Although nearly all these social controls have arisen from past group experiences, they are not always adequate guides for limiting current individual action. Almost all the means for group regulation of individuals have evolved spontaneously, effectively, and slowly from human needs, and have been put into operation bunglingly. Social restraints have been exercised rarely to meet carefully ascertained group welfare. But nearly all possess more merit than their haphazard manner of development would imply.

Social pressures are essential to progress. Every group exercises control over its members as a matter of group self-protection and in order that the energy of the members may not be dissipated in socially disintegrating ways. It is an encouraging sign when a group does not rely absolutely upon the automatic use of controls, but begins to determine for its constituents constructive, telic, and socialized methods of change. It is a socially hopeful day when a group undertakes to diagnose itself, and upon the basis of that diagnosis, to establish consciously and wisely de-



terminated sets of social restraints and social encouragements.

Social controls are commonly too rigid in certain particulars, too lax in other ways, and too emotionally haphazard in nearly all regards. Since group pressures generally operate as objective instruments, the individual is occasionally misjudged, coerced unjustly, and inadvertently encouraged to foment social sedition. Often he is not properly stimulated to make his best contributions to his group and to society.

Consequently, from the standpoint of group welfare certain exceedingly vital questions must be faced. (1) In regard to any new movement, how much social control shall a group exercise? (2) What shall be the nature of this control? (3) By what methods shall it be applied? If too much pressure is exerted by the group, individual initiative is stifled and progress halted. If too little restraint is employed, group cohesion is endangered, and social chaos may result. The problem is not only one of quantity of control, but also a matter of quality of control and of the time of application. For example, what kind of control shall a parent use over a child who objectively is telling "stories," but subjectively is giving his imagination free rein? Shall the teacher use the same variety of control in handling a mischievous boy who is bubbling over with energy as in dealing with one who is deceitful? Shall society use the same controls in prescribing treatment for an obstreperous fanatic as for a delinquent corporation? Also, shall controls be applied bluntly, arbitrarily, belatedly, or shall they be exercised through the persons who are to be controlled, indi-

rectly, and in proper season? And fundamentally, what are the main agencies of social control?

1. *Agencies of Social Control.* (1) Customs and conventions are powerful social controls. They begin to influence the child from birth, or even from before birth. An infant is born into a maze of inherited traditions which determine his general development during the years of his helplessness. Parental customs and conventions largely determine the nature of his food, his earlier habits, and the stimulation or non-stimulation of his thought-life. As soon as he ventures from parental care, he finds himself in a network of established rules of conduct—in school, on the playground, at church.

The prestige of custom affects the adolescent tremendously. Ceremony and ritual combine to mold his habits and his feeling-attitudes. When an individual is initiated into either a fraternal or a religious organization, he is impressed, by means of the ritual, with the importance of the given organization, of the ideals of the group, and often of his own insignificance. When individuals regularly join together in singing, they become united and perhaps permanently socialized. Thus consciously and unconsciously they feel the force of ritual and ceremony.

Taboo is another custom—negative in nature—that operates as a powerful social control. “Thou shalt not” has been pronounced in relation to a thousand phases of life, all the way from primitive Tierra del Fuego to sophisticated London, and from the historic tablets of Moses to the forceful warnings of a mod-

ern Roosevelt. The taboo is enforced through the assertion that evil consequences will follow its violation. Thus, sometimes, the primitive lad is kept out of the cocoanut tree, the modern boy from the water-melon patch, and the adult in all climes from the broad road that leads to destruction.

(2) Practically every personal belief is a social control. From his family, play, school, and church life, the individual acquires personal beliefs which fundamentally affect his conduct. As a result of these beliefs he prides himself upon making his own decisions and upon being self-made, whereas the various groups of which he has been a member have in reality made many of his decisions for him—by their teachings and influence. He is not self-made to the extent that he believes and boasts. He is parent-made, school-made, playground-made, church-made to a degree which he little suspects or would cheerfully admit.

Personal religious beliefs, according to which the individual lives continually under the direction of an all-powerful Being whose eye "seeth in secret," function effectually.<sup>1</sup> Both law and public opinion can be evaded, but not a Judge who is all-seeing, all knowing, and all-powerful.

(3) Another potent social control is law, which is a phase of custom with present-day modifications. Since law is codified, it is especially commendable as a control. It is written with exactness, and hence is tangible, economical, and specific. It is highly pre-

<sup>1</sup>See the excellent chapters on this subject by E. A. Ross in his *Social Control*.

ventive, because its provisions can be published succinctly, far and wide, and with due notice regarding its methods of operation. It acts with certainty. Within general limits, given offences against society will be punished in specific ways, times, and places.

The weaknesses of law in exerting social pressures are many. It often acts with provoking slowness, allowing offenders to escape due punishment. It does not search out the subjective phases of conduct, and hence its judgments are sometimes misplaced, and sometimes they fail to reach the real causes of group offense. Its action is frequently paralyzed by the financial, social, or political power of the offender.

(4) The government is a mighty agent of control. In the United States under war conditions the government provided for the compulsory service of all men between certain ages, dealt vigorously with open or secret disloyalty, and censored the news and hence partially regulated public opinion. In Germany in peace times the government through its control of the educational system brought up a generation according to its pre-conceived aristocratic, military ideas. It is clear that to preserve the liberties of the individuals of the state, public educational institutions must be supplemented by equally powerful private educational institutions with freedom to criticize constructively the state itself and the social values. It is not so important to build a strong state control of citizens as it is to train strong individuals fundamentally imbued with a nation-state loyalty, and motivated by public interest more than by private advantage.

(5) Education represents a multitude of controls. Education through the schools, the press, and the platform, as well as through the other main social institutions, is the parent of all social controls. Unconscious and conscious imitation of ideas, beliefs, and feelings regulates the individual's conduct. The group, through education, can train its rising generation in any direction that it wills. Consequently, group education must not be determined by a small coterie of selfishly minded individuals but by the entire membership.

(6) Art wields an unconscious influence over individuals. The music of three centuries ago which sways multitudes today effectively molds current conduct. Through the feelings, music melts individuals and re-directs their energies. In hymns and songs people live over the joys, sorrows, and anticipations of past generations. Community singing and pagentry socialize individuals.

(7) Public opinion rules individuals.<sup>2</sup> Public opinion is the general background of the socially reflected self. The force of public opinion is so powerful that only the strongest minded persons can stand out against it. With the development of marvelous systems for the transmission of ideas, public opinion often gains cyclonic power.

Public opinion compels unpatriotic individuals to buy Liberty bonds, to respond cheerfully to special public service calls, to live better morally than their

<sup>2</sup>The advantages and disadvantages of public opinion as a form of control have been comprehensively discussed by E. A. Ross, *Social Control*, Ch. X, *Social Psychology*, Ch. XXII; by Tarde, *L'opinion et la foule*; by Sighele, *La foule criminelle*.



desires dictate, to meet regularly a minimum of group responsibilities. Public opinion functions immediately. Its siren voice of praise or blame sounds promptly after the individual acts. There is less delay than in the case of law.

Public opinion is an inexpensive method of regulating individuals. Public opinion requires no lawyer's fees; it works gratuitously. It is preventive, for people fear its onslaught and modify their conduct accordingly. It is more flexible than custom or law. It strikes ruthlessly into secret places and fearlessly ferrets out motives.

On the other hand, group opinion travels on the tongues of gossips and acquires greatly exaggerated forms under the influence of professional tale-bearers. It is not precise or codified. It muddles, distorts, and contradicts. It provokes people to violent rage and whimsical performances. It arouses people and sends them out with the hangman's noose in search of offenders. It produces vigorous denunciations that sometimes swiftly float away.

Public opinion rarely represents group unanimity. An offender can always find some group members in whose opinion his offense is condoned, excused, or even praised and applauded. When responsibility is shifted, as is done oftentimes in the case of corporate conduct, public opinion wavers, loses its force, and allows the guilty parties to escape its lash.

The agencies of social control are manifold, intricately related, and omnipresent. They operate continuously. They are in constant combat with individual initiative, invention, and freedom. They have

functioned primarily as repressive agents; they are becoming forces of social encouragement.

2. *Positive Versus Negative Social Control.* Negative group control is suppression of the individual by the group. Historically, society has stressed social inhibition rather than social inspiration. It has utilized fear rather than hope. It has compelled rather than inspired. It has impinged rather than stimulated. It has carried the rôle of "Thou shalt not." It has featured repression, prohibition, negation. The Hebrew commandments were negative controls. The Puritans established a set of negative controls over recreation and amusements. Nearly everywhere society has been content to throw offenders into dark, repressive jails. Parents are noted for their negative injunctions to children—"Don't do this," "Don't do that."

Society has an elaborate protective philosophy which is fully developed as a negative instrument. It applies opprobrious names to any individual who varies from group standards. Heretic, shyster, quitter, boner, knocker, tom-boy, sissy, fraid-cat, renegade, traitor—these are a few of the epithets which the group uses in order to protect itself. In the navy, the following terms illustrate the protective philosophy which serves corrective purposes: white mouse, handshaker, scoffer, scupper, rookie, bucker, a boat, a kick out. The immigrant must bear the following contact with protective philosophy: Dago, Hunkie, Sheeny, or Chink. Protective philosophy serves useful purposes, but easily vitiates the cause it represents when it takes an unjust form. Epithets when

applied to incoming immigrants who have not had the time or the opportunity to become adjusted are deplorable. They greatly hinder the cause of Americanization.

Negation alone is insufficient; it must be accompanied by opportunities for expression. If a child is acting wrong, that action proves that he possesses energy which is seeking an outlet. If that energy is dammed up with a prohibition, and no outlet provided, it will presently either break through the dam or go over the banks at some unsuspected weak place, causing harm to the individual himself and probably to others. If an adult commits a crime, that act indicates the presence of misdirected energy. If society merely shuts up the criminal in a dark jail, feeds him poorly, and gives him a hard place where he can not sleep, his energy will express itself through brooding and automatically produce a sense of injustice if not bolshevistic desires.

Positive social control is society's method of encouraging the expression of individual energy constructively. The wise parents find that to the degree which they become play directors for their children, the need for formal discipline diminishes. Likewise, when a city establishes a recreation park in a congested district, delinquency in that neighborhood decreases. When a manufacturing concern gives its employees representation upon managerial boards, industrial unrest largely disappears.

The positive protective philosophy of groups has been inadequately developed. The "hero" classification of positive terms is much smaller than the

“traitor” and “heretic” set of negative nomenclature. Further, the appeal to hope does not touch apparently as deep chords of human nature as does the fear of pain. Nevertheless, every group may well specialize upon its positive protective philosophy.

A primitive, emotional group must be ruled more or less arbitrarily—from above or from without—but an educated group can be controlled democratically—by releasing the many self-controlled springs of socio-rational interests of individuals. Positive social control endeavors to secure “the least total suffering, and then proportional suffering,” and finally, to further all the constructive processes of individual and social growth.

Groups have exercised social encouragement by awarding honors, degrees, and prizes. But these have made their appeal to the few. Society needs on a large scale to institute a program for inspiring every member. The masses need increased inspiration, not only to contribute to the welfare of their own groups, but to society. The masses need to be given constructive mass visions.

Positive social control is synonymous with the constructive phases of social teleosis. It seeks to discover the underlying principles of progress. It works out programs of advance. It stimulates all individuals everywhere to subordinate standards of individual success and power to ideals of societal welfare. It strives constantly to change all anti-social into social attitudes and activities.

On the other hand, negative social control often exercises inadequate, misplaced influence upon indi-

viduals. It has unintentionally made the need stand out strongly for positive social encouragement. It has caused social unrest. The underlying law of negative social control is that the more nearly social justice is obtained, the less the necessary quantity of negative social control.

Positive control will provide all individuals with a full opportunity for creative effort. It will stimulate initiative, invention, and leadership ability. It will transform imitators into inventors, enrich personalities with socialized desires, and crown society itself with new life and achievements.

## PROBLEMS

1. What is social control?
2. In what way have you felt the effect of group coercion?
3. Is more social control needed in a dense or in a sparse population?
4. In a homogeneous or a heterogeneous population?
5. In time of war or of peace?
6. In a society stratified by classes or in a society not so divided?
7. Why is it sometimes necessary for teachers to use "polite coercion" in order to get students to work?
8. In what particulars is there a high degree of social control in the United States today?
9. In what ways is there very little control in our country?



10. In what ways in the United States is more control needed? In what regards is less control needed?

11. What are the dangers of too much group control?

12. What happens when there is too little group control?

13. In what ways is public opinion the best method of control?

14. On what occasions does public opinion arise?

15. Is the sardonic newspaper cartoon more effective in moulding public opinion than the good-natured cartoon?

16. Which is the more effective in forming public opinion, the cartoon or the editorial?

17. What is the chief advantage of law as an agent of control?

18. Why are the laws in the United States often easily broken?

19. What is the strongest point of custom as a type of control?

20. Does a religious institution or a business organization bind "its members more closely to custom"?

21. Define: The protective philosophy of a group.

22. Explain: The tyranny of the majority.

23. Distinguish between "the tyranny of the majority" and "the fatalism of the multitude."

24. Is it true that the members of a small minority, no matter how meritorious its side of the question may be, are always called "traitors" and other scurrilous names, by an overwhelming majority?

25. Why are infamous names applied to refractory members of a group?

26. How generally are individuals aware of being under group control?

27. Wherein would lie the need for social control if every member of society were completely socialized?

28. Explain: The state is more rapacious than it allows its citizens to be.

29. Who are the professionals whose business it is to maintain the social order?

30. Distinguish between caste control in India and class control in the United States.

31. Which standards do people think about the more: Those of their own group, those of the class above them, or those of the class below them?

32. What is the best way to estimate the volume of social control at any time in a given society?

33. Is there reason to believe that in years to come social control will be more necessary in the United States than now?

34. Is persecution a good method of controlling individuals?

35. Is there a larger place for authority in settling public questions than in settling private questions?

36. Is it wrong to punish those who persist in folly that hurts only themselves?

37. Illustrate: "There never has been a society that did not tolerate or approve some conduct that was bad for it."

38. Which has the greater influence in developing a student, a large university or a small college?

39. Why is education "the most efficient form of social control in modern society"?

40. What would be the effect on progress of no

social control?

41. Explain: "We who would like to love our neighbors as ourselves are maintaining systems of social control that actually prevent us from doing so."

42. Give an original illustration which distinguishes between positive and negative social control.

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## CHAPTER XV.

### SOCIAL CHANGE AND PROGRESS

1. *Elements in Social Change.* Groups like individuals rarely remain stationary—they are either retrograding or advancing. If they are generating energy, they are going forward evolutionarily or revolutionarily.

Too much social restraint produces a social crust and social stupefaction. If there be sufficient individual vitality and initiative, unrest will ensue, revolutions will foment, and the social crust will be broken. Hence, through revolutions with all the attendant suffering, loss of life, and chaos, the group may progress. If individual enterprise be too weak, and if the body politic be too flabby, then the crust will continue to increase in thickness until group life is smothered. On the other hand, if too little or too inadequate control be employed, the centrifugal forces will gain undue power, anarchistic and bolshevistic tendencies will increase, and social disintegration will likely follow.

There are two main forms of group change and progress—the slow and the rapid, the quiet and the disturbing, the natural and the abnormal, the evolutionary and the revolutionary. If the leaders possess common sense, patience, flexibility, and a social vision,



the natural and normal evolutionary method of growth will prevail. With an educated membership and socially wise leaders, revolutions are unnecessary.

While customs afford group continuity and constitute social heredity, they must not be permitted to impinge too much or to extend their authority beyond their usefulness. Customs must not be allowed to grow too many tentacles or to grip too hard. Although traditions are vital to group unity and progress, yet they may stifle the very spirit which gave them their original power. All similar tendencies must likewise be guarded against if evolutionary processes are to swing clear of obstacles.

An evolutionary society maintains and encourages the spirit of constructive criticism. Outworn ideas often become deeply cherished in human hearts or firmly entrenched behind brusque fortifications. If a group would grow steadily, it should maintain a welcome and a fair hearing for new ideas. It is human nature to accord grudgingly an open mind to new and disturbing ideas. It has been well said that one of the greatest pains in the world is the pain of a new idea, but it is to such ideas that evolutionary societies must grant hearings. History is full of painful new ideas which have been ultimately accepted. Note these:

That the earth is round;

That slavery should be abolished;

That women should vote;

That a League of Nations should be established;

That laboring men should organize;

That everybody should work.

Migration is a leading cause of gradual social change. When an individual moves from Iowa to California he leaves behind him much of the old furniture and accumulated bric-a-brac and some of the old traditions. From the moment of his arrival he is frequently "shocked." Former methods of acting are found to be out of place in the new environment. One by one and at tremendous mental cost changes are made. Five years later, newcomers from Iowa are astounded at the changes which have occurred in the lives of their former neighbors, who have been forced to respond to the call of new life-conditions. If people migrate in the early years of life, then the new elements in the adopted home region are acquired with alacrity.

Often the newcomers bring new ideas. Sometimes immigration will awaken a stagnant community. At any rate there is usually a wholesome interstimulation between immigrant and native which gives a new spirit to the one or the other, and thus to the entire community.

Imitation is essential to evolutionary change. As pointed out in an earlier chapter, no one imitates a copy exactly. In each imitation, modification occurs. These changes small in the particular are powerful and world moving in the aggregate. Again, imitation is the process by which new ideas and inventions spread from one individual to another, and from group to group.

Invention is normally a part of evolution. New ideas are the initial centers of change. From these centers the elements of progress normally pulsate and

produce irregular but continual advances.

Revolutionary change comes only and belatedly when the methods of evolution fail. If provisions in a dynamic society are not made for group changes, then the suppressed forces will foment, and gathering momentum, will burst the bonds of undue suppression. Progress may ultimately result, but the cost of the explosion in terms of human suffering and social damage will be excessive.

Individuals in positions of group authority sometimes shortsightedly find it advantageous to make the group organization static. Then they encyst themselves in this organization, and having gormandized, they naïvely rest—until the social explosion comes and the “top” of society is blown off. Then comes an upsetting of the social equilibrium, a period of chaos which does not end until a new social order is obtained. While such a revolution makes some gains, it produces disrespect for law and order and thus fosters new evils.

Whenever social institutions become inflexible, the forces of revolution begin to move. In dynamic groups there are four causes of revolution. (1) Intellectual stagnation at the top holds back a whole institution, even a nation, until the mentally suppressed but alert can gain control. Sometimes a military program fails because those at the head are incompetents. Individuals in authority often lack the mental vision to encompass the changes which are brought by a new era, but remain in power—until thrust aside. Preceding the French Revolution, an intellectual and privileged class developed a “rigid organism.” In

order to get into this crusted aristocracy, it was necessary for an individual to have sixteen noble ancestors. This rigidity was a leading cause of the social explosion which is generally called the French Revolution.

(2) Political autocracy caused the American Revolution. The American colonists protested time and again against the traditional rules of political unfairness which England had arbitrarily imposed. But King George would not heed, and hence the Revolution was inevitable.

(3) Economic oligarchy is often a powerful adjunct of political autocracy in causing revolutions. In Russia for centuries an economic oligarchical rule had become politically enthroned. The forces of discord gained sufficient strength to attempt a revolution in 1905, but failed. Their shattered hopes were reorganized, and gaining momentum, completely upset the established rule of special privilege in 1917.

(4) Religious cant and dogmatism have been the causal elements in one bitter church schism after another. Religious dogmatism has often ruled nations, especially where the church and state have been combined in authority. The church when in positions of state control has tended to become inflexible. Witness the work of the Spanish Inquisition. The conservatism of the Church of Rome produced Lutheranism; and of the Church of England, Puritanism and Wesleyanism.

In recent years in England whenever the agencies of revolt gain sufficient strength to threaten a serious disturbance of the government, a Lloyd George appears with concessions strong enough to satisfy temporarily

the liberals and yet of such character that the conservatives begrudgingly grant them. The situation then runs somewhat smoothly until another social disturbance occurs. Thus England today is advancing by skillful adjustments between the forces of evolution and revolution, and proves again the dictum of Turgot that "well-timed reform alone averts revolution."

As a method of procedure, violence breeds violence. Revolution creates more revolution—and the end may be the destruction of the virtues of civilization as well as the evils. Revolutionists, as professionals, are prone to fatten on social evils, even when these maladjustments are not fundamental. Revolutionists, after overthrowing an old order, often prosper by living upon the economic fruits of a disinherited oligarchy. But the day comes when these confiscated gains are exhausted, and the revolutionists, having failed to build up a stable order, are in a state of mutual distrust and anarchy. Then, progress must be courted over and over again by the slow processes of evolution.

A group tends to exert the greatest pressure upon its most vigorous members—without always distinguishing between its benefactors and its enemies. It viciously crushes out its conscientious objectors without observing that nearly all these persons possess the very courage which makes any group strong. By fiendish methods of suppression the group sows the seeds of discontent and revolution.

2. *A Theory of Social Progress.* Throughout this book definite hints have been given from the viewpoint of social psychology of a theory of social prog-



ress. In these concluding pages this theory will be summarized and stated more exactly. Social progress is determined by the amount, quality, and methods of social control, and upon the extent, quality, and persistence of individual initiative, inventiveness, and leadership. It depends upon the kind and degree of encouragement and inspiration as well as of restraint which the group exercises over its members.

Social progress is the result of a constructive conflict between individual leadership and social control. These two factors are in constant interaction. Upon the basis of the cultural development of his day, the individual comes upon accidentally or after a carefully directed search finds or invents a new idea or method. The new mode must pass the test of social criticism. If its adoption means the rejection of traditional standards, then a conflict ensues. The new is championed by enthusiastic leaders; the old, likewise, is championed by chivalrous defenders. The conflict may be long drawn out, as in the case of the fight over prohibition; or it may be short and swift, as in the debate in our Congress over conscription.

If the proposed activity is genuinely superior to the established procedure, and if the group is characterized by a fair degree of flexibility, then the new will win its way to general acceptance. Upon the basis of this new cultural advance, still better ideas and methods will be discovered and invented, and the process described in the preceding paragraph will be repeated. Thus, the individual initiates, invents, and leads; and the group adopts and supports.

Conflict is a disturbing but necessary element both in

individual and in group progress. It is conflict which awakens individuals and makes them active. Conflict gives zest to life, drives away *ennui*, and prompts the creative expressions of personality.

Conflict must not occur between social forces that are markedly unequal, lest the weaker be destroyed and the stronger grow flabby through lack of strenuous competition. To be most advantageous, conflict must occur between nearly equal forces. Conflict should not be suppressed altogether, but socially controlled—upon the grounds of relative equality and of social productivity.

Conflict must be held within the bounds of social rules or else it will inevitably and quickly descend to the levels of prejudice and brutality. Social regulations must keep conflict upon productive planes and raise it from level to level—physical, mental, spiritual, in order.

Within groups, conflicts must be kept alive between the official and the unofficial forces. Private associations must be free to compete with the public, or governmental organizations. The political party in power needs continuously to face the honest criticism of parties not in power. Governmental and private ownership of economic enterprise are both essential. Neither in itself alone contains all the elements of sustained progress. One works for the public interest and the other fosters private initiative. But with all the economic resources owned and operated by the government a powerful class control would result and individual initiative would decrease. With all economic resources owned by a few gigantic interlocking

monopolies, the government would be shackled economically and public welfare would be rendered subservient to the caprices of the privileged few. Under either set of circumstances group retrogression would sooner or later take place. The dual existence of public and private economic organizations must be maintained. Neither complete socialism nor complete individualism alone will guarantee progress; neither by itself allows for that degree of conflict and widespread stimulation which is essential to prolonged group advancement.

In all fields of human endeavor private associations are needed to experiment with new ideas, to initiate new movements, and to prod up the public agents, keeping them upon levels of efficiency. The public, or official, organizations are needed to represent all factions and to carry forward activities which all agree upon. The competition between these two types of social structures will be widely beneficial and mutually helpful if socially harnessed and directed.

In a similar way the progress of the world depends upon a balanced co-operation between large, or national units, and the international group, or mankind. Any world order is clearly unstable that rests upon fifty sovereign groups, each deciding what is right, honorable, and just for the other forty-nine, and each regulated in its actions by no inclusive authority. The nature of human progress during the past millennium indicates the need for a set of generally accepted planetary values, a thriving world opinion, an organization of the friendship of the world, and a smoothly functioning League of Nations. A telic program

along democratic lines for world harmony, justice, and progress is imperative. If it is necessary and wise to form judicious plans for the individual, the industrial corporation, the church, the nation-state, how much greater is the need and the wisdom of consciously making provision for world progress?

National conflicts must not continue upon the destructive levels of physical combat, secret alliances, balances of power, competitive consumption, but upon the slowly ascending inclines of productive competition and social benefit. The national units must each give a portion of its power to a world-inclusive organization, which shall make the rules for all conflicts and competitions. Each shall then play according to the rules of the world society and within the bounds determined by economically productive and socially meritorious standards.

Any group of individuals must determine, if it would wisely progress, the direction which its development may best take. It must decide upon the types of control it shall use for different individual members. It must stress positive control, putting liberal premiums upon individual initiative, new ideas, methods, and inventions along its chosen paths of development. The highest lines of telic advance for any group lie in the direction of world-wide human welfare.

Such a trend involves the rise of "sociocratic" thinking, according to which all processes, even the most intellectual, must be subordinated to the socialized needs of human beings. Sociocratic thinking results in a willingness to recognize and encourage ability wherever found—under any color of skin or on any

social level. Sociocratic thinking leads to active democracy. Sociocratic thinking and acting produce rich and well-balanced personalities.

## PROBLEMS

1. Are the needs of the individual always in line with group advancement?
2. Are the needs of the nation always in the direction of world progress?
3. Explain: "When everybody thinks alike, nobody thinks at all."
4. Why is it unwise to be either an "individualist" or a "socialist" in matters involving human progress?
5. Does life in the United States today stifle one's opportunities for believing and judging, and increase one's opportunities for doing and enjoying?
6. Illustrate natural social progress.
7. Illustrate telic social progress.
8. What is the chief cause of social revolution?
9. What is the greatest danger in revolution?
10. What is the main advantage of social evolution?

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